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The mill and town today
Three times a day sirens wail across the Bai Bang mill and adjacent Phong
Chau township announcing the end of  an eight hour shift. The new shift has
already arrived and replaces the workers as they leave their machines. In this
way, the mill has been able to operate at, and even slightly exceed, its maximum
production capacity in recent years.
The 600 workers of  the finished shift make their way through the mill to the
main gate. They leave their well maintained buildings and machines, and
walk past the landscaped and manicured gardens towards their bicycles and
motorbikes. From the new administration building, an imposing three storey
structure of  tinted glass and aluminium, the General Manager can observe
the exodus. He will leave later to join some of  the other managers for tennis
at the Swedish camp.
The stainless steel main gate retracts at the push of  a button and the workers
depart. Most are on foot as they live nearby. Others are on bicycles or
motorbikes, although few live more than 3 kilometres from the mill. They are
well dressed and cheerful, happy to have a secure job in a profitable state
enterprise. Nobody quits at the mill.
The road from the mill immediately greets Phong Chau township. Shops line
the main street, which goes directly up a hill for about 1 kilometre to a T-
intersection: left to Hanoi, right to Tuyen Quang province and, eventually,
China. About 100 metres from the mill gate is the local hotel, an ugly Soviet-
style building with a miserable quality of  service. The mill owns and runs this
hotel, while the local government owns and runs the former Swedish camp.
Next to the hotel is an enclosed public swimming pool, 25 metres in length.
The hotel and the pool were built out of  the mill’s ‘social fund’.
Just past the hotel and down a small alley is the market of  about 100 stalls.
Fresh fish, meat and vegetables are plentiful. Prices are about one third less
than those in Hanoi. Workers and other townsfolk can buy a wide variety of
consumer goods including toiletries, clothes and electrical goods. Most of
these items come from China, but some are made in Vietnam and others
smuggled in from Thailand.
The shops lining the road up the hill are mostly selling electrical goods. There
is a film processing shop and a karaoke bar. Most buildings on the street are
two storey, and those off  the street one storey. All are made of  brick, which
was not always the case. Only 20 years ago, about 90 per cent of  Phong Chau
houses were cottages with thatch roofs and mud walls. It was a desperately
poor area, like most of  northern Vietnam.
At the top of  the hill, mill managers turn left toward the most attractive housing
in the township. These are a series of  streets with double storey cottages and
small gardens about 1 kilometre from the T-intersection – just across the road
from the Swedish camp. The roads are sealed and the houses are well
maintained. Here also is the gymnasium, an enclosed stadium about the size
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of  a basketball court. The Bai Bang social club – sedate dancing and
karaoke – is part of  the complex. These are also recent constructions funded
from the mill’s ‘social fund’ and finished just in time for the celebration of  15
years of  mill production in November 1997.
The Swedish camp looks down upon the gymnasium from the other side of
the main road. Although rarely full, it remains in use as a weekend retreat for
Hanoi expatriates. The swimming pool is maintained, the tennis court lights
work and ‘Western meals’ – mashed potatoes and schnitzels – can be arranged.
Two of  the four-bedroom villas, and many more of  the smaller units, remain.
Termites ate the rest. It is a tranquil and pleasant setting – a far cry from
when over 700 Swedes, Finns and other foreigners crowded into it.
The camp area has been reduced over the years. It was initially about twice
its present size. The barbecue area is now overgrown, like the lower tennis
court. Swedes – mostly former workers on the project – still come and stay,
sometimes as tourists and sometimes on business. The plans to expand the
mill in the near future have drawn some back with an eye on selling equipment
and services.
Casual observation, along with the many anecdotal stories of  Swedes and
Vietnamese, gives a strong impression of  a mill that has brought great
prosperity to the area. Today Phong Chau town stands out as a pocket of
wealth in what remains a relatively poor province.
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Summary
Bai Bang is Sweden’s largest, most expensive and longest running
development cooperation project
In 1974 Sweden began its largest development cooperation project – the Bai
Bang project in Vietnam. The project involved construction of  an integrated
pulp and paper mill at Bai Bang about 100 kilometres north of  Hanoi, and
provision of  the necessary infrastructure and training support to ensure a
successful handover to Vietnamese management. Its overall objective was to
raise Vietnamese living standards by providing a domestic production capacity
to satisfy Vietnam’s paper needs. From 1974 to 1995 Sweden committed about
SEK2.8 billion (SEK6.5 billion in 1996 prices) to the project (mill and forestry)
including side projects covering housing, transport and vocational training.
Bai Bang represented an enormous development cooperation challenge
The project involved establishing a capital intensive industrial complex in a
poor, labour intensive, centrally planned economy. The Vietnamese economy
at the time was seriously depleted, after years of  war, of  functioning
infrastructure, skilled labour and materials, and had no recent experience of
how Western style construction and management systems operated.
The achievements at Bai Bang documented in this evaluation are impressive
and have been registered against considerable odds. They reflect Swedish
perseverance and willingness to progressively commit more and more resources
to overcome a succession of  obstacles which threatened the project. And this
perseverance and generosity was matched by Vietnamese determination and
optimism to ensure that Bai Bang was successful.
The mill today
The mill is profitable and pays high wages though liquidity is low
The mill is trading profitably and meeting its taxation obligations – assisted
by a 40 per cent tariff  and occasional prohibitions on imported paper. Sales
growth in recent years has been strong – all of  which is to the domestic market.
Average wages of  mill workers are about double those of  other state enterprise
workers and living conditions of  workers are excellent. The mill has low debts
and a strong net asset base though business liquidity is low. Having received
its capital as an aid transfer, the mill does not have to make a commercial
return on this capital. This greatly improves the mill’s prospects for achieving
longer term financial viability.
xviii
Mill management structures and performance are superior to normal
Vietnamese practice
Swedish experts introduced conventional Western style management principles
with a Scandinavian flavour of  equity and caring. It was not until 1989 when
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy began in earnest that these principles
could be effectively applied. Management practices at Bai Bang are admired
throughout the state owned enterprise sector.
The mill lacks financial independence,
which is a threat to its longer term viability
Bai Bang mill is a member company of  the Vietnam Paper Corporation (VPC),
a general corporation controlling the country’s largest pulp and paper mills.
VPC regulates the activities of  these mills, restricting competition between
them. Bai Bang is constrained from operating as an independent profit
maximising business. VPC uses Bai Bang’s profits to cross-subsidise other less
profitable mills and controls its input purchases, product pricing and investment
decisions.
The paper mill is now operating at full capacity
Paper production has climbed rapidly since 1994 assisted by new investment,
operational changes and pulp imports. Production in 1996 of  57␣ 000 tonnes
exceeded the design capacity of  55␣ 000 tonnes.
The pulp mill is functioning below design capacity
Pulp mill production is at 44␣ 000 tonnes per year compared with planned
capacity of  48␣ 000 tonnes. Chip size and quality are highly variable – which
reduces pulp quality – and losses are high. A loss of  digester time through
steam shortages has constrained production below capacity.
A shortage of  steam is the biggest constraint to production. The whole mill
runs or stops according to the performance of  the power boiler. The installation
of only one boiler was a major design fault.
The chemical plant functions well
Chemical production exceeds mill requirements. Surplus chemicals are sold
to earn mill revenue.
Paper quality is improving
The mill makes 16 basis weights from 52 to 120 gsm. Quality is being
continually upgraded – but further improvements are needed to withstand
import competition in an increasingly demanding domestic market. Domestic
consumers have a generally favourable view of  Bai Bang paper.
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Forestry operations
The profitability of forestry operations is low
Vinh Phu Raw Materials Company (VPMC) has responsibility for forestry
operations and holds a monopoly under the direction of  VPC on supplying
logs to the Bai Bang mill. VPMC makes a small profit and a modest
contribution to government revenue in a heavily regulated commercial
environment. Decision making processes at VPMC are Vietnamese in nature
with little evidence of  a Swedish influence.
A professional plantation program is in place and
log supplies are now adequate for mill needs
A professional program of  evaluation of  species, silvicultural techniques and
propagation methods, coupled with the dissemination of  information to
growers, has been established around the Forest Research Centre near Bai
Bang. Improvements in land tenure arrangements – which have authorised
the allocation of  state forest land to private individuals, land contracts with
revenue sharing arrangements between farmers and VPMC, state subsidies,
a growing awareness of  the environmental advantages of  reforestation and
greatly improved incentives for forest workers – have led to a massive expansion
in tree planting.
Housing and transport side projects have fulfilled their aims
The housing side project has provided a high standard of  community living
conditions making Bai Bang an attractive place to live and work in. The
transport side project, by substantially enhancing the efficiency of  mill
operations, has played a critical role in the successful functioning of  the mill.
Economywide impact
The mill has a substantial impact on the regional economy
The mill, as the largest enterprise in Phong Chau district of  Phu Tho province,
contributes substantially to local business activities through purchase of  local
inputs, paper sales for further processing and spending of  mill wages by workers
and their families. The mill also makes a significant contribution to local
infrastructure – by supporting schools, medical facilities and the environment,
and the provision of  electricity and water, roads and leisure facilities. About
VND42 billion per year is injected into the forest supply regions through log
purchases.
But the economywide impact of the mill is small
Through its effects on employment, import replacement and government
revenue we estimate that the mill generated, in 1996, about VND465 billion
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of  national income (real GDP increase of  0.18 per cent). This supported
about VND217 billion of  additional private consumption (0.1 per cent
increase, which is equivalent to VND2900 per citizen). The mill contributed
about VND63.3 billion in additional government revenue (the mill accounts
directly for 0.085 per cent of  government revenue). The mill made a positive
contribution to the balance of  trade of  VND445 billion.
While these figures seem large in absolute terms, they are small in relation to
economywide totals – the mill represents only 0.09 per cent of  Vietnam’s
GDP and mill forestry requirements are less than 1 per cent of  Vietnam’s
forestry production.
Mill and forestry wage income is distributed
in favour of males employed at the mill
Mill and forestry combined employed 5509 full time workers in 1996 – 2858
at the mill and 2651 in forestry. Sixty-six per cent of  mill workers were males
and 34 per cent females. Seventy per cent of  the mill’s wage bill went to males
and 30 per cent to females. The average wage earned by females is about 10
per cent less than for males, reflecting a higher percentage of  females in lower
wage categories. Fifty-six per cent of  salaried forestry workers were males
and 44 per cent females. Wages of  mill workers are about 3.5 times the average
forestry worker wage. This reflects the much higher value product of  mill
labour.
About 54 per cent of  mill and forestry wage income accrues to male mill
workers, 24 per cent to female mill workers, 12 per cent to male forestry
workers and 10 per cent to female forestry workers.
Contribution to human resource
capacity building
The project’s contribution to human resource
capacity building has been substantial
A comprehensive and highly successful human resource capacity building
program was undertaken. On-the-job training was provided to thousands
of  construction workers – many of  whom took their skills elsewhere in the
economy. An effective vocational training school was established. The school
now trains workers for all Vietnam’s paper mills (1200 trainees are working
in other mills) and by the end of  1997 had provided over 20␣ 000 person
courses. Transfer of  knowledge programs to enable Vietnamese handover
were conducted. And training of  forest workers has occurred on a large
scale.
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Training has made workers more productive
The various training initiatives have left behind a mill workforce with high
skill levels (45 per cent are currently classified as skilled and 42 per cent as
semi-skilled). Skills training is highly prized and is needed for workers to
advance professionally.
Indicators of  the value of  the training are provided by the high wages of  mill
workers, a mill now running at full capacity and the high demand for places
at, and graduates from, the vocational training school. Training has also
improved the life choices and social position of  workers.
The legacy of the Scandinavian management model is strong
Exposure to the Scandinavian management model has allowed the mill to
flourish since the advent of  doi moi. And exposure to the Scandinavian
management model at Bai Bang influenced a Vietnamese policy institution
which played a major role in the formulation of  the economic and state
enterprise reforms.
Social and cultural impact
Worker living standards have been improved substantially
The project has delivered a substantial and sustained improvement in the
living standards of  mill workers. The Phong Chau district around the Bai
Bang mill stands out as a pocket of  wealth in a poor province. Mill workers
are prosperous. They enjoy high wages, improved access to consumer goods,
improved health, housing, transport, education and training opportunities,
and a rich cultural life. Township businesses are sharing in this prosperity.
Living standards of forestry workers have also improved sharply
The presence of  the mill has raised forest worker living standards considerably
above those of  local farmers – which is the relevant comparison. Improved
land tenure arrangements have extended the benefits to private farmers willing
to grow logs for the mill. But more needs to be done to improve the health of
women forest workers.
The benefits have been delivered without
creating significant social problems
Apart from some disquiet about the increasing social differentiation between
households and the large gap between the wages of  mill and forestry workers,
mill activities have not been accompanied by increased social problems.
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The benefits have been shared by both Kinh and ethnic minorities
Ethnic minorities in the forest regions have participated in the benefits – with
some training courses designed specifically for their participation. Although
traditional lifestyles have changed, most regard the change in livelihood –
from shifting agriculture to stable farming and tree growing – as beneficial to
family welfare. There is no evidence of  overt discrimination against ethnic
minorities.
But the number of beneficiaries is small
Around 25␣ 000 jobs are being sustained by the mill – mill and forestry
employment and employment in closely dependent industries. This number
is small relative to the region’s population and the large injection of  donor
funds. Pulp and paper mills are extremely capital intensive.
A showcase Western style mill management system, and trust and
openness in dealing with outsiders are enduring Swedish influences
Language barriers and bureaucratic restrictions inhibited cultural exchange
in the early years of  the project. And social tensions arose from time to time.
Both Swedes and Vietnamese persevered to overcome social tensions.
There is enduring goodwill to Sida and the Swedish people who worked on
the project. Styles of  work and management are the key attributes learned
from the Swedes. And trust and openness in dealing with foreigners is an
important Swedish legacy.
Social costs and benefits
The mill provides social benefits through a number of avenues
The mill contributes to Vietnamese living standards through a number of
pathways. It generates profits and makes taxation payments to the government.
It pays more for logs than their value in other uses. Hillside rehabilitation through
planting trees adds to agricultural production. Workers earn more than they
would get in other activities. Social services are provided to the wider community.
Many people trained at the mill are employed elsewhere.
The mill also imposes social costs
Some social costs are imposed through mill emissions. While the mill is dirty
by one US standard, it is clean by Asian standards and even by other Western
standards. The available evidence suggests that at current levels of  production
the environment can absorb the effluent.
And, because of  the tariff  on imported paper, consumers are paying a higher
price than necessary for their paper.
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Social benefits exceed social costs
Our estimates suggest net social benefits in 1996 of  between VND21␣ 796
million (which assumes that, in the absence of  the mill, consumers could import
paper at world prices) and VND143␣ 668 million (which assumes that, in the
absence of  the mill, the tariff  on imported paper would still be in place to
protect other mills). This translates to benefits of  between US$2.2 million
and US$13 million.
Future financial viability
Mill profits are most sensitive to the price
of paper and domestic pulp production
The domestic price of  paper – which is influenced by the world price in foreign
currency, the exchange rate between the dong and foreign currency, and the
tariff  on imported paper – is a critical determinant of  mill profitability. The
production of  domestic pulp, which is cheaper than imported pulp, is also an
important determinant of  profitability.
The mill could survive without tariff protection
If  domestic pulp production could be increased to design capacity, unit cost
reductions of  about 5 per cent would be needed for the mill to remain profitable
without tariff  protection. But if  pulp production remains at current levels,
cost reductions of  about 11 per cent are needed. There are numerous
opportunities for the mill to reduce costs.
New investments and independence from
VPC could make the mill’s future secure
If  the mill did not have to pay into VPC’s depreciation fund, its profits and
ability to fund new investments would increase significantly. New investment
– in a power boiler and in paper production capacity to achieve 100␣ 000
tonnes of  paper per year – could be profitably funded by an independent Bai
Bang mill, even if  it was still required to meet the depreciation ‘tax’. For the
mill to fund this new investment and break even in an environment of  no
tariff  protection, a 10 per cent reduction in unit costs of  production is needed.
And the mill would be in a strong position to withstand exchange rate
fluctuations and increases in the price of  logs.
Achievement of objectives
All stated objectives for the main project and side projects have been met
The mill, under Vietnamese management, is producing paper at maximum
capacity and is making a positive contribution to Vietnamese living standards.
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Forestry operations are on a sustainable basis – with positive environmental
benefits. Mill employees enjoy high housing standards. Transport problems
experienced in the early stages of  the project have been largely overcome.
Implicit political objectives are also likely to have been met
Through the project Sweden was able to demonstrate its support for the
Vietnamese people to end foreign intervention in Vietnam. And knowledge
gained about Vietnam’s institutional, social, political and economic structures
was valuable to Sweden. The knowledge and goodwill created by Sweden’s
commitment to the project earned Sweden an important ‘place at the table’
as a trusted source of  advice on Vietnam’s economic transition. The project
also promoted Swedish commercial objectives – 85 per cent of  project outlays
were paid to Swedish companies.
Whether Sweden got value for money depends on what the alternative
uses of the funds were and the valuation placed on the broader and
more intangible benefits of the project
If  the Swedish money spent on Bai Bang had been invested instead and the
interest used to finance general imports by Vietnam, the amount available to
finance imports would have been several times the estimated net benefit of
the mill in 1996. But this is a crude and impractical benchmark. It is likely
that the real value of  resources transferred to Vietnam was considerably less
than Sida project outlays. And there are important spillover effects of  the
project, which have not been captured in the quantitative analysis. The values
Sweden places on implicit objectives of  the project and how well they are
judged to have been met are important determinants of  the value for money
assessment.
Project’s relevance
Vietnam’s paper needs are increasing rapidly
Per capita consumption of  paper is closely related to per capita income. With
its rapid income growth, Vietnam’s paper requirements will also increase
rapidly. These must be met by domestic production and/or imports. Whether
paper production at the mill is an efficient use of  Vietnamese resources is a
key consideration in the project’s relevance.
Vietnam has a comparative advantage in growing pulp logs – high rainfall
mountain land with low value alternative uses to forestry and a hardworking,
low income mountain area workforce. A capital intensive mill may therefore
still be consistent with the country’s strong comparative advantage in labour
intensive activities.
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But the mill must adapt to operate without import protection
The protection against imports enjoyed by the paper mill sector of  Vietnam
is inconsistent with efficient resource use. But the restrictions on the mill’s
commercial activities imposed by VPC restricts its ability to make excess profits
through import protection. As paper protection is phased out under Vietnam’s
international trading agreements, the mill will need to achieve significant cost
efficiencies to remain profitable. Further reforms to state owned enterprises
which allow the mill to function as a truly independent financial enterprise
will be necessary for it to remain viable over the longer term without protection.
Lessons – understanding conditions
for sustainable development
Bai Bang is an example of sustainable development cooperation
Mill activities are technically sound and financially viable when the original
capital costs are treated as sunk. Pollution is small and forestry activities are
sustainable and delivering environmental benefits. Skills training is addressing
the industry’s human capital needs. Against many expectations, Bai Bang is
an example of  a sustainable development cooperation project.
The Bai Bang experience contains a number of important lessons
Policies and institutions matter a lot. Changes brought about by doi moi – land
tenure reforms, more liberal pricing, performance based remuneration, and
more open trade and exchange rate policies – are important reasons why the
mill and forestry are sustainable. The project helped the reform process – and
it was fortunate for the project that the reforms occurred.
Perseverance and commitment pay. Support at the highest level is needed for
projects of  the size of  Bai Bang to succeed. And perseverance and optimism
on both sides is needed – Swedish determination was matched by that of  the
Vietnamese.
Receptivity and flexibility are important. Mechanisms for adjusting project
elements to accommodate shifting priorities and profound changes in the
project environment are needed. This requires effective structures for
interaction between cooperating partners.
Research is essential. Detailed information on the physical and socioeconomic
context for a project is needed before initiation if  large cost overruns are to be
avoided.
Local ownership of  projects is essential. Handing operational responsibility
to the recipient with donor involvement shifting to the provision of  advice
creates good incentives for success.
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Cultural differences should be prepared for. Good management of  cultural
issues speeds progress. This may require training of  advisors and foreign
workers.
Conditions for sustainable development
The Bai Bang experience has demonstrated that improvements in economic
wellbeing in developing countries has as much to do with institutions, policies
and building human capital as it does with transfers of  physical capital.
11 Introduction
IN 1969 VIETNAMESE AND SWEDISH government officials began
discussions on possible Swedish aid to Vietnam’s industrial sector. At that
time Vietnam viewed the acquisition of  state of  the art industrial technology
as a key ingredient to its economic development. Forestry land was available
and Vietnam was also seriously in need of  paper for educational and other
purposes.
The outcome was the so-called Bai Bang project, which aimed to improve
living standards through expanding domestic paper production in the Bai
Bang region, about 100 kilometres from Hanoi. The project involved the
construction of  an integrated pulp and paper mill, and the provision of  the
necessary physical infrastructure, forestry and training support to ensure a
successful handover to Vietnamese management.
Bai Bang was designed as a development cooperation rather than turnkey
project.
• The Swedish contribution was to supply the process machinery and
construction material not locally available, the technical knowledge for
design, engineering, construction and installation, sufficient training to allow
the Vietnamese to run the plant and support for forestry through silviculture
assistance, vehicle training and maintenance, and design of  harvesting and
transport systems including road construction.
• The Vietnamese were to contribute the necessary labour force, domestic
construction material, transport and port facilities and services, facilitate
the movement of  expatriate personnel and run the necessary forestry
operations to ensure sufficient wood fibre for the mill.
Bai Bang was to become Sweden’s largest and longest running development
cooperation project. Its initial five year time scale of  1975 to 1980 was extended
for a further five years in 1985 then further extended for a phasing out period
between 1985 and 1990. It is also the most controversial with a high public
profile.
The Swedish media has given considerable attention to:
• the rationale behind the choice of  the Bai Bang project;
• the political processes through which it was conceived and implemented;
• the problems encountered in implementation; and
• the considerable budget and time overruns to overcome these problems.
2The challenge at Bai Bang
The Bai Bang project represented an enormous development cooperation
challenge for Sweden.
• It involved establishing – in a low income, essentially undeveloped, labour
intensive, centrally planned economy – a capital intensive industrial complex
drawn from a high income industrialised economy.
• The Bai Bang region was virtually devoid of  complementary infrastructure
– roads, power, housing and skilled workers. In fact, Bai Bang was deliberately
chosen by the Vietnamese authorities because of  these shortcomings. The
project was envisaged as the catalyst for development in an extremely
undeveloped region by encouraging the movement of  people from the
overpopulated Red River delta.
• There was no firm understanding of  the quality and quantity of  the forest
resource needed to support the mill.
• Vietnam was an unknown quantity as an aid recipient. There was an
enormous cultural gap between the Swedish and Vietnamese counterparts.
The gap was accentuated by language difficulties, vastly different economic
systems, living standards, and ways of  thinking and doing things.
The project also represented an enormous challenge to Vietnam.
• The economy at the time was seriously depleted of  skilled labour and
materials as it attempted to recover from a long and exhausting reunification
war. Incentives to divert labour and materials (both local and imported for
the project) to other activities were large.
• There was no recent experience at the time among the political and
bureaucratic system of  how Western-style construction and management
systems operated.
• The then system of  central planning and strict bureaucratic controls lacked
the capacity to provide appropriate incentives to workers whose most urgent
priority was to get food to sustain them and their families.
• The forest resource was seriously depleted and Vietnam lacked the capacity
to reverse this depletion.
• The mill was designed to provide low quality pulp to make paper for domestic
consumption in an essentially closed economy – yet after the doi moi reforms
the same configuration was expected to produce paper of  sufficient quality
to compete against imports.
3Project scope and financial outlays
The Bai Bang project involved Sida support of  about SEK2.8 billion over the
period 1974 to 1995 (equivalent to about SEK6.5 billion in 1996 prices) to
fund:
• construction of  an integrated pulp and paper mill involving a chemical
plant, power plant, maintenance enterprise, transport enterprise and paper
factory;
• management of  the facilities until handover to the Vietnamese;
• a forestry component involving facilitating the establishment of  a forest
research centre, forest training school, and plantation and soil conservation
support;
• a vocational training component centred around the establishment of  a
vocational training school;
• a housing project to supply mill employees with good quality housing; and
• a transport project to build the necessary infrastructure to ensure effective
transport of  raw materials to the mill.
The project was originally conceived as a package covering construction of
the pulp and paper mill, support for development of  forest operations (but
with the main forestry responsibility with the Vietnamese), vocational training
and social infrastructure investment. When the plant commenced production
in the early 1980s the need for input support through side projects became
more apparent leading to the specification and funding of  vocational training,
plantation and soil conservation, housing, transport and living condition
projects as independent side projects.
About 97 per cent of  outlays were spent up to June 1990, which marked the
withdrawal of  Swedish management from the mill. The remainder was spent
between July 1990 and June 1995 on extensions to side projects, especially the
plantation and soil conservation project (table 1.1).
About 75 per cent of  the Swedish financial contribution was spent on the mill
complex and 15 per cent on forestry, including plantation development (chart
1.2).
Since 1995 Sida has continued to support the Bai Bang project indirectly
through its Rural Mountain Development Program, which runs from 1996 to
2000. An important component of  this program – assisting farmers in the
northern provinces that comprise the mill’s raw material area – is to replant
bare hillsides for both soil and water conservation, and to provide logs for
pulp and paper.
4The construction phase did not take off  until 1977. Photo WP-systems archive.
5The project from 1969 to now
The history of  the Bai Bang project is a long and complicated one. Box 1.3
contains some key milestones. Several factors stand out.
• The drawn out planning and construction phase.
• The 15 years needed after production commenced before production
reached planned capacity.
• The addition of  a succession of  side projects (and additional expenditure)
throughout this period to facilitate the objectives of  the project being
achieved.
Data source: Table 1.1.
Mill
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Vocational training
Plantation och soil
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Living conditions
1.1 Swedish financial contributiona to the Bai Bang project SEK million
Planning and Initial Post-with-
construction operations Withdrawal drawal
Component phase phase phase support Total
1974 – July 1983 – July 1985 – July 1990 –
June 1983 June 1985 June 1990 June 1995
Main project
Mill 1 551.3 183.6 331.5 2 066.4
Forestry 122.5 69.1 162.1 353.7
Unallocated 11.8 30.3 56.2 7.6 105.9
Side projects
Vocational training 5.2 44.6 14.9 64.7
Housing 0.5 30.8 0.8 32.1
Transport 0.3 62.1 9.6 72.0
Plantation and soil 29.6 36.5 66.1
conservation
Living conditions 5.2 5.2
Total 1 685.6 289.0 716.9 74.6 2 766.1
a There was also a Vietnamese financial contribution, which was envisaged as being about 10 per
cent of initial project costs.
Source: Berlin (1997); Scanmanagement (1990).
1.2 Composition of Bai Bang project expenditure
61.3 History of Bai Bang project: some milestones
1969 Vietnamese delegation visits Sweden – discussions about possible Swedish aid to
Vietnam’s industrial sector.
1970 Swedish delegation visits Vietnam to determine appropriate sectors for Swedish
assistance – preliminary report prepared on potential in forestry sector.
1971 Project alternatives evaluated.
1972 Specific report on Bai Bang project delivered. Envisaged budget of less than
SEK500 million for a four year project.
1973 Preliminary work and negotiations on project.
1974 Intergovernment agreement signed to implement project.
1975–76 Preconstruction phase.
1977–80 Construction phase. Sida contribution of SEK770 million (adjusted to SEK920
million to cover higher than anticipated inflation and further adjusted to SEK1055
million to cover increased costs because of delays in purchasing equipment) was
for a complete project covering investment in the pulp and paper mill, development
of forest operations, vocational training and social infrastructure investment.
1980 Budget estimated to blow out to SEK2000 million.
1981 Commencement of pulp and paper production at mill.
1982 Official inauguration of facilities.
1983 Recognition of the need for input support through independent side projects.
–  Housing project (to supply mill employees with good quality housing). Budget of
   SEK55 million.
– Transport project (to ensure effective transport to and from mill). Budget of
SEK30 million – increased to SEK97 million in 1984.
– Vocational training side project. Budget of SEK44 million.
1984 Poor conditions of forestry workers exposed. Additional SEK170 million agreed for
forestry component (to create a forestry organisation capable of supplying the mill
with enough fibrous raw materials in an environmentally acceptable manner).
Disbursement of SEK120 million of this conditional on improved working conditions
for forest workers and new project organisation between the mill and forestry.
Additional SEK330 million agreed for mill.
1986 – Specific agreement for forestry component as a side project – plantation and
soil conservation project. Budget of SEK40 million.
– Additional SEK10 million to support recurrent costs of vocational training centre.
1990 – End of Sida support for mill and forestry under Bai Bang project.
– Withdrawal of Swedish management.
********
1991 – Project to improve living conditions of forest workers. Budget of SEK5 million.
– Ongoing forest support program by Sida until 1995.
1994 Technical assistance program funded by Sida (SEK20 million) spare parts (SEK18
million), transport project (SEK10 million), vocational school (SEK4 million) and
environmental protection (SEK20 million).
1995 Significant new investment at mill by Vietnamese management.
1996 Mill production reaches planned capacity of 55␣ 000 tonnes of paper.
t
t
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71.4 The Bai Bang complex: a snapshot
Organisational structure
• Pulp and paper mill run by Bai Bang Paper Company (BAPACO), a state owned enterprise.
• Log procurement for the mill controlled by the Vinh Phu Paper Raw Materials Company
(VPMC), a state owned enterprise.
• Both BAPACO and VPMC are members of, and largely controlled by, the Vietnam Paper
Corporation (VPC), a state owned general corporation set up in December 1995 to control
and coordinate pulp and paper production in Vietnam.
Production (1996)
• 57␣ 000 tonnes of paper (compared with mill design capacity of 55␣ 000 tonnes).
(Production in 1997 of 53␣ 630 tonnes.)
• 41␣ 400 tonnes of bleached craft pulp (compared with design rate of 48␣ 000 tonnes).
– With a further 17␣ 158 tonnes of imported pulp (29 per cent of pulp requirements).
• Largest paper mill in Vietnam accounting for 26 per cent of domestic paper production
and 70 per cent of domestic market for writing and printing paper.
Product mix (1996)
• Printing and writing paper with basic weight range from 50 to 120 grams per square
metre (gsm) – nominal standard of 60gsm.
• Brightness 70 to 80 per cent ISO.
• Copy paper, computer forms and telex paper.
• Lined paper and textbooks.
Financial performance (1996) – VND11␣ 000 = US$1
• Turnover: VND550 billion.
• Profit: VND42 billion (most profitable paper mill in Vietnam).
Employment and wages (1996)
• 2800 persons employed in mill.
• Average wage of VND1 million per month (about double average wage in other paper mills
and state owned enterprises).
Forestry operations (1996)
• Raw material area of 365␣ 000 hectares.
• Available forest area for mill is 250␣ 000 hectares (bamboo 52␣ 000 hectares, plantation
forest 61␣ 000 hectares and 136␣ 000 hectares earmarked for plantations).
• Over 35␣ 000 hectares of successful plantations in northern provinces since 1984.
• National plan to establish 5 million hectares of plantation by 2010 with 1 million hectares
designated for pulp production.
• Plantation logs grown on a 7 to 10 year rotation with average MAI of 6 to 15 cubic metres
per year.
Continued on next page
8Box 1.4 summarises the present day performance of  the mill and forestry
operations.
A snapshot evaluation
In this report we provide a snapshot evaluation of  the impact of  the Bai Bang
project on the Vietnamese economy and its people. Our focus is on conditions
today, some seven years after the withdrawal of  Swedish expertise and financial
support, rather than the events that have led to today’s outcomes. Our ‘snapshot
evaluation’ is complemented by a ‘process evaluation’ being undertaken by
the Christian Michelsen Institute and which provides a strong historical
perspective on the project.
The snapshot approach differs from the more traditional approach to project
evaluation, which involves comparing the time path of  costs and benefits
1.4 The Bai Bang complex: a snapshot Continued
Forestry operations (1996) Continued
• Mix of 30 per cent long fibres (bamboo) and 70 per cent short fibres (eucalypts, manglieta,
styrax and acacia).
• 2600 persons directly employed by VPMC with up to 10 000 persons employed in all forest
operations.
• Average log price of VND360 000 per tonne ex-mill door and VND190 000 per tonne to
growers.
• Eighty-five per cent of logs supplied by forest enterprises (attached to VPMC and provinces)
and 15 per cent from private growers (farmers).
Technology
• Two twin-wire paper machines – reel width 3.8 metres, operating speed 500 to 600 metres
per minute.
• Three pulp digesters – 140 cubic metres each. Four stage bleaching system.
• Power plant of: one coal fired boiler, 145 tonnes of steam per hour; one recovery boiler, 36
tonnes of steam per hour; two turbines and two generators with total capacity of 28
megawatts.
• Chemical plant with design rate of 7000 tonnes chlorine per year (annual chlorine use of
5000 tonnes with surplus chlorine and other chemicals sold to yield about VND2 billion
annually).
• Transport enterprise: 40 trucks (300 tonnes total capacity), 12 barge trains (9600 tonnes
total capacity ) and modern river port.
• Well equipped maintenance enterprise in mechanical, electrical, measurement and control
systems.
Future plans
• New investment approved in April 1998 to:
– improve paper quality;
– expand pulp capacity from 48 000 to 61 000 tonnes per year; and
– expand paper production from 57 000 tonnes to 100 000 tonnes per year by the year
2000.
9incurred over the life of  the project. In the case of  Bai Bang, with its long and
tortuous history, putting together such a time path would be difficult and of
doubtful relevance. The key issue is how well the project is performing today
and the contribution it is making to Vietnam.
The snapshot approach measures impacts – mill and forestry performance,
economic impact, impact on people – at one point in time relative to a
counterfactual of  no Bai Bang project. In looking at the situation in the
economy and region today, it attempts to isolate the effects of  the Bai Bang
project from the effects of  all other events and changes shaping today’s
outcomes in Vietnam. The performance of  the mill today and its social and
economic impact has been greatly influenced by this timeline of  events and
changes.
The counterfactual in our approach is not only no Bai Bang, but also no
alternative form of  development assistance to Vietnam. In this regard, the
evaluation differs from what would probably have been the appropriate ex␣ ante
evaluation if  Sida were committed in the early 1970s to some kind of  large
scale development cooperation activity. However, it is not really feasible to
construct other counterfactuals involving alternative forms of  development
assistance to Vietnam. These were never developed sufficiently to the status
of  realistic alternatives.
In the context of  the momentous set of  events and changes that Vietnam has
experienced since the project began, the snapshot approach has considerable
appeal. Its emphasis is on how things are today rather than the path followed
to get there. But some caution is needed in its application. Ideally, the snapshot
year should provide a ‘typical year’ representation of  outcomes. This is most
critical in the case of  mill performance. Our snapshot for the living conditions
of  mill and forest workers is late 1997 – early 1998 when our field survey work
was undertaken.
Our snapshot year for the analysis of  mill financial performance and economic
contribution is 1996. This is the year in which mill paper production finally
reached planned capacity.
It was also a tough year for the world paper industry with world prices
significantly below their 1994 and 1995 levels. Vietnam’s producers faced
strong competition from imported paper and price reductions were needed
to clear a build up in paper stocks. The duty on imported paper was increased
(to 40 per cent for printing and writing paper, and to 20 per cent for newsprint)
to assist domestic producers.
World paper prices fluctuate considerably from year to year in response to
changes in production and demand – both of  which can be substantial. Judging
how representative 1996 trading conditions are of  ‘normal’ trading conditions
is also made more difficult by the uncertainties for the pulp and paper industry
of  the Asian financial crisis and how long the crisis will last. The key player in
the region is Indonesia, which has put in place a threefold increase in pulp
and paper production capacity since 1990. The massive devaluation of  the
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Indonesian rupiah will stimulate Indonesian exports of  pulp and paper. For
Vietnam, this means continued downward pressure on paper prices, but
cheaper pulp imports. But Indonesian production is constrained by limits to
wood and wastepaper supply. And the dramatic increase in the cost of  imported
inputs and the prospect of  continuing social unrest may cause disruptions to
Indonesian production.
Evaluating the project from the vantage point of  the present day Vietnamese
economy and global pulp and paper markets may be seen as unfair in some
quarters. In particular, the designers of  the project more than 20 years ago
could not have foreseen the dramatic changes in the Vietnamese economy of
the past decade following doi moi or the globalisation of  the world economy
through reduced barriers to goods and services trade, investment and capital
flows. We give due recognition to this in our evaluation.
Structure of report
In undertaking the research we have found a poor understanding of  what has
been achieved by the Bai Bang project against considerable odds. Our report
is about these achievements (and failures) and the lessons that can be learned
about development cooperation from the experience.
Mill
performance
Performance of
forestry and side
projects
Impact on
economy
Impact on
human resource
capacity building
Social and
cultural impact
Social benefits
and costs
Future
viability
Achievement
of objectives
Relevance
Understanding
conditions
for
sustainable
development
1.5 Components of the evaluation
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The components of  our evaluation are shown in chart 1.5.
Two state owned enterprises, the Bai Bang Paper Company (BAPACO) and
the Vinh Phu Paper Raw Materials Company (VPMC), currently have
responsibility for the operations of  the pulp and paper mill, and the
procurement of  logs for the mill respectively. These two companies are in
turn members of, and responsible to, the Vietnam Paper Corporation (VPC
or Vinapimex), a state owned general corporation responsible to the
government for Vietnam’s major pulp and paper mills. In chapter 2 we analyse
the current performance of  the mill. Our analysis covers:
• the financial performance of  BAPACO;
• its structure, management and links to VPC; and
• the technical performance of  the mill at each stage of  the production line
from wood and other raw materials intake through the mill yard and pulp
mill, chemical plant, power and steam plant, and paper mill. We analyse
the quality of  two sample products – copy paper and exercise book paper.
Our technical assessment highlights the critical production issues that need
addressing if  the mill is to have an assured long term future.
In chapter 3 we assess the performance of  forestry operations – financial
performance of  VPMC, VPMC’s structure, management and links to VPC,
and plantation development. We also consider the contribution of  the housing
and transport side projects.
Economic activity is generated through the mill’s purchase of  logs and other
materials, and through the payment of  wages and profits, which are spent. In
chapter 4 we analyse the contribution of  this spending to the region and the
national economy. We also look at how the income generated by the project is
distributed between the different categories of  workers in forestry and at the
mill.
A strong feature of  the project was its training and human resource capital
building component. In chapter 5 we assess the project’s contribution to human
resource capacity building, both within the paper and raw materials companies
and throughout Vietnamese society. Our assessment includes an evaluation
of  the impact of  the so-called Scandinavian management model, introduced
to Bai Bang by Swedish experts, on the managerial performance of  the
companies.
The project has brought about major changes in social and cultural conditions
for men, women and children in the Bai Bang region since construction at the
site began in the mid-1970s. These changes, which we address in chapter 6,
are manifest in a variety of  socioeconomic indicators as well as in the more
difficult to measure aspects of  social life such as cultural values, attitudes,
tastes and ideas.
Each year the mill, forestry and associated activities deliver an array of  financial
and social benefits, and impose financial and social costs. A key issue in our
evaluation is the net contribution of  the project in a typical year. In chapter 7
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we use a social cost–benefit framework to determine the net contribution.
Is the mill capable of  remaining viable over the longer term? We address this
question in chapter 8 with the help of  a financial model of  the mill’s operations.
Our analysis covers the key factors that will shape longer term viability:
• global market developments – in particular, foreign currency prices for pulp
and paper, and the exchange rate between the dong and the US dollar;
• changes in Vietnam’s trade policies under a move toward a more open
economy with no quantitative restrictions or tariffs on imported paper;
• the scope for improving productivity through changed mill input–output
relationships; and
• the ability of  the mill to fund new investments that will improve its product
quality and production level.
In chapter 9 we assess the extent to which the project achieved its overall
objectives and the project’s achievements in relation to Sweden’s total financial
contribution.
In chapter 10 we assess the relevance of  the project against Vietnam’s current
economic and social policy objectives. With the introduction in 1986 of  doi
moi, Vietnam’s wide ranging process of  economic restructuring, profound
changes in the institutional and policy environment for social and economic
development are being put in place. We assess how the Bai Bang project
contributes to, and is affected by, Vietnam’s economic and social policy
objectives as the transition to a market economy unfolds. Key economic reforms
impacting on the relevance of  the Bai Bang project, and which we therefore
consider in our assessment, are:
• trade and exchange rate reforms;
• government revenue and expenditure reforms;
• reforms to public administration and the legal system;
• land tenure reforms;
• financial sector reforms; and
• reforms to state owned enterprises.
Finally, in chapter 11 we identify the lessons that can be learned from the Bai
Bang project as regards development cooperation and the fundamental
conditions for sustainable development. Development cooperation projects
are determined in the context of  prevailing theories about development and
prevailing knowledge about the social, political and economic circumstances
in which they will be implemented. In addressing this task we take account of
how theories of  development and development cooperation have changed
since the project was conceived and how Sida’s approach has also shifted over
time.
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The mill and its immediate surrounds
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2 How well is the mill
performing today?
The mill is trading profitably and meeting its taxation obligations, though
financial liquidity is low. New investment, substantial pulp imports and increased
tariffs on imported paper have boosted production and profitability. Mill manage-
ment structures and practices are distinctly superior to usual Vietnamese
practice. But VPC seriously constrains BAPACO’s financial independence, which
is a potential threat to the mill’s longer term viability. The mill is well maintained
and operated, but technical performance is constrained by a shortage of steam.
While mill performance is technically acceptable, it is not yet economically
secure.
IN THE INCREASINGLY MARKET ORIENTED present day Vietnamese
economy, the key measure of  an activity’s performance is its profitability.
Profitability of  the mill depends in turn on its technical performance, the way
it is allowed to be managed by its owners (the Vietnamese government) and
tariffs on imported paper. How profitable are mill operations? How well are
they managed? How good is their technical performance?
Mill operations:
financial performance of BAPACO
The company maintains good financial records and accounts. These follow
the Vietnamese Accounting System (VAS) for state owned enterprises in the
manufacturing sector, which became effective in January 1996.
Recent financial performance is summarised in table 2.1 and chart 2.2. The
detail is provided in appendix 2A.
Over the period 1990 to 1996 the mill achieved rapid growth in sales with net
turnover (gross sales net of  turnover tax) increasing by 500 per cent. Paper
price increases accounted for 53 per cent of  the increase, with the remaining
47 per cent due to sales volume growth and a change in the product mix
toward higher value products.
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2.1 Summary of key financial information for BAPACO 1990–96
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Net turnovera VND million 87 852 182 006 226 145 200 192 294 184 503 047 534 208
Cost of goods sold VND million 80 112 163 452 203 337 190 465 285 100 453 111 435 508
Gross marginb % 9 10 10 5 3 10 18
Fixed assets (NBV) VND million 175 107 316 570 295 268 292 153 274 741 220 530 197 230
Inventories (stocks) VND million 108 116 215 278 206 043 229 509 232 040 325 704 369 150
Trade debtorsc VND million 2 196 5 375 17 294 3 653 2 072 44 544 3 746
Current assets VND million 134 950 263 011 265 836 267 322 247 382 404 346 405 193
Current liabilities VND million 12 787 19 639 42 902 62 232 32 415 82 106 93 308
Working capital VND million 122 163 243 372 222 934 205 090 214 967 322 240 311 885
Capital VND million 297 270 559 942 518 202 497 243 489 708 542 770 509 116
Profit before tax VND million 4 295 11 841 11 350 – 1 480 38 894 42 849
Taxation charge VND million 2 032 4 737 4 540 – 518 13 613 14 997
Profit tax rated % 47 40 40 35 35 35
a Value of sales less turnover tax. b Net turnover less cost of goods sold as a percentage of net turnover.
c Money owing from sales of paper.  d Taxation charge as a percentage of profit before tax.
Source: Derived from BAPACO financial statements.
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2.2 Growth in Bai Bang mill turnover and profits
Data source: Table 2.1
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All BAPACO’s paper sales are to the domestic market. There are two reasons
for this. The domestic market for paper is larger than Vietnam’s paper
production – by around 70␣ 000 tonnes per year. Hence, there is no need to
export. And Vietnam’s paper is not particularly competitive on export markets.
Reductions in production costs and improvements in paper quality are needed
for this to occur.
Profits have grown strongly in recent years to reach VND42.8 billion in 1996.
Profit increased from 9 per cent to 18 per cent of  total sales between 1990
and 1996. By contrast, Vietnam’s two other large mills, Tan Mai and Dong
Mai, both recorded losses in 1996.
The sales and profit performance of  the company has been assisted by a
strong demand for paper, a tariff  on imported paper (which was raised from
20 per cent to 40 per cent in 1996) and controls over import volumes from
time to time through quotas.
Current assets in 1996 were VND405 billion compared with current liabilities
of VND93.3 billion.
Operating costs
These are summarised in chart 2.3.
Most materials are supplied locally. For example, coal is supplied by the
Vietnam Coal Corporation, petroleum products are supplied by the Vinh
Phu Petrol Company, and bamboo and logs are supplied through VPMC.
Pulp is imported mainly from Indonesia and Thailand, and incurs an import
duty of  1 per cent. The Phu Tho General Trade Company procures pulp,
chemicals and other materials for the mill. Spare parts are procured from a
Source: BAPACO financial statements.
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2.3 Components of mill operating costs 1996
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range of  sources, including Sweden, Thailand and Japan. Import duties on
spare parts range from 0 to 30 per cent.
Labour costs (salaries, social insurance and health insurance contributions)
account for only 7.7 per cent of  production costs.
The depreciation charge (10.8 per cent of  production costs) has shown a
significant variation from year to year due to changes in the rates applied by the
Ministry of  Finance to the book value of  assets. In poor trading years the
company is allowed to pay less than the nominated depreciation rate, with charges
above the nominated rate recouped in good trading years. This helps even out
the profit stream from year to year. In 1996 the depreciation charge was 120
per cent of  the standard rate. (Standard treatment is depreciation calculated on
a straight line basis with rates of  4–7 per cent (buildings), 7–18 per cent
(machinery), 5–15 per cent (transportation) and 6–10 per cent (office equipment).)
Since 1995 depreciation has been retained within VPC for reinvestment by
member companies. Before that, depreciation was paid to the national budget.
Other expenses accounted for 4.2 per cent of  production costs in 1996. These
include:
• interest on loans;
• a capital tax for the use of  government capital (set at 4.8 per cent of  the
capital stock value excluding capital financed by the company through
retained earnings);
• administration expenses; and
• insurance costs.
Fixed assets
Table 2.4 summarises the fixed assets of  the company as at end-December
1996. These are dominated by machinery, buildings and transport equipment.
Other assets include those for staff  benefits (nursery, kindergarten), assets to
be disposed (mainly antennae brought in by Sweden to serve Swedish
telecommunication needs during the construction phase) and assets of  the
technical training college, which has recently been transferred to VPC.
2.4 Fixed assets at cost and depreciated value 1996
Cost Accumulated Net book value
depreciation
VND million VND million VND million
Buildings 105 503 48 172 57 331
Machinery 381 057 272 802 108 255
Office equipment 4 997 4 491 506
Transport equipment 45 514 28 703 16 811
Other assets 18 873 9 570 9 303
Total 555 944 363 738 192 206
Source: Estimates provided by company officials.
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Assets were revalued upwards in 1991 as part of  a restructuring of  all state
owned enterprises. Some office equipment and machinery are quite old and
will need replacement in the future. As the company is short of  cash, new
investment will require new capital or loans. Such investment will require
approval from VPC and the Ministry of  Finance.
Revenue
The company’s revenue stream is shown in chart 2.5. Sales of  paper products
accounted for 98 per cent of  total sales in 1996, all to the domestic market.
The remaining 2 per cent of  sales is represented by sales of  electricity, chemicals
produced, hotel services and transportation services, which were in excess of
the needs of  the company.
Key contributing factors behind the rapid growth in paper sales in recent
years are:
• new investment in early 1995 allowing paper machines to increase
revolutions from 300–400 metres per minute to 500 metres per minute;
• substantial imports of  pulp, which has allowed increased production volume
of  paper and product quality; and
• an increase in the tariff  on imported paper from 20 per cent to 40 per cent
in 1996 and a temporary ban on imported writing paper applied in the
second quarter of 1996.
The 1996 production mix and average selling prices are shown in table 2.6.
Data source: BAPACO financial statements.
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Inventories (stocks)
The company maintains large inventories (VND369 billion in 1996). About
77 per cent of  these are raw materials (wood and bamboo, pulp, chemicals,
fuel, spare parts) and nearly 20 per cent finished goods (chart 2.7). Raw materials
stocks are sufficient for three months of  production. Stocks of  finished paper
relative to sales were also high in 1996 (about two month’s sales). Inventories
can be difficult to convert into cash at short notice. Because of  its large share
of  current assets held in inventories, the company’s liquidity is low.
Allocation of profits
Profit after tax is appropriated to various funds for specified purposes as follows
(chart 2.8).
• Fifty per cent to the business development fund – to fund small fixed asset
investments. Increases in capital through the fund are not subject to capital
tax.
• Ten per cent to the reserve financial fund.
• Five per cent to the reserve fund to help fund unexpected layoffs of  workers.
2.6 Production mix and prices 1996
Weight Average price
Tonnes VND million/tonne
Total reels (sold to paper converters
and publishers) 55 164 10.01
Reams 2 371 10.30
Lined pads 194 10.92
Exercise books 514
Telex paper 11.50
Source: Company records.
}
Raw materials
VND283.5 billion
Finished goods
(including goods
on consignment)
VND68.6 billion
Other
VND2.8 billion
Tools and
supplies
VND14.3 billion
2.7 Inventories December 1996
Data source: BAPACO financial statements
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Data source: Discussions with company officials and financial accounts.
• Two thirds of  the remaining 25 per cent to the bonus fund (to pay worker
bonuses).
• One third of  the remaining 25 per cent to the welfare fund – spent on social
activities, subsidies to employees in need and for the construction of
community facilities such as the swimming pool, club and sports stadium,
and social infrastructure such as roads and health.
• Ten per cent to VPC.
Apart from the 10 per cent contribution to VPC, all other funds remain under
the control of  BAPACO’s board of  management.
A consequence of  this predetermined allocation of  profits to the various funds
is that only half  the company’s profits are available to it to fund new
investments.
Return on capital
The accounts show total capital for the company of  VND509.1 billion for
1996. About 93 per cent of  this is capital from government (mill capital
transferred by Sweden) and capital transferred from retained earnings. The
remainder is listed as business development funds, and bonus and welfare
funds. In 1996 the return on capital was 5.5 per cent.
Wages, employment and value added per employee
Employee wages are heavily oriented toward worker performance – which is
not a common practice in other companies. Wages consist of  two components:
Taxation
35%
Business
development fund
31%
Bonus fund
11%
Reserve
financial fund
6%
VPC
6%
Welfare
8%
Reserve fund for
unexpected layoffs
3%
2.8 Allocation of company profits 1996
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• basic salary – calculated as a multiple of  the minimum salary level of
VND114␣ 000 per month where the multiple takes into account seniority,
education, professionalism, fluency in foreign languages, etc., length of
service and job title; and
• additional salary – paid monthly and based on company sales.
Wages are paid twice monthly. They are topped up from payments from the
bonus fund.
Average wages have grown rapidly in recent years (chart 2.9) to exceed VND1
million per month by 1996. This is about double the average wage level in the
state owned enterprise sector. When combined with the excellent living
conditions, health and social amenities provided by the company, this yields an
even higher social wage. Because of  their much greater productivity, Bai Bang
mill workers earn considerably more than workers in other state owned paper
mills.
Value added per employee (which measures the income generated through
the company’s employment of  labour and capital) has climbed rapidly in recent
years (chart 2.9). This increased income has been shared between wage
payments to workers and profits to mill capital.
The number of  employees has been reasonably stable since 1990 at around
2800. Most are permanent workers with ab out 1 per cent being temporary.
Temporary employees work mainly on simple production tasks such as
wrapping, packing, lining and cutting paper for short periods. The number
of  temporary workers rose sharply in 1997 and 1998 to number about 400.
a Profit before tax plus labour costs plus depreciation divided by the number of employees.
Data source: Derived from company records.
About one third of  the workforce are female. As shown in chart 2.10, about
45 per cent of  the workforce in 1996 were classified as skilled, 42 per cent
semiskilled and 13 per cent unskilled. The number of  skilled workers increased
Av
er
ag
e 
w
ag
e
(V
N
D
'0
00
 p
er
 m
on
th
)
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1996199519941993199219911990
Average wage
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
pe
r 
em
pl
oy
ee
a
(V
N
D
 m
ill
io
n 
pe
r 
pe
rs
on
 p
er
 y
ea
r)
Value added
2.9 Wages and value added per employee
22
Data source: Company records.
The average wage level at Bai Bang is about double the average wage level in the state owned enterprise sector
which is a reflection of  higher labour productivity. Photo A. Berlin
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2.10 Composition of BAPACO workforce by skill level, gender and type of activity 1996
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by 20 per cent between 1990 and 1996, while unskilled workers decreased by
19 per cent.
The mill runs three, eight hour working shifts per day with about 1200 to
1300 workers involved in shift work. Workers on the late night shift (11.00 pm
to 7.00 am) receive an additional allowance of  40 per cent of  salary.
How viable is BAPACO in the short term?
Pulp and paper mills are highly capital intensive. The cost of  capital can
amount to up to 40 per cent of  the total cost of  production. The Bai Bang
mill received its fixed capital in the form of  non-returnable development aid
from Sweden. It therefore does not have to earn a commercial return on this
capital either in the short or the longer term. (In fact, calculations in Bai Bang
project planning documents of  the early 1970s indicate that the economics of
the mill were such that it could not generate a commercial rate of  return on
the mill capital stock.) To remain viable in the short term the mill must generate
sufficient revenue to cover its production costs, meet the various taxation
obligations of  the authorities such as turnover tax and capital tax, and maintain
its plant and equipment in good working order.
But this will not guarantee viability over the longer term. For pulp and paper
mills to achieve longer term viability they need to engage in a more or less
continuous program of  equipment renewal to improve product quality. The
company will need to generate sufficient profits after tax to fund this renewal,
either through its retained earnings or through borrowings.
The 1996 accounts show that BAPACO had current assets of  VND405 billion,
91 per cent of  which were stocks. Its current liabilities were VND93 billion,
70 per cent of  which were loans from government banks. These loans are
repayable within six months and bear interest at a rate of  1.5 per cent per
month. The company does not have sufficient cash to repay these loans, which
are likely to be rolled over into the future.
The high ratio of  current assets to current liabilities (current ratio of  4
compared with a typical current ratio of  2) indicates that the company is
financing its current assets out of  its own capital. But, as indicated by the high
ratio of  stocks in current assets, the company has low liquidity and cannot
convert its current assets quickly into cash. It does not have cash to invest in
fixed assets. The company could become much more liquid if  it were to reduce
its stocks of  materials and finished product.
The mill is trading profitably in the short term and meeting its financial
obligations. Given the structure within which it operates, there is no need for
the mill to maintain a high level of  liquidity. However, because of  the controls
VPC exerts over its sales, purchases of  raw material, retention of  depreciation
and financing of  new investment (discussed later), BAPACO cannot be
considered to operate as an independent financial entity.
24
Contribution to government revenue
The company contributed about VND50 billion in 1996 to government
revenue through a range of  taxes (table 2.11).
• Turnover tax (2 per cent of  turnover of  paper products) is paid monthly.
• Profit tax of  35 per cent of  estimated profits is paid monthly.
• Capital tax of  4.8 per cent of  the capital granted state owned enterprises is
paid monthly.
• Housing tax (collected from workers who stay in company staff  housing) is
charged at 60 per cent of  the rent collection and paid to the tax authorities.
• Personal income tax is paid annually on actual average monthly income.
Income tax is 10 per cent for monthly incomes (excluding bonuses) between
VND1.2 million and VND2 million, and 20 per cent for monthly incomes
exceeding VND2 million. Salaries for most workers fall below the level that
incurs income tax.
• Land tax is 0.5 per cent of  the notional land value.
• While the depreciation charge has, since 1995, been allowed to remain at
the company for reinvestment purposes, the depreciation fund is effectively
controlled by VPC, which determines and controls the investment plans of
each of  its mills. Depreciation funds paid by Bai Bang could be transferred
to other companies as part of  VPC’s internal capital requirements.
• Aid funds are those received by the Bai Bang mill from the Swedish
government in the form of  stock or assets. They are paid back to the state
budget when used or sold.
2.11 Taxation paid by BAPACO
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
VND VND VND VND VND VND VND
million million million million million million million
Taxation
Turnover tax 3 201 6 457 8 494 7 396 9 078 9 931 10 611
Profits tax 2 032 4 737 4 540 – 518 13 613 14 997
Tax on capital – 12 364 23 791 21 623 21 068 20 978 21 486
Housing taxes – – – – 126 90 101
Land tax (rent) – 70 280 421 434 630 1 750
Personal income tax – – – – – – 43
Other taxes – – – – 3 296 1
Depreciation fund 3 523 10 199 28 469 20 091 20 004 6 687 –
Aid fund return to state budget 3 738 12 789 11 946 – – – 500
Social security and trade union fees
Social insurance 275 350 526 1 025 1 566 1 373 1 466
Health insurance – – – 681 339 605 644
Trade union fees 36 77 122 194 168 183 195
Source: BAPACO financial accounts.
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• Other taxes consist of  license tax, tax on obsolete stock and tax on selling
houses.
• In addition to the above taxes the company also collects for the authorities
social insurance, health insurance and trade union fees.
All taxes and obligations are paid to the local tax authorities. They are then
transferred to the central government treasury. Provincial–central government
revenue sharing arrangements exist for some taxes such as turnover tax.
Customers
The company has a list of  more than 160 customers. They include stationery
enterprises and publishing companies. Sales to five major customers accounted
for 71 per cent of  sales in 1996 (table 2.12) of  which 75 per cent was in Hanoi
and 25 per cent in Ho Chi Minh City. The remaining 21 per cent of  sales
were made to a large number of  smaller customers. The major customer is
VPC, which acts as the company’s agent. The company does not have the
right to open agencies for selling its rolled paper. However, it can open agencies
anywhere in Vietnam (other than Hanoi to avoid competition with VPC’s
shop in Hanoi) to sell its processed paper (notebooks), which is only about 10
per cent of  the total value of  its produced paper.
What do customers think of Bai Bang paper?
To answer this we conducted a survey of  the heads of  departments of  planning
and material procurement in six printing houses using Bai Bang paper. Firms
interviewed had more than 150 employees, annual revenue between VND7
billion and VND90 billion, and paper consumption of  at least 150 tonnes per
year with four firms consuming more than 4000 tonnes per year. They included
some of  the biggest printing houses in Hanoi.
Interviewees were first asked to rate the quality of  Bai Bang paper on a scale
of  6 (excellent) to 1 (poor). Results indicated a favourable view, with quality
rating scores as follows.
2.12 Major customers 1996
Customer Volume sold Value
Tonnes VND million
Hanoi
VPC 20 843 209 868
Stationery Centre 4 649 45 559
Stationery Enterprise 2 951 29 370
Ho Chi Minh City
Branch of VPC 6 828 68 111
Bao Hang (private company) 2 532 25 306
Source: BAPACO financial accounts.
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• Whiteness: 4.9
• Smoothness: 4.9
• Thickness: 4.4
• Absorbency: 5.1
• Price in relation to quality: 4.6
• General evaluation: 4.9
Some interviewees indicated that whiteness and thickness varied from time to
time and, given the quality, the price is still high relative to imported paper.
When asked why the company decided to buy Bai Bang paper, interviewees
rated most highly its reliability of  supply, its satisfactory quality and its price
advantage over imported paper. Bai Bang paper was considered popular and
available at any time and place.
When asked about whether they would continue to buy Bai Bang paper if  the
price were to increase by 30 to 40 per cent relative to the price of  imports
(which could occur if  tariffs on imported paper were suddenly removed and
if  the productivity of  paper production at Bai Bang did not increase), all
interviewees said no.
BAPACO management structures, decision
processes and interaction with authorities
Both BAPACO and VPMC are member companies of  Vietnam Paper
Corporation (VPC or Vinapimex). VPC was formed in 1995 through an
amalgamation of  state owned enterprises. It is one of  18 so-called general
corporations in Vietnam. The official motivation for the formation of  general
corporations was to strengthen their capacity to compete against imports and
to protect production of  strategic goods. BAPACO and VPMC report through
VPC to the government through the Ministry of  Industry. The companies must
also report through VPC on financial issues quarterly to the Ministry of  Finance,
personnel issues six monthly to the Ministry of  Planning and Investment,
planning and plan realisation six monthly to the Ministry of  Planning and
Investment, statistical data to the General Statistical Office, and import and
export plans to the Ministry of  Trade (chart 2.13). VPMC must also report
through VPC to the Ministry of  Agriculture and Rural Development on forestry
issues such as plantation development, silviculture and obtaining logging
permission. Both companies have close relationships with the Phong Chau
District People’s Committee, and with the provincial People’s Committee. They
must pay tax to provincial authorities and obey local administrative rules.
VPC controls nine pulp and paper mills including Bai Bang and the other
two large mills of  Tan Mai and Dong Nai – a production capacity of  154␣ 000
tonnes of  paper and 143␣ 000 tonnes of  pulp. It also controls two raw material
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companies including VPMC, the technical vocational school and an institute
of  paper, plywood and stationery factories and a financial company.
We undertook an analysis of  how BAPACO and VPMC interact with VPC
and the government, and the management structures and decision making
processes in each company. Our findings are documented in appendixes 2B
(BAPACO) and 3B (VPMC).
VPC’s activities constrain mill performance
VPC seriously constrains BAPACO from operating as an independent profit
maximising business. VPC uses BAPACO profits to cross subsidise the
operations of  Bai Bang’s domestic competitors and ‘manages’ competition
between them. VPC controls the price of  logs supplied by VPMC, prices
charged for BAPACO paper, and how and where BAPACO can sell its paper.
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Paper
Company
Vietnam Paper Corporation
Vinh Phu
Raw Materials
Company
District
People’s
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Provincial
People’s
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2.13 Accountabilities of BAPACO and VPMC
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Prices are not always adjusted fully to reflect movements in world paper prices.
There is an element of  social pricing – to ensure affordability of  products to
categories of  domestic consumers. Exports and imports must be approved by
VPC. Decisions on developing new products also need VPC approval. These
decisions may not be in BAPACO’s best interests as VPC must also take care of
its other member companies. In return, the mill receives a degree of  protection
against imports and has access to subsidised funds for capital investment.
In general, mill managers believe this to be an unsatisfactory deal. They would
prefer to ‘go it alone’ as an independent financial enterprise with full control
over production, pricing and distribution.
Our analysis in chapter 8 suggests that BAPACO has the strength to operate
independently using its own profits and access to credit at market rates to
fund new investment. We cannot find any economic logic for VPC. In our
view, VPC’s power and current activities represent a significant threat, perhaps
the greatest threat, to the longer term viability of  BAPACO.
Organisational structure of BAPACO
BAPACO is run by a board of  directors comprising a general director and
four vice-directors. These people are collectively responsible for 25 units of
activity covering operations, maintenance, economics and investment. The
structure is hierarchical and cumbersome. A management board, which
includes the board of  directors plus the personnel manager and financial
manager, decides main issues involving personnel and large financial decisions.
Rewards and sanctions
Employees are rewarded through salaries, bonus payments, welfare benefits
and promotion. Promotion is an appealing incentive bringing with it higher
status, power and salary. Salaries have a performance element and the bonus
fund is allocated according to the rated performance of  each unit. The welfare
fund is distributed according to the wishes of  employees and the labour union.
In recent years BAPACO has spent heavily on employee (and employee family)
amenities including a swimming pool, club and VND6 billion sports centre,
which was completed in time for the 15 year anniversary celebrations in
November 1997.
Sanctions are difficult to apply in practice unless rules are violated. Dismissals
for poor performance are difficult to apply. Transfer to other positions is the
feasible outcome.
Decision making processes
The model is one of  a group (usual Vietnamese practice) rather than individual
decision making. But decision making processes in BAPACO are faster than
in many state companies. Horizontal communication is encouraged and works
well. Because of  clear job descriptions and clear responsibilities, people
understand who must make what decisions. And there is a tendency to delegate
more to middle and line managers.
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On personnel matters, VPC can assign or demote the general director who in
turn can make recommendations on vice-directors to VPC. The personnel
department makes suggestions on unit heads to the general director and
Communist Party steering committee taking into account the opinions of  the
board of  directors. In practice, the general director’s decisions never conflict
with the party steering committee’s opinions.
The company often has pressure applied to accept workers who are relatives
of  powerful people or its current or former employees. Because of  this and
pressure from local authorities to create more jobs, it hires many more workers
than it needs. This reduces productivity.
The company has autonomy on spending for its day-to-day operations in its
annual plan, spending its bonus fund and welfare fund, and spending on
advertising. It must get approval from VPC for new investments and asset
disposal. And it must transfer all its depreciation to VPC and seek VPC’s
permission to draw on it. VPC may also approve additional investment funds
for BAPACO from the depreciation and business development funds of  other
companies in VPC and vice versa.
Comparisons with usual Vietnamese practice
Management structures and processes at BAPACO reflect the influence of  the
so-called Scandinavian management model implemented and taught by the
Swedish experts up until their departure in 1990. This model is essentially
conventional Western style management principles with a Scandinavian flavour
of  equity and caring. Its label as Scandinavian reflects that the Vietnamese
were first exposed to it through the Sida project. As a result, these structures
and processes differ from usual Vietnamese practice in a number of  respects.
• The company has clear goals, which are well communicated to its employees.
This is often not the case in other Vietnamese companies.
• There are clear responsibilities and accountabilities in the organisational
structure with each person having only one supervisor. By contrast, many
Vietnamese companies do not have clear job descriptions and responsibilities.
• There is a stronger focus on productivity and profitability.
• Delegation of  decision making is more widely practiced and workers are
encouraged to find their own solutions to problems rather than going to
supervisors.
• Information sharing through bottom up and horizontal communication is
more widely practiced.
• There is a more participative approach to management demonstrated in
the way employees are involved in the allocation of  the welfare fund.
• There is a strong emphasis on punctuality in the workplace in contrast to
the situation in many other state owned companies where workers often
talk of  ‘rubber time’.
30
The so-called Scandinavian management model was implemented and taught by the Swedish experts up until
their departure in 1990. Photo WP-systems archive.
• The company takes better care of  employee welfare than usual Vietnamese
practice – examples being the sports stadium and club for its employees
and health care provisions for employees and their families.
• There is more and better internal analysis and monitoring of  financial
performance.
• The company uses more systematic and professional planning procedures,
and data recording and retrieval systems with more attention given to the
value of  time in making financial decisions.
All managers interviewed said that the management principles they had
learned from Swedish experts could not be effectively applied until the
economic reforms began. Under the planned economy era, management had
to wait on decisions from government. But, with the transition to a market
economy, managers had an opportunity to apply what they had learned. The
content of  the Scandinavian management model is addressed in chapter 5.
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How good is the mill’s technical performance?
To answer this we undertook an evaluation of  how well each part of  the mill
was performing. Our evaluation, which is presented in appendix 2C, also
contains a series of  recommendations for improving the mill’s technical
performance and international competitiveness.
Although in production since 1982, Bai Bang is not an old mill. There are
many much older mills that still compete in the marketplace. If  the mill carries
out a continual program of  investment renewal, its working life could extend
for up to another 50 years.
Several mill design aspects are unusual.
• It is unusual that a mill constructed in the late 1970s would be only 55␣ 000
tonnes in capacity – uncertainties about fibre availability at the time being
a major reason for this.
• There is a curious mix of  simple and complex equipment in the production
line – for example, a 1930s design bleach sequence and two sophisticated
twin wire paper machines.
• The mill was designed to operate in a closed economy supplying a simple
product – school exercise books of  low brightness. But, with pulp production
constrained to 48␣ 000 tonnes, pulp imports must have always been envisaged
to reach paper design capacity of  55␣ 000 tonnes. And, with economic
liberalisation in the 1990s, the mill has had to adjust to produce products
capable of  withstanding import competition.
Paper production climbed from 11␣ 000 tonnes in 1982 to 30␣ 000 tonnes by
1990. Production climbed rapidly after 1994 (chart 2.14), assisted by new
investment, operational changes that increased paper machine speed by 50 per
cent and pulp cooking from 14 up to 19 cooks per day, and imports of  pulp.
Pulp mill
The mill is being operated and maintained reasonably well. Chip size after
screening is highly variable and losses between the blow line and bleached
storage are high. The quality of  purchased chips is also highly variable and
reduces pulp quality.
Because of  high losses in digester time, output has failed to reach design capacity.
Shortage of  steam is the main factor in lost digester time (chart 2.15).
The mill is required by the local authorities to meet tough emission standards.
Chemical plant
The plant is clean and functions well. Plant design rate is 7␣ 000 tonnes per
year of  chlorine, but the mill uses only 5␣ 000 tonnes. The difference is sold on
the open market, earning about VND2 billion annually.
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Data source: Pulp mill records.
Steam shortage
43%
Paper machine down
21%
White liquor shortage
10%
Equipment failure
10%
Bad cook
10%
Chip shortage
3%
Other
3%
2.15 Factors contributing to lost digester time per calendar day
Data source: BAPACO records.
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2.14 Mill paper production, pulp production and pulp imports
Maintenance department
Numbers employed are large (555, of  which 436 are tradespeople and 119
are in day labour operations). Groups are designated for each mill area. The
spare parts system set up by the Swedes is regarded as being ‘still possibly the
best in Vietnam’, though the high diversity of  foreign suppliers used initially
creates problems in sourcing parts.
The power boiler is the biggest single problem that needs attention. Erosion
of  tubes in this boiler is a significant issue. The recovery boiler is unable to
supply sufficient steam on its own to enable the fibre line to continue operating.
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Trades people are trained at the vocational training school. Workers initially
came from poor farms and lacked a machinery culture. But this is now changing
as second generation family members are starting to work at the mill.
Power and steam plant
There is one coal-fired power boiler and a recovery boiler. The plant is in
need of  a higher level of  maintenance than it receives. The whole mill runs or
stops according to the performance of  the power boiler. The recovery boiler
steam capacity is too little to enable mill operation on its own. Coal-fired
boilers require continued maintenance and the installation of  only one boiler
is considered a major design fault.
Paper mill
To improve paper quality a range of  new initiatives were recently introduced.
Some, such as the change to alkaline sizing, the new calendar, sizing press and
on-machine quality measuring system, were not yet working properly at the
end of  1997 but are all worthwhile investments.
Refining of  pulp fibres is the bottleneck in the paper mill. Machine rolls are
adequate at present machine speeds, though a change in the press section
would reduce paper breaks.
Product quality
The mill makes 16 basis weights of  paper in the range 52 to 120gsm. The
four most common weights are 52, 58, 60 and 70gsm. Recent changes in
technology such as the move to alkaline sizing, the new calendar and
measurement of  basis weight, moisture, ash and caliper on machine were
introduced to address specific quality complaints from the market.
The local market’s perception of  quality is changing. Starch is used on exercise
book paper for the school market in southern Vietnam, but is not demanded
in the north. Schools in Hanoi are now asking for coated paper covers on
exercise books and higher brightness is in increased demand.
The mill cuts to standard sizes. Reels are sold to merchants for cutting to odd
sizes. Cutters work to order. The mill makes paper to order and produces
paper for general sale.
We analysed and tested two qualities of  Bai Bang paper, copy paper of
nominally 60gsm and exercise book paper, against Australian standards. Bai
Bang’s copy paper was slightly bulkier, weaker, lower opacity, of  lower tensile
strength and rougher. The formation was also highly non-square. Bai Bang
exercise book quality paper was bulkier (a positive quality parameter), not as
square, had lower tensile strength, lower brightness and was rougher.
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Managers stated that the management principles they had learned from the Swedish experts could not be effectively
applied until the economic reform program began. Photo © Heldur Netocny/PHOENIX.
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Technical improvements that should be made
While the mill’s performance is technically acceptable, it is not yet economically
secure. It needs to be able to reduce its operating costs by between 10 and 15
per cent to be confident of  withstanding import competition without tariff
protection. The two most critical issues that need addressing to achieve this
involve:
• installation of  a second power boiler; and
• upgrading of  paper quality to satisfy changing market requirements.
Area Issues
Wood supply • Maximum 20 per cent bamboo.
Wood yard • Improve chip screening. Rechip oversize.
Pulp mill • Extend cook time to obtain kappa 18.
• Accurately measure yield loss after digester.
• Install knot drainer, recook knots, shut knot refiner.
• Aim CI2 residual to be 0.1 per cent.
• Install D stage C Ep D H.
• Install wet lap machine (or larger bleached pulp storage tower).
Paper mill • Maximum 30 per cent of imported pulp to be softwood.
• Ensure ABB QCS operates and use to improve CD profile.
• Use size presses. Consider changing to applicator type (for example,
Symsizer).
• Aim for total broke return (including wet-end, dry-end and finishing room
return paper) to be less than 15 per cent.
• Overhaul rewinder (replace if necessary) to be able to consistently cut
narrow width reels.
• Rearrange piping and chests to make refining system more flexible.
• Exploit newly installed alkaline sizing system to make more copy and offset
printing paper.
Finishing • Use full width reels on A4–A3 sheeter.
• Recalculate price differentials between sheets and reels.
• Consider improving efficiency of exercise book machine.
Chemical plant • Install integrated chlorate–C102 plant.
Power and steam • Install second coal-fired boiler.
• Calculate advantage of shutting the direct contact evaporator and using only
indirect evaporation.
• Evaluate future need to use the condensing turbine.
Marketing • Explore all avenues for reducing the demand for narrow width reels or justify
the cost of necessary equipment upgrades to enable efficient supply by Bai
Bang.
• Consider using ream and reel wrapping as sales devices.
Maintenance • Continue effort to have maintenance tradespeople identify with production
departments.
• ‘Satellite’ maintenance areas.
Source: Technical evaluation (appendix 2C).
2.16 High priority technical improvement issues for consideration
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A summary of  high priority improvements that the mill should consider to
improve both its technical performance and international competitiveness is
set out in table 2.16.
How can Bai Bang compete in the global market?
The world’s paper requirements are supplied by three categories of  mills:
• international;
• national; and
• specialty.
International mills are large (over 300␣ 000 tonnes per year), export-oriented,
modern or recently modernised integrated pulp and paper mills producing a
few standard grades of  paper. Fixed costs are a very high proportion of  total
costs. Paper is often priced on a variable cost basis as it is essential for these
mills to keep their machines fully loaded.
National mills are smaller, domestic-oriented and lack the size and cost-
efficiency to export. They tend to be older and make a wider range of  grades
and grammages. They are close to the requirements of  their domestic
customers. The more competitive are integrated with pulp mills.
Specialty mills are smaller, usually older still, nonintegrated and with many
machines. They make a wide range of  grades, often with a wide range of
finishing options. Production costs and prices are high.
Bai Bang is a national mill. To compete in the global market it must focus on:
• quality;
• service; and
• price.
Bai Bang needs to exploit its ‘closeness to market’ competitive advantage by
offering rapid reliable supply of  predictable, ‘fit for purpose’ paper. Technical
advice on how best to use and handle paper, prompt response to complaints
and offering tailor made quality to domestic customers are ways in which Bai
Bang can withstand import competition.
Being competitive in quality and service can permit a national mill to charge
somewhat more than the imported price. This situation is evident at Bai Bang.
In 1996 imported paper of  equivalent quality to Bai Bang was selling in the
Hanoi market at a price about 10 per cent below the price of  Bai Bang paper.
In early 1998 the landed duty free price of  comparable but higher quality
paper from Indonesia was VND8.6 million per tonne. The ex-factory price
from BAPACO was around VND9 million per tonne. BAPACO’s selling price
in Hanoi was VND10 million per tonne and VND10.6 million per tonne in
Ho Chi Minh City. While BAPACO’s prices seem competitive, the company
often has problems meeting the financing terms offered by foreign competitors.
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For example, in the lead up to the ban on imports in 1997 purchasers were
getting three months and longer credit terms.
How does Bai Bang measure up?
The key requirements for a successful mill in the global paper market are:
• sufficient raw material available at the mill at a reasonable cost;
• year round fresh water availability in sufficient quantities;
• adequate transport links for raw materials in and paper out;
• adequate financial resources to fund continuous investment to maintain
and modernise the facility;
• access to technical expertise; and
• a stable operating and maintenance workforce willing to be trained.
Bai Bang’s strengths and weaknesses measured against these requirements
are shown in table 2.17.
2.17 Competitive strengths and weaknesses of BAPACO
Strengths
• Well established with some modern machinery
• Expanding wood resource allowing increased paper output in future
• Professionally planned plantation establishment program
• Low capital cost charges
• Vietnamese run for Vietnamese customers
• Well equipped training school
Weaknesses
• Single unit power boiler limits pulp mill output
• Low brightness capability of bleach plant limits perceived paper quality
• Mill investments have not kept up with quality demands in present market – paper brightness,
opacity and surface strength need improving
• Requirement to be a ‘good citizen’ and financial control exerted by VPC may limit availability of
capital
• Poor road system is a barrier to close links with major market centres
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3 Performance of
forestry and side projects
VPMC makes a small profit in a heavily regulated commercial environment. Its
contribution to government revenue is also small and the average wage it pays
its workers is only one third that received by BAPACO workers. Decision making
processes in VPMC are Vietnamese in nature, with little evidence of a Swedish
influence. A professionally planned plantation establishment program has been
implemented. This, together with improvements in log procurement arrange-
ments and worker incentives, is delivering sufficient logs to meet mill require-
ments. The housing and transport side projects have made effective contribu-
tions to the project with the transport project being critical to project success.
THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER ANALYSED the performance of  the company
responsible for mill operations. Mill performance is heavily determined by
the availability of  sufficient logs at a reasonable price. In the early years of  the
project there were ongoing concerns about the quality and quantity of  logs
available for the mill. Although the Vietnamese authorities at the time of  the
project planning phase argued that there were plentiful supplies of  bamboo
and hardwood, it soon became apparent that an extensive plantation program
would be needed to secure sufficient supplies for the mill over the medium to
longer term.
Since the mill began operations, paper production has been constrained from
time to time by inadequate log supplies. Considerable effort has therefore
gone into institutional reforms and investments in forestry to improve log
availability. Up until 1990 log procurement was the responsibility of  a raw
material supply union reporting through a board of  management to the
Ministry of  Forestry. The raw material supply union in turn worked with
each of  the raw material provinces to source logs from forest enterprises in
each province. These forest enterprises were controlled by their respective
provincial governments. The system was highly bureaucratic and was governed
by Ministry plans.
Between 1990 and 1996 the mill was allowed to buy logs from many supply
sources. This system was abandoned because it led to uncontrolled destruction
of  forests.
39
In 1996 VPMC became the sole provider of  logs to BAPACO. VPMC sources its
logs from its own forest enterprises, from independent forest enterprises under the
control of  the provincial authorities in Tuyen Quang, Yen Bai and Lao Cai, and
from private growers. Private growers include forest enterprise workers planting
trees on forest enterprise land and private farmers. Under these arrangements the
supply chain is more direct than previously and easier to control.
In this chapter we analyse the financial performance of  VPMC, its
management structures and decision making processes. We look at the progress
that has been made in plantation development and in reforestation of  the
hillsides of  the forest supply regions, which were cleared in earlier years for
firewood and for agriculture.
Financial position of VPMC
VPMC’s revenue is essentially determined for it by the volume of  logs demanded
by BAPACO and by a set price for logs at the mill door. The volume of  logs
required depends on the operational efficiency of  the pulp mill. As noted earlier,
the log price is set by VPC in conjunction with BAPACO. It is based on what
the mill considers it can afford to pay to achieve its desired profit level taking
into account all other costs. VPMC’s costs are dominated by what it pays for
logs to growers at the point of  supply (the forest). The log price to growers is set
by subtracting freight, bridge and ferry costs, storage costs and a regulated profit
component for VPMC from the mill door price (table 3.1). Grower prices
therefore vary according to location. While this mechanism for determining log
prices effectively preserves the profits of  both BAPACO and VPMC, it does so
at the expense of  log growers, who receive the residual.
In contrast to the situation with BAPACO, the accounts maintained by VPMC
are poor. The company was not prepared to release any financial information
to us. However, VPC provided us with extracts of  the financial reports of
VPMC for 1995, 1996 and the first nine months of  1997. This data was
incomplete and contained considerable discrepancies.
3.1 Mill door log prices 1997
Mill door pricea
VND/t
Eucalyptus 420␣ 000
Acacia 340␣ 000
Styrax 330␣ 000
Manglieta glauca 330␣ 000
Bamboo 360␣ 000
a Prices to growers are about 50 per cent of mill door prices with the difference between grower
price and mill door price being absorbed by the costs incurred between the forest and the mill
(including VPMC’s profit margin).
Source: VPMC.
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A summary of  the financial position of  the company is shown in table 3.2.
More details are provided in appendix 3A.
Revenue and operating costs
Net turnover (total value of  sales less turnover tax) was VND60.2 billion in
1996. The cost of  producing these sales was VND52.8 billion. The company
made a small profit before tax of  VND1.04 billion in 1996.
The accounts show a 73 per cent increase in turnover from 1995 to 1996.
Apart from salary expenses of  VND9.1 billion in 1996, the financial reports
do not provide a breakdown of  operating costs.
Fixed assets
The accounts show total fixed assets in 1996 of  VND24.9 billion, made up of
VND22 billion of  depreciated fixed assets, VND1.4 billion of  construction in
progress and VND1.6 billion of  long term investments.
Current assets and liabilities
In 1996 VPMC had current assets of  VND118.2 billion dominated by stock
on hand and accounts receivable. Current liabilities were VND59.5 billion.
The company had a very small loan (VND2.5 billion) and a small amount of
cash on hand (VND9.9 billion) relative to its total current assets.
3.2 Key financial outcomes for VPMC
1996
Net turnovera VND million 60 165
Cost of goods sold VND million 52 784
Gross marginb % 12.3
Production volume m3 107 226
Fixed assets – NBV VND million 24 930
Inventories (stocks) VND million 74 204
Trade debtorsc VND million 22 106
Current assets VND million 118 974
Current liabilities VND million 59 455
Working capital VND million 58 284
Capital VND million 43 214
Profit before tax VND million 1 037
Taxation charge na
Profit tax rate na
na Not available from the financial reports.
a Value of sales less turnover tax. b Net turnover less cost of goods sold as a percentage of net
turnover. c Money owing from sales of paper.
Source: VPMC financial statements.
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Return on capital
In 1996 total capital was VND42.6 billion dominated by paid in capital of
VND35.9 billion. The return on capital was low at 2.4 per cent. This compares
with a return on capital of  5.5 per cent for BAPACO.
Wages and employment
Permanent employment by VPMC in 1996 was 2651 persons (1161 female,
1490 male). The total salary expenses were VND9064 million, yielding an
average monthly wage of  less than VND300␣ 000 (compared with more than
VND1 million per month for BAPACO employees). Salary costs represent 17
per cent of  the cost of  goods sold. There have been large reductions in VPMC’s
permanent workforce – from around 10␣ 000 workers at the end of  the 1980s
to 2590 at the end of  1997.
In addition to its permanent employees, VPMC also hires workers on a part time
basis for certain times of  the year and engages private growers in tree planting
operations on a revenue sharing basis. Private growers and other part time workers,
which are estimated to involve 9000 to 10␣ 000 persons, can be permanent
employees of  VPMC, their families or relatives, or other nearby farmers.
Contribution to government revenue
In 1996 VPMC contributed VND3.5 billion to state taxes (table 3.3). The
company appears to be paying an effective profits tax of  between 13 and 16
per cent, which is low for a typical Vietnamese company. In addition to the
above taxes, the company collected VND2.5 billion from workers in social
insurance, health insurance and trade union fees.
3.3 Contribution of VPMC to government revenue
1996
VND million
Turnover tax 763
Profits tax 138
Tax on capital 260
Housing taxes 182
Land tax 710
Natural resource tax 497
Personal income tax na
Other taxes 976
Total 3 526
na Not available.
Source: VPMC financial statements.
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Short term viability of VPMC
With its monopoly on log supplies to BAPACO and set prices for the logs it
sells and what it pays for logs, VPMC’s profit stream is reasonably secure in
the short term. A key issue over the longer term is whether the prices it is
prepared to pay for logs will provide sufficient incentives for logs to be grown.
At present, logs are in abundant supply. When additional production capacity
comes on stream at Bai Bang the log supply situation will become tighter.
However, it is expected that the current plantation inventories and expansion
program will be sufficient to meet mill needs on a sustainable basis for
production of  around 100␣ 000 tonnes of  paper per year.
VPMC management structures, decision proc-
esses and interactions with authorities
VPMC is run by a board of  directors (one general director, two vice-directors),
which controls four administrative and technical departments, 20 forest
enterprises and three forest support enterprises. The 20 forest enterprises
establish plantations and harvest, manage and protect forests. They keep
individual profit and loss accounts to report to the company’s financial
department. The three other enterprises consist of:
• a road construction enterprise – which constructs access roads;
• a forest product transporting and trading enterprise – which trades and
transports logs to the mill; and
• a forest design enterprise – which undertakes plantation and harvest design
to specified environmental and silvicultural requirements for the company.
Each forest enterprise has a director, vice-director and chief  accountant, and
several plantation brigades. The organisational structure is direct and simple
with enterprise directors managing their enterprises according to company
regulations.
Rewards and sanctions
Salaries for workers in company management and administration are set
according to government regulation and reflect a minimum payment plus
increment based on seniority and location rather than performance. Salaries
for forest workers are based on quantity of  work done. Forest worker salaries
are low compared with salaries of  workers in other nonagricultural sectors.
But they are high compared with agricultural incomes (which is generally the
next best alternative form of  work for forest workers), they are paid regularly
and there is a retirement pension as an additional enticement plus what can
be earned from private plantations. For these reasons, forest enterprises have
no trouble in finding workers.
Like BAPACO, VPMC has bonus and welfare funds. But, because the company
has only a small income, distributions from these funds are low and do not
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provide much of  an incentive to workers. There is some resentment among
VPMC employees of  their low salaries compared with the salaries earned by
BAPACO workers.
The government’s land allocation policy, aimed at reforesting bare land, has
provided strong financial incentives to forest workers. Under this policy forest
enterprises are given land and funds to plant trees according to their capability.
Forest enterprises in turn redistribute this to their employees, finding it an
effective way to plant and protect forests. Employees also receive tree nursery
services and other technical support. Land close to employee houses is highly
prized. Areas located far from the houses stay with the enterprises, which
then assign workers to plant and protect them.
Additional earnings from this source can be substantial compared with their
salaries. A further incentive is that workers can control the land if  they are
able to successfully plant it to trees.
The main sanction on forest workers is threat of  job loss through the extensive
and continuing downsizing of  forest enterprises. Dismissal for poor
performance is rare.
Decision making processes
VPC controls major purchasing, log pricing and selling decisions, though
VPMC has autonomy in day-to-day spending operations. Log harvest plans
require approval from VPC and MARD. VPMC is subject to pressure from
provincial authorities to buy timber from local farmers even when its own
supply of  logs exceeds mill demands. The communist party steering committee
exerts a strong influence on personnel matters.
Plantation investment plans are controlled by VPC as follows.
• Based on the production plans of  BAPACO, VPMC’s planning department
calculates the required log volume and plantation needs.
• Forest enterprises state their plantation capabilities in terms of  land area
and labour.
• VPMC’s planning department reconciles these two plans and sends a
proposal to VPC for consideration and modification.
Unlike the case with BAPACO, the decision making processes in VPMC are
similar to those usually employed in Vietnamese companies. They are
cumbersome, time consuming and dominated by group decision making.
There is very little evidence of  a Swedish influence on company management.
Expanding log supplies
The availability of  logs and the quality of  pulp they yield is critical to the long
term viability of  the mill. There was considerable doubt about the supply
potential of  the forests at the time the decision to proceed with the project
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was made. No firm evidence of  sufficient future supply was provided by the
Vietnamese authorities (Scanmanagement 1990).
This had two important consequences.
• The paper mill design capacity was constrained to 55␣ 000 tonnes and pulp
mill design capacity was constrained to 48␣ 000 tonnes (which necessitated
pulp imports for paper capacity to be achieved).
• An extensive forestry program was put in place at the start to trial and
reforest large areas, and build the necessary transport infrastructure to access
existing forests.
The initial emphasis was on silviculture, harvesting and transport. This was
later broadened to include actions to improve the conditions of  forest workers
and the bureaucratic structures under which the forest resource was managed
and harvested.
The forestry part of  the project was split from the main project in 1986 with
silviculture and soil conservation activities carried out under the Plantation
and Soil Conservation Project, which incorporated social and agroforestry
considerations as well as industrial plantations. This work continued between
1990 and 1996 under the Vietnam–Sweden Cooperation Program. And the
present Sida funded 1996–2000 Mountain Rural Development Program also
contains a substantial social forestry aspect.
Since the mill began
operations, paper
production has been
constrained from time
to time by inadequate
log supplies. For the
time being log supply
does not seem to be a
problem.  Logs being
driven down Song
Lo, 50 km north of
Bai Bang.
Photo © Heldur
Netocny/
PHOENIX.
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Plantation development
The mill has an assigned raw material area (forestry development area) covering
land in the provinces of  Vinh Phu, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai and Ha
Giang. The raw material area, which has been enlarged several times, contains
native forests and land suitable for plantations.
Initial supplies were heavily dependent on bamboo from natural forests.
Bamboo grows fast (four to five year rotations) and the Vietnamese have a
long tradition in growing it. With plantation development, bamboo use has
since fallen from 70 to 30 per cent by volume of  log procurements with about
half  the bamboo sourced from farmers. Bamboo sales to the mill are still an
important income source for farmers in the lower valleys.
Early plantations were pine and later mainly eucalyptus, styrax and acacia.
An inventory was constructed of  industrial plantations established between
1984 and 1994 by state enterprises and cooperatives controlled by the raw
materials company in the provinces of  Vinh Phu, Yen Bai, Tuyen Quang and
Lao Cai (Jaako Pöyry Consulting AB n.d.) The total area planted between
1984 and 1994 was 51␣ 300 hectares – consisting of  32␣ 200 hectares of
hardwood and 1400 hectares of  pine with 10␣ 600 hectares classified as failed,
4300 hectares as destroyed and 2700 hectares as harvested. Over half  the
failure was due to illegal logging, buffalo damage and disease, with the rest
due to silvicultural problems. Total standing volume in compartments of  age
four and above was estimated at 1.067 million cubic metres (over bark).
Plantation development has accelerated over the past five years with industrial
plantation development by state owned forest enterprises and with rapid
reforestation by farmers in a belt 50 to 200 kilometres from Bai Bang. The
massive increase in tree planting reflects the following factors.
• Improvements in land tenure arrangements through the Forestry Act of
1991, which authorised the allocation of  state forest land to private
individuals. Under these arrangements farmers can gain security over land
for up to 50 years. This has encouraged planting of  industrial and fruit
trees in the lowlands, and the protection and management of  native forest
in the highlands. (Donovan, Rambo, Fox, Le and Tran (1997) note that,
since the introduction of  the 1991 Forestry Act, much of  what has previously
been classified as swidden land has now been reforested.)
• The introduction of  a system of  land contracts based on subsidised seedlings,
extension advice on planting and management, and revenue sharing
arrangements with government and local authorities.
• A growing awareness by farmers of  the contribution of  treed hillsides to
the productivity of  upland agriculture through prevention of  soil erosion
and through retention of  water in the high valleys.
• State program 327 introduced in 1994. This program channels funds
through provincial departments of  agriculture and forestry, and provincial
treasuries to subsidise farmers and state enterprises to plant trees to protect
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bare hills. The program is believed to have had a substantial impact on new
plantings.
• A recognition by farmers that industrial tree planting can be an attractive
commercial enterprise. The economics of  private plantation development
vary considerably between sites. High returns are possible on suitable sites
within a reasonable transport distance from the mill. For example, Olney
(1995), in a report prepared for the Vietnam–Sweden Forestry Cooperation
Program, reports an internal rate of  return of  71 per cent on low and
midland eucalyptus plantings. By contrast, Hang (1995) concluded from a
study of  smallholder reforestation projects in central coastal Vietnam that
the prices of  logs at the farm gate were too low to make such plantings
financially attractive.
• A freer market for logs than existed in the 1980s, though with VPMC still
being sole purchaser of  logs for the Bai Bang mill.
Plantation productivity is being continually improved through better
silvicultural techniques, and screening of  species and varieties to suit particular
sites. In commercial plantations in Tuyen Quang province acacia and styrax
are producing 80 cubic metres of  logs per hectare (ten year rotation) and
manglieta glauca about 100 cubic metres per hectare (15 year rotation).
The role of the Forest Research Centre
The Bai Bang region has a professionally planned plantation establishment
program centred around the nearby Forest Research Centre (FRC). Established
20 years ago, the FRC received extensive funding from Sweden until 1996
and is now part of  VPC. FRC employs 90 people, 20 of  whom are senior
researchers. It concentrates on evaluating tree varieties and establishing
silvicultural techniques. It operates trial plantations and a production nursery
from seed, cuttings and tissue culture.
The FRC has established about 50 or more species and provenance tests
throughout the region and has identified which areas are best suited to which
trees. Plantation performance differs considerably between species and
locations. Mean annual increments (MAIs) of  about 16 cubic metres of  logs
per hectare over bark have been measured after year ten on unimproved stock.
MAIs of  above 30 have been measured on tissue culture clones. The FRC has
200 hectares of  tissue culture clonal trials.
These measured MAIs are extremely high by European standards. They
indicate that Vietnam’s forests are capable of  rapid production of  pulp logs.
By comparison, average MAIs recorded in Sweden’s plantation forests are
around 4 cubic metres of  logs per hectare per year. The growth rate ranges
from 7 cubic metres per hectare per year in the south of  Sweden to only 1
cubic metre per hectare per year in the north.
The FRC provides considerable assistance (seedlings as well as technical
expertise) to people who want to plant trees. Extension services include news
bulletins and training programs in planting. The FRC has played a major
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part in reforestation of  bare hillsides and in securing future mill requirements
for logs.
The FRC has also been active in helping ethnic minorities in the raw material
area. Ethnic minorities who were previously engaged in slash and burn
agriculture have proved to be skilled and strong participants in the reforestation
programs.
Current mill needs and plantation availability
There are enough logs from forest enterprise sources to meet current mill
requirements. But, to provide farmers with income and to ensure plantation
reserves for the future, around 10 per cent of  logs are currently being purchased
from private growers.
The annual rate of  plantings by farmers and the accumulated farmer
plantation area is not known, though anecdotal evidence suggests that the
increase in wood fibre biomass on private farms is very large.
The current plantation estate of  VPMC is shown in table 3.4. Estimates of
plantation area by species in the five provinces are also provided by the Forest
Research Centre’s socioeconomic and environmental monitoring studies (table
3.5). The plantation area and timber volume available to the mill is considerably
higher than the estimates in these tables when private plantations and natural
forests are taken into account. The government is restricting native forest
harvesting and, as plantations come on line, the use of  native forest wood at
Bai Bang will decline.
The plan of  VPMC is to establish 6000 hectares of  plantations per year (2500
hectares of  styrax, 1500 hectares of  eucalypt and 2000 hectares of  acacia) to
achieve a 70␣ 000 hectare plantation estate. Should this be achieved, there will
be adequate quantities of  wood available to meet the mill’s expansion plans.
A 70␣ 000 hectare estate managed on a ten year rotation with trees having an
MAI of  16 cubic metres per year per hectare over bark, as measured in FRC
trials, will provide about 490␣ 000 tonnes (bone dry) of  wood annually. This
would be enough to produce 280␣ 000 tonnes of  paper at 10 per cent ash
content. Even with MAIs of  only one quarter of  this there would be more
than enough wood to allow the mill to operate at full capacity.
The productivity being achieved in commercial plantations is still
considerably less than that being measured in FRC trials. Productivity using
natural seedlings is much lower than productivity being achieved using
laboratory developed nursery seedlings in the newer plantations. The goal
is to achieve, through more research on the best species for various soil
conditions, MAIs of  20 to 25 cubic metres per hectare per year, which is
more than double current yields.
The target rate of  plantation development is about 20 per cent above the
average rate of  plantation development that has occurred over recent years.
But, with steady improvements in plantation technology being achieved, the
target rate of  establishment appears physically achievable.
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On a national scale, the Vietnamese government plans to establish 5 million
hectares of  plantations by 2010. One million hectares of  this is designated for
pulp production and forms part of  VPC’s master plan for log supplies.
But doubts still remain about the commercial viability of  plantations. At current
log prices and growth rates, non-subsidised interest rates are too high to make
plantation investments viable. Enterprises need tax exemptions for the first
and second rotations to ensure viability. VPMC spent VND21 billion in 1997
on 3500 hectares of  new plantations. About VND15 billion of  this was a soft
loan from the government. And more money is needed to fund the construction
of  plantation access roads.
Incentives facing forest workers and private growers
The incentives facing forest enterprise workers and private log growers are
critical determinants of  log availability. The poor conditions of  forest workers
were identified in a 1984 socioeconomic study of  raw material supply (Larsson
and Birgegard 1985) as a major factor constraining the supply of  logs to the
mill. As discussed in chapter 6, the present situation is vastly different. Average
wages of  forest workers in forest enterprises now exceed 400␣ 000 dong per
month, which is substantially higher from the incomes for local people not
employed in forest enterprises. In addition, forest workers have access to income
from planting trees on land made available by the forest enterprise. Workers
receive low interest loans to provide further encouragement to tree planting
and sell the grown trees to VPMC under a nominated revenue sharing
arrangement. An average of  VND150␣ 000 per month is obtained from this
source.
Housing standards of  forest workers have also improved markedly, with most
now living in separate houses of  brick and tile with cement floors – superior
accommodation to that of  neighbouring farmers. Houses have access to
gardens of  between 1000 and 5000 square metres. Health and education
3.5 Estimates by the Forest Research Centre of plantation area by species and year
Hectares
Eucalyptus Eucalyptus Acacia Styrax Manglieta
Year camaldulensis urophylla mangium tonkinensis glauca Other Total
1986 1 180 0 10 1 550 2 550 540 5 830
1987 1 301 0 20 1 740 860 390 4 311
1988 1 520 0 410 2 500 240 170 4 840
1989 800 800 940 2 690 260 210 5 700
1990 250 1 590 930 2 650 130 50 5 600
1991 200 1 850 1 100 2 700 500 50 6 400
1992 200 1 040 850 2 660 510 610 5 870
1993 200 1 000 1 000 1 950 750 600 5 500
Total 5 651 6 280 5 260 18 440 5 800 2 620 43 760
Source: Nguyen and Huynh (1994).
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provisions have also vastly improved. Because of  the very favourable working
conditions, it is now easy to recruit forest workers.
Some private growers and forest enterprise managers considered that the prices
they were receiving for logs in the forest provided inadequate returns for their
efforts. While incentives to date have been sufficient to encourage a big increase
in tree planting, at issue is whether prices to growers will need to be raised
over the longer term to encourage continuous planting on a sufficient scale to
meet mill requirements. Log prices in the future will be shaped by a
combination of  factors, including the demands by the mill and other enterprises
for the logs and the extent to which advances in silvicultural techniques deliver
improved log growth rates and plantation productivity.
Performance of other side projects
In addition to forestry and related activities directed at plantation and soil
conservation and the living conditions of  forest workers, the project also
involved side projects covering vocational training (considered in chapter 5),
housing and transport.
Housing
The housing side project, which commenced in 1984, aimed to provide a
standard of  community living conditions sufficient to attract and motivate
the industrial workforce. Under the project 154 houses were constructed for
mill workers and their families. These houses are well maintained and of  a
higher quality and larger size than the norm in today’s Vietnam. They are
serviced by roads (paved by BAPACO) and are made available to employees
at very low rents (around US$3 per month in 1997).
The project has fulfilled its aims. The town today enjoys extremely high
community living conditions, which the housing project has contributed to.
The high quality of  housing and other community infrastructure makes Bai
Bang an attractive place to live and work in.
Transport
In the early operations phase the supply of  raw materials to the mill was
heavily constrained by inadequate transport facilities. A transport side project
commenced in 1985 to supply a fleet of  pushers and barges for river transport
of  coal and limestone, and a river harbour with modern unloading facilities
close to the mill. The transport side project has made, and continues to make,
a critical contribution to the efficiency of  mill operations.
Transport facilities are now operated by a transport division within BAPACO.
The division operates barges and the port, and also a fleet of  well maintained
vehicles (mostly Swedish) and continues to buy equipment from Sweden. As
well as providing workshop services for mill transport equipment, the transport
division provides about 20 per cent of  its services to outside customers.
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4 Economywide impact
We estimate that in 1996 the mill and forestry generated about VND465 billion
of additional national income (US$42 million), supporting additional real private
consumption expenditure of about VND2900 per Vietnamese citizen and
generating an additional VND63.3 billion in government revenue. Because of
paper import replacement, the balance of trade improves by VND445 billion.
The regional impact is considerably more significant. About 54 per cent of mill
and forestry wage income accrues to male mill workers, 24 per cent to female
mill workers, 12 per cent to male forestry workers and 10 per cent to female
forestry workers.
THE ANALYSIS in chapters 2 and 3 was concerned with the performance of
mill and forestry operations conducted by the two companies responsible for
that performance. Mill and forestry operations in turn ‘spill over’ to affect the
performance of  the regional economy and the national economy as industries
buy and sell from each other. In this chapter we address the following questions.
What is the impact of  the project on the regional economy and the national
economy and what are the main pathways through which this impact occurs?
How much does the mill and associated forestry activities contribute to national
income, the balance of  trade and the public funds balance? And how is the income
generated by the project distributed across different categories of  workers?
The mill and associated activities impact on the regional and national
economies through a number of  pathways.
• The mill spends on inputs. Some of  these, such as coal and logs, are produced
domestically. This expenditure raises output, employment and income in
domestic input supplying industries such as mining, forestry, chemicals and
petroleum. To expand their output, input supplying industries must also
spend on inputs, some of  which are supplied by other domestic industries.
• The mill spends directly on imported inputs. And input supplying industries
are also partly reliant on imported inputs. This requires foreign exchange
earnings from exports to pay for them and has implications for the balance
of  trade.
• The mill spends directly on labour. This creates direct jobs and wage bills
also expand in input supplying industries. Wage bills are in turn spend on
domestic and imported goods and services. This leads to growth in output,
employment and income in domestic industries supplying consumption
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goods and services (local restaurants, leisure facilities, etc.) and to foreign
exchange requirements for imported goods and services.
• The mill provides bulk paper for further processing. This provides
employment and income earning opportunities for further processing into
finished products.
• The mill provides paper for local residents. To the extent that Vietnamese
paper demands are met by local production, foreign exchange is saved
through lower paper imports.
• The mill uses labour of  various skill levels, and other goods and services
which may be in limited supply. Labour, capital and raw materials used by
the mill are not available to contribute to output, employment and income
elsewhere in the economy. That is, the mill has a cost in that it crowds out
other activities that might have used these inputs.
• The mill contributes to government revenue directly. Both BAPACO and
VPMC pay taxes to regional governments and the central government on
their turnover, profits and capital. The expansion in output of  industries
supplying inputs to the mill, and industries supplying goods and services to
wage earners in mill companies and supplier industries has resulted in an
expansion in the tax base and hence taxation revenue. Governments in
turn spend this revenue, which provides a further stimulus to economic
activity and employment, and provides physical and social infrastructure,
which enhances community living standards.
• Each time spending occurs as a result of  mill activities, production and
employment receive a stimulus somewhere in Vietnam. The stimulus may
occur in the local district (such as in the case of  paper converter activity in
Phong Chau townlet), in neighbouring provinces (for example, through forest
operations in Tuyen Quang province) and in provinces far removed from
the mill (for example, through government spending throughout the country
of  taxation revenue collected from mill and associated activities).
Our analysis of  the impact of  the project on the regional economy is based
on information collected on the cost and sales links between the mill and
regional industries. We address the impact of  the project on the national
economy by using an economywide model. The model quantifies the direct
and indirect links between the mill and other sectors of  the economy, giving
due consideration to the income foregone from using resources for paper
production at Bai Bang rather than in some alternative activity.
Regional impact
The mill is located in Phu Tho province (Vinh Phu province under the old
boundaries) in the district of  Phong Chau (legendary capital of  18 King Hung
dynasties) between the Red and Lo Rivers. The district (population 240␣ 000)
is the centre for economic, political and military affairs in the province and
contributes 40 per cent of  the province’s budget. Phong Chau district townlet
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was founded by the government at the end of  1979 to administer the Bai
Bang industrial zone. The mill is the largest enterprise in the district. Other
industries include a chemical and fertiliser factory, military factory and battery
factory.
The district’s budget comes from taxes on local business and provincial
government allocations. The mill does not contribute directly – its taxes go to
the central government – but makes a major indirect contribution through
expenditure of  mill employees on goods and services provided by local
businesses.
As well as contributing to local business development indirectly through
spending of  wages by workers and their families, the mill sustains a number
of  local businesses through its purchase of  inputs and through product sales
for further processing.
• The mill purchases alum from a local factory employing 13 people and
producing 500 tonnes of  alum per year.
• The mill purchases glue from a silicate glue factory producing 100 tonnes
of  glue per year.
• About 150 to 200 people in Phong Chau are engaged in supplying bamboo
chips to the mill.
• There are 18 paper converters in Phong Chau converting reject paper from
the mill each year into carton paper and tissue paper, and in making exercise
books from mill paper. In total they convert about 300 tonnes of  paper per
year. On average about 10 people are employed in each local converter
business – about 180 people in all.
As a result of  the mill, the nearby Phong Chau townlet (population 16␣ 000) is
the richest in the district and province with flourishing small business, very
high housing standards and social infrastructure (chapter 6).
Phu Tho province in 1997 had an estimated provincial income (GDP) of
about VND3000 billion. Income generated directly by the mill accounts for
about 5 per cent of  Phu Tho GDP.
The project’s contribution to Phu Tho GDP is somewhat larger than the
direct contribution from mill income. To the direct contribution from the mill
income we must also add the net income generated by local industries within
the province from supplying inputs to the mill and from supplying goods and
services to satisfy the wage spending of  mill workers.
About VND34.5 billion (8.7 per cent) of  1996 mill expenditure is spent on
wages. These wages are in turn spent on goods and services to meet the
consumption needs of  wage earners. Some of  these goods and services are
supplied locally, which adds to the prosperity of  the local business community,
while some leak to other domestic supplying regions and to imports. From
our survey of  the profitability of  Phong Chau businesses and their degree of
dependence on the expenditure of  mill workers and their families (see chapter
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6), we estimate that income generated by these businesses through providing
goods and services to mill wage earners and their families accounts for about
0.5 per cent of  provincial GDP.
In addition to its role in generating income, the mill makes significant
contributions to social infrastructure in the district. BAPACO provides support
to:
• local schools;
• the local medical station (where emergency access is for all local residents
not just employees);
• the electricity network (5.5 kilometres of  lighting and 1.5 kilometres of  high
voltage cabling provided);
• road development (9.5 kilometres of  road recently upgraded);
• the local water supply (about 55 per cent of  the population use the water
supply from the mill);
• the electricity grid (5.5 per cent of  the population purchase mill electricity
at a 20 per cent price discount to the market price);
• leisure facilities (the mill provided swimming pool, sports stadium and club
can be used by all local residents);
• environmental improvement (VND500 million provided by BAPACO in
1995); and
• natural disaster relief  (flood and storm mitigation help).
Links to regional activity through mill expenditure
Around one third of  the 1996 expenditure of  the mill was on imported pulp.
This represents a leakage from the Vietnamese economy. A further 55 per
cent was spent on raw materials – logs, chemicals, coal, etc. – nearly all of
which is supplied domestically (logs from the five northern provinces covering
the mill’s raw material area, limestone from Ninh Binh province, salt from
Nghe An and Binh Thuan provinces, and coal and rosin from Quang Ninh
province). Domestic expenditure on these items stimulates output and
employment in the activities supplying these materials and in the regions in
which the supplying activities are located. Major suppliers are VPMC (through
which e.g. Tuyen Quang Forest Products Company supply logs to the mill),
the Vinh Phu Petrol Company (fuel), the Phu Tho General Trade Company
(equipment, machines, chemicals, imported pulp) and the Vietnam Coal
Corporation (coal). Table 4.1 contains information on the activities of  these
companies and the importance of  the mill as a customer.
VPMC is 90 per cent dependent on the Bai Bang Paper Company for its
sales. The direct impact of  Bai Bang can therefore be estimated as an injection
of  2880 million dong annually into the company, the employment of  2340
full-time workers (with an average monthly income of  VND470␣ 000 in 1997)
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and the annual contribution of  VND2880 million to government in taxation.
A further 9000 workers are engaged on a part time basis in growing wood for
the company.
VPMC and other input suppliers also spend on wages, and goods and services
in producing inputs for Bai Bang. This expenditure creates further flow-on
effects on employment, output and income in industries servicing these
expenditure needs.
Expenditure by VPMC in 1996 was VND52.7 billion. Of  this, VND9.1 billion
was wages for VPMC’s 2651 direct employees. These wages are in turn spent
on goods and services providing a stimulus to output and employment in the
regions supplying these goods and services. No further breakup is provided in
the company’s financial accounts, though the majority of  the remainder is
payments to log suppliers.
Table 4.2 shows the annual estimated injection of  purchasing power into the
wood supply regions in 1997 assuming that 50 per cent of  the mill door price
is returned to the grower. This injection is in turn spent by regional growers
on goods and services. Some of  these goods and services are provided locally,
providing a flow-on stimulus to output and employment in regional economies.

About VND42 billion per year is injected into the log supply regions from the
purchase of  logs for Bai Bang. This injection is used to pay the wages of  forest
workers and other inputs to log growing and harvesting with the surplus
accruing as profits to forest enterprises. A share of  these profits is in turn
spent on amenities for workers.
The difference between the cost of  logs at the mill door and the payment for
logs at the point of  supply is spent on transport and other service costs incurred
between forest and mill. This expenditure also generates economic activity
and employment in Phu Tho and neighbouring provinces.
4.2 Estimated injection of money to log supply regions from purchase of logs from
Bai Bang Based on 1996 log prices and volumes
Estimated Employment in
injection of state forest
Percentage money from Population GDP per enterprises in
Region  of logs sale of logs of province  capita each region
% VND billion Million US$ No.
Tuyen Quang 30 13.38 0.66 250 1 750
Ha Giang 10 4.46 0.55 100 750
Yen Bai 15 6.69 0.67 130 1 500
Vinh Phu 40 17.48 1.1 na 250
Phu Tho 1.25 192 960
na Not available.
Source: Compiled from information supplied by VPMC.
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Only 1.5 per cent of  the sales of  the Vinh Phu Petrol Company are to
BAPACO. The petrol company sources its product outside the region, which
is where the flow on benefits from its servicing of  BAPACO’s needs accrue.
Nearly half  the sales of  the Phu Tho General Trading Company are to
BAPACO. The trading company sources its inputs to BAPACO from
throughout Vietnam and overseas. Less than 2.5 per cent of  the sales of  the
Vietnam Coal Corporation are to the mill.
Factors influencing and inhibiting these links
By far the strongest link between the mill and other industries is its link to
forestry operations through VPMC. This link is orchestrated through the
monopoly given to VPMC by VPC as sole supplier of  logs to BAPACO.
Advantages of  this arrangement are:
• the mill has a secure supply of  logs at a set price; and
• the authorities can identify the source of  the logs and hence can control
rates of  harvest, area and location of  harvest, which assists management of
the forest estate and assists in controlling illegal logging.
Disadvantages are:
• log suppliers can be squeezed on prices;
• log suppliers have restricted opportunities to sell logs elsewhere; and
• BAPACO cannot choose between suppliers and prices.
It is highly likely that the VPMC log monopoly is creating inefficiencies in
resource allocation in the log growing and distribution sector. More competitive
supply arrangements would allow logs to flow to their highest value end uses
and achieve better incentives to growers in different regions.
The next most important link is between the mill and the Phu Tho General
Trading Company, through which the mill coordinates substantial material
purchases. The trading company in turn is linked to a range of  suppliers in
Vietnam and overseas. BAPACO is not allowed to import directly – importing
equipment and materials must be done through VPC. This reduces the
commercial flexibility of  BAPACO and hence its profit performance.
BAPACO also has downstream links to customers. More than 160 customers
purchase its paper. The customer links are tightly controlled by VPC, which
buys and resells 50 per cent of  BAPACO’s paper and prevents it from
establishing other avenues for selling its rolled paper. This restriction is a
significant constraint on BAPACO’s commercial operations and profitability.
It prevents BAPACO from aggressively marketing its products to domestic
customers.
58
Impact on national economy
The national economic contribution of  the project is the amount it contributes
to improving living standards of  Vietnamese citizens. Measures of  this
contribution are how much the mill adds to national income (real GDP) and
how much additional real consumption it makes possible. To obtain such
measures requires that we add up the net income generated by the mill directly
and indirectly through its links to other industries in the economy. We also
need to take into account the ‘crowding out’ effects of  the mill. Resources
used by the mill are not available for use in other income generating activities
– hence potential income is lost elsewhere. And production at Bai Bang may
raise the demand for inputs and hence their price and cost to other industries,
leading to reduced growth prospects for these other industries. An
economywide model, which incorporates the links between the mill and input
supplying industries and downstream users, and which accounts for the total
availability of  resources and their demands by all industries, is needed to
determine this.
By accounting for all sectors of  production and demand in the economy and
the relevant resource constraints, the model (see appendix 4A for details)
determines the impact of  mill production on each sector of  the economy and
on key macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP and the balance of  trade.
Rice field not far from the Phong Chau township. The economic activity at the mill is
helping to spur economic growth in the region. Photo A. Berlin.
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The model divides the Vietnamese economy into 41 sectors of  production.
Paper production is covered by two sectors: the Bai Bang Paper Company,
which is modelled as a separate industry; and a second sector that includes all
other Vietnamese paper production. A forestry sector supplies logs to the two
paper production industries.
The model is constructed around an input–output database for Vietnam for
1996. The database incorporates the cost structure for Bai Bang as revealed
in BAPACO’s financial records and the industry sectors (both domestic and
imported) from which it sources its inputs. It also incorporates the sales structure
of  its products to households, government, and industry to commerce.
In 1996 Bai Bang was the largest of  Vietnam’s 93 paper mills, accounting for
26 per cent by volume of  Vietnam’s paper production of  219␣ 000 tonnes.
Other large mills are Dong Nai (annual production of  about 15␣ 000 tonnes
of  mainly printing and writing paper) and Tan Mai (annual production of
about 40␣ 000 tonnes of  mainly newsprint). Net imports (imports less exports)
of  paper in 1996 were 55␣ 000 tonnes, implying per capita consumption of
about 3.6 kilograms of  paper per person.
National economic contribution of the mill
The contribution of  the mill to the economy is assessed by simulating the
effects of  closing the mill assuming that the other mills are unable to expand
their production to fill the gap. This is a realistic assumption in the short
term. The analysis assumes that tariffs on imported paper remain unchanged
with no quantitative restrictions on paper imports. All paper imports are
assumed to pay the tariff  (no smuggling). Other important assumptions are
that nominal wages economywide, the level of  real government consumption
expenditure, real aggregate investment in the economy and capital in use in
all other sectors remain unchanged. Results are in table 4.3.
Value added at the mill accounts for 0.09 per cent of  Vietnam’s GDP. This
represents the mill’s direct contribution. To this we must add the indirect
contribution through the mill’s effects on the performance of  other sectors.
4.3 Economywide impact of closing the Bai Bang mill 1996
Percentage
change from base Value
% VND billion
Real GDP – 0.18 – 465
Real consumption – 0.10 – 217
Real exports 0.15 125
Real imports 0.48 570
Balance of trade – 445
Aggregate employment – 0.15 na
na Not applicable.
Source: Economywide model for Vietnam.
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If  Bai Bang were to close it would cease to purchase logs and other raw
materials. This would reduce output, income and employment in input
supplying industries, but not by the full amount of  Bai Bang’s purchases. These
industries would be able to divert some of  their production to other markets
in Vietnam and overseas. Bai Bang would cease to employ labour. But some
workers would be able to find employment in other industries. Reduced wage
payments would mean reduced consumption expenditure by workers and their
families, leading to losses of  output, employment and income in domestic
industries supplying goods and services to satisfy this consumption. Bai Bang
would cease to import pulp and equipment. While this would save foreign
exchange, imports of  paper would be needed to replace the lost production
causing an increase in foreign exchange requirements.
With Bai Bang closed Vietnam must spend more on imported paper. Imports
of  writing and printing paper are projected to increase by 244 per cent. As a
result, the balance of  trade deteriorates. Jobs are lost at Bai Bang and in input
supplying industries, reducing wage income and real consumption expenditure.
Aggregate employment falls by 0.15 per cent. There is a small reduction in
the overall level of  costs in Vietnam as Bai Bang ceases to make demands on
domestic resources. This provides a small stimulus to exports offsetting
somewhat the effects on the balance of  trade from additional spending on
imported paper. The net result is a reduction in real GDP of  0.18 per cent
(equivalent to a loss of  VND465 billion per year in 1996 values). The fall in
real private consumption expenditure is less than the fall in GDP – private
consumption expenditure is sustained somewhat at the expense of  a
deterioration in the balance of  trade. The balance of  trade deteriorates by
VND445 billion through the need to spend more on imported paper.
Table 4.4 presents projected changes in output for an aggregated level of
sectoral detail. Industry production across all sectors in the economy (including
Bai Bang) falls by an average of  0.2 per cent. The reduction in production of
the forestry sector is only 0.1 per cent. There are two reasons for this. Demands
by Bai Bang on Vietnam’s forestry sector account for only a small percentage
of  the sector’s total production (our estimate is less than 1 per cent). And, with
Bai Bang not purchasing logs and a slightly lower overall level of  costs in the
economy, there is a small stimulus to exports of  forestry products (exports are
projected to increase by 1.7 per cent).
Effects on public funds balance
The analysis in chapter 2 indicated a direct contribution of  BAPACO and
VPMC to government revenue of  about VND52 billion in 1996. This would
be lost if  Bai Bang were to close. In addition, the government would lose
revenue (from turnover tax, profits, tax, etc.) through the contraction in output
and profitability of  other industries linked directly and indirectly to Bai Bang.
Offsetting this somewhat would be taxation revenue increases from sectors
that are able to expand their output as the ‘crowding out’ effect of  Bai Bang
ceases.
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4.4 Effects on sector performance of closing Bai Bang mill
Sector Output
% change
Agriculture 0.0
Forestry – 0.1
Fishing 0.0
Mining 0.0
Fuels – 0.8
Food processing – 0.1
Textiles, clothing and footwear 0.0
Wood processing and products – 0.1
Bai Bang – 100.0
Other paper and products 0.2
Petroleum and natural gas – 0.9
Chemicals and products 0.0
Cement 0.1
Other non-metallic minerals 0.1
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals – 0.1
Machinery and electrical equipment – 0.1
Other industry – 2.2
Electricity, gas and water – 0.2
Construction 0.2
Trade and transport – 0.2
Communication – 0.1
Finance and insurance – 0.1
Public administration, health, education, etc. 0.0
Personal services 0.0
All industries – 0.2
Source: Economywide model for Vietnam.
The structure of  Vietnam government sector revenue in 1996 is shown in
table 4.5. BAPACO and VPMC accounted for 0.085 per cent of  this revenue.
Based on model projections of  how changes in sector performance following
the closure of  Bai Bang would change each of  these components of  the tax
base, the total effect of  the closure of  Bai Bang is an estimated reduction in
government sector revenue of  VND63.3 billion. That is, in addition to the
VND52 billion in revenue lost from BAPACO and VPMC, a further VND13
billion is estimated to be lost elsewhere in the economy.
4.5 Structure of Vietnam government sector revenue 1996
Revenue
VND billion
Agricultural tax 1 850
Natural resources tax 2 960
Turnover tax 9 900
Special consumption tax 3 000
Profits, capital and land tax 10 255
Personal income tax 1 050
Transfers – depreciation allowance 960
Import and export duties 15 000
Other (includes grants) 15 945
Total 60 920
Source: Ministry of Finance, Vietnam.
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This loss in government sector revenue would be borne by all regions – through
the various revenue sharing agreements that exist between the different levels
of  government in Vietnam.
Contrasting national and regional effects
The model-based analysis shows that the contribution of  the mill and
associated forestry and other activities to national economic performance is
small in percentage terms. This is hardly surprising. Income and employment
generated by Bai Bang is only a very small percentage of  national income
and employment. The impact is more significant at the regional level and
larger still for the Phong Chau district – Bai Bang is the dominant industrial
activity in the district.
Because interregional flows of  economic activity are not known, it is not
possible to quantify the impact at the regional or district level. Expenditure
from income generated by the Bai Bang mill ‘leaks’ through interregional
trade flows to stimulate economic activity and employment in other regions.
Some caveats
The Vietnam model, like any model, is a simplification of  the real world. Its
purpose is to help us understand the interactions in the economy – particularly
the interactions between Bai Bang and other sectors. Its accuracy in
determining the effects on the economy of  closing Bai Bang will depend on:
• how well the links between Bai Bang and other sectors are specified in the
model’s input–output database;
• how accurately the numerous parameters in the model reflect the
behavioural responses in the economy; and
• how appropriately the model’s theory is for Vietnam.
Details on each of  these components are set out in appendix 4A. As indicated
in the appendix, there are significant shortcomings in each of  these areas.
The available data on interindustry links in Vietnam is incomplete. And there
are no available statistical estimates of  response parameters. Numerous
simplifications and assumptions have had to be made to formulate the model.
For these reasons, the results presented in tables 4.3 and 4.4 should be viewed
as indicative rather than definitive. But simplifications and assumptions are
also strengths in that they make explicit what is going on in the model. If
necessary, particular assumptions can be modified to test their importance.
We are confident that our database reasonably describes the size of  Bai Bang
relative to other sectors and Bai Bang’s use of  domestic resources. We are less
confident about behavioural responses. Sensitivity analysis shows that the
results are sensitive to the assumed degree of  substitution between domestically
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produced and imported paper. Our analysis has assumed a moderate degree
of  substitution. If  Bai Bang paper is a lot less substitutable with imported
paper than our choice of  substitution parameters implies (see appendix 4A),
then the effects on the economy of  closing Bai Bang would be significantly
larger than indicated by our results.
Distribution of income from mill and forestry
As we have shown, the Bai Bang paper mill generates income for the
Vietnamese economy. The main direct beneficiaries in the first round are the
workers at the mill and in forestry activities. Most of  this income comes from
wages paid – by BAPACO and by VPMC. Workers receive additional rewards
through the distribution of  profits into company bonus and welfare funds.
Income distribution within BAPACO
BAPACO pays equal salaries to males and females for each salary classification.
There are, however, significant differences in the distribution of  male and
female employment across departments within BAPACO (chart 4.6).
Of  the 2874 BAPACO employees in November 1997, 66 per cent were males
and 34 per cent were females. All directors are males. All quality control
workers are females. Males dominate a number of  departments such as security,
woodchip handling, maintenance and transport. Females also dominate some
departments such as accounting, paper converting and kindergarten.
Ninety-nine per cent of  workers were classified as permanent and only 1 per
cent as temporary. Salaries are set according to skill levels and are based on
state regulations and mill performance. There are four broad salary levels
according to type of  service, with average 1996 salary levels as follows.
• Management. Average monthly salary VND1␣ 210␣ 000 – equivalent to US$109
or SEK731.
• Production. Average monthly salary VND1␣ 095␣ 000 – equivalent to US$99
or SEK662.
• Production assistants. Average monthly salary VND804␣ 473 – equivalent to
US$72 or SEK486.
• Other services. Average monthly salary VND650␣ 000 – equivalent to US$59
or SEK393.
The difference between the highest salary and the mill average cannot exceed
three times. The mill general director receives a multiple of  6.7 times the
payment to the lowest paid worker. Our survey of  mill workers (chapter 6)
found that average manager incomes were only a little more than double
those of  average worker incomes. The range between manager incomes is
very large – lower management levels receive not much more than skilled
workers, but the highest paid eighteen managers receive over VND3 million
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Data source: Mill records.
4.6 Distribution of male and female employment at paper mill November 1997
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per month. Of  the 70 managers (deputy department heads and above) 17
were women. We estimate that:
• of  the total wage bill of  BAPACO of  VND34.5 billion in 1996, about 70
per cent went to males and 30 per cent to females; and
• the average wage earned by females appears to be about 10 per cent less
than for males – due entirely to a higher percentage of  females in the lower
wage categories.
We have no information on how non-salary rewards, such as disbursements
from the welfare fund to employees encountering financial and social
difficulties, are distributed between males and females.
Income distribution within VPMC
VPMC, like BAPACO, pays the same wage to males and females of  the same
job classification. The distribution of  income between males and females
follows from the distribution of  employment between males and females. Our
estimate is that 56 per cent of  VPMC’s 1996 wage bill to permanent employees
of  VND9064 million is paid to males and 44 per cent to females.
Distribution of income from mill and forestry combined
Of  the combined wage bill of  the two companies for permanent workers
(VND43.6 billion in 1996), 79 per cent is absorbed by mill workers and 21
per cent is absorbed by forestry workers (chart 4.7).
Data source: BAPACO and VPMC financial records.
Mill and forestry combined employed 5509 full time workers in 1996, of  which
52 per cent were employed in mill operations and 48 per cent in forestry
operations. The reason for the much higher share of  income accruing to mill
workers reflects the much higher wages at the mill – average mill wage of
about 3.5 times the average forest worker wage (chart 4.8). Our surveys of
4.7 Distribution of mill and forestry wage income between workers
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forest workers (chapter 6) revealed incomes in 1996 about 10 per cent higher
than implied by the wage bill records and further strong growth in income in
1997.
Data source: BAPACO and VPMC financial records.
To a larger extent these wage differentials reflect differences in the productivity
of  labour between the two activities. Relative to mill production, forestry is a
low productivity activity – the low wages of  workers reflect the low productivity
of  tree growing as well as an element of  illegal logging, which is difficult to
control.
The very uneven distribution of  income between mill and forestry workers is
an issue of  contention among workers at VPMC (chapter 6). Many VPMC
workers consider themselves to be underpaid relative to BAPACO workers.
The feeling of  wage injustice is accentuated by the generous social conditions
of  employment enjoyed by BAPACO workers. VPMC is unable to come
anywhere near matching these conditions for its forest workers.
The distribution of  the combined mill and forestry full time worker wage bill
across males and females is shown in chart 4.9. Over half  the wage income
accrues to male mill workers and 24 per cent to female mill workers.
Other income derived from the mill
and forestry
VPMC also engages large numbers (between 9000 and 10␣ 000) workers on a
contractual basis to help with forest growing operations. These persons are
rewarded under a number of  different arrangements – payment for work
4.8 Average wages of mill and forestry workers 1996
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done, profit sharing arrangements and so on. Many are also permanent
employees of  VPMC. The supplements to income received from participation
in private forestry vary considerably between participants (chapter 6) and have
not been included here.
Data source: BAPACO and VPMC financial records and survey results.
4.9 Distribution of mill and forestry wage income across males and females 1996
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5 Contribution of the
project to human
resource capacity building
The project has made a substantial contribution to human resource capacity
building through training during the construction phase, transfer of knowledge
training, a technical assistance program for managers, support of the regional
forestry training school and the establishment and support of the Vocational
Training School. Benefits have accrued to mill workers as higher wages and to
mill capital as higher profits. Significant benefits have also accrued to workers
and enterprises outside the mill. The advent of doi moi provided an opportunity
for the Scandinavian management model to flourish. Its legacy is strong, but it
is doubtful if it would have survived without the change in external environment.
WHAT IMPACT HAS THE PROJECT MADE to human resource capacity
building? How has the technological and managerial training under the project
affected the human resource capacity at Bai Bang and how has this training
affected the professional lives of  workers? What was the content and impact
of  the so-called ‘Scandinavian management model’? What spillover effects
have there been of  the training element of  the project to other institutions in
Vietnam? We have addressed these issues through:
• analysis of  training records;
• visits to the various training institutions and interviews with training
personnel; and
• surveys of  and interviews with workers at the mill and elsewhere throughout
Vietnam who received their training through the Bai Bang project.
The project faced the challenge of  establishing a modern capital intensive
industrial complex in an agrarian society with little experience in the
implementation of  large scale industrial projects. This challenge was
exacerbated by the legacy of  four decades or more of  war, which had destroyed
much of  the nation’s human and physical capital. It could only be met with a
massive and far-reaching capacity building effort. The extent of  effort required
only became fully apparent as the project proceeded.
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Some SEK90.2 million (current prices) was spent on formal training activities
(mill and forestry training and the vocational school component) under the
project. This represented just over 3 per cent of  the total project cost. Formal
activities included:
• training of  construction workers during the construction phase;
• substantial support for the regional Forestry Training School;
• the establishment and ongoing support of  the Vocational Training School
from 1983 onwards;
• transfer of  knowledge training during the 1980s once the facilities became
operational; and
• a technical assistance program designed to help mill management address
the demands of the new style of management needed in the transition to a
market economy.
However, the human resource capacity activity of  the project went well beyond
these formal training activities.
The later stages of  the mill project (the third contract with Scanmanagement
covering the period 1985–1990 and accounting for some 20 per cent of  the
total cost) was largely dedicated to the transfer of  knowledge to equip
Vietnamese management and workers with the ability to run the mill
independent of  external support. The key tasks during this stage were to ‘train
Mill, Forestry and Procurement personnel in Management, Operation and
Maintenance and to assist and support the Vietnamese Party in fulfilling
optimum production targets’. And there was considerable human resource
capacity building associated with activities outside of  the main project
components. Swedish interventions at Hai Phong port made to expedite
processing of  imported equipment provided much needed assistance in
improving the overall functioning of  port operations. And informal advice
given to other mills when training activities for Bai Bang employees were
being developed spread knowledge of  modern mill management techniques.
Construction training
At the peak of  the construction phase some 3000 Vietnamese workers
supplied by the Viet Tri Building Company and the Erection Company
under the Ministry of  Construction and by the Ministry of  Light Industry
(MOLI) were working on various aspects of  the project. Although the original
project agreement called for the Vietnamese authorities to supply the
necessary skilled workers, most needed training in the required disciplines.
By September 1978, the Swedish contractors had given formal training to
some 1524 workers in skills such as welding, carpentry, plumbing, asphalt
work, instrumentation, painting, and diesel engine operation (WP-System
1979). The project experienced problems in supply of  workers, and a fairly
common occurrence was that workers were reallocated to other activities in
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the country shortly after completion of  training. Scanmanagement, in their
completion report said:
It also has to be mentioned that a serious educational problem throughout
the investment phase was that Vietnamese personnel, once trained and
prepared by the Swedes for a specific task within the organization, were
frequently withdrawn from the project by their superiors when the
education was over, and ordered to work elsewhere. A loss of  competence
and a loss of  time and money was incurred as other Vietnamese had to be
trained for the same task. However, Vietnam could benefit from this
extensive vocational training, financed by Sweden. (Scanmanagement
1990)
Training for forest operations
The project has provided considerable assistance to the training of  forest
workers. The original design of  the project did not include vocational training
for forest workers, because it was expected that experienced operators and
mechanics would be supplied to the project. However, recognising the skills
problem, Interforest started training activities at a training centre at Ham
Yen, part of  the Phu Tho Forestry Training School.
Sida provided financial assistance to the Phu Tho school over the period 1976
to 1992. This school, constructed by the government, was formally controlled
by VPMC, but is now controlled by the Ministry of  Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD).
The school provides courses in:
• plantation and harvest training;
• mechanical forestry and driver training;
• forest accounting, computer and English training; and
• forest protection training.
Each year up to 300 persons are trained in courses lasting up to two years.
Graduates are employed by forest enterprises and also agricultural
cooperatives, which are now engaging in plantation forestry in the six provinces
that make up the raw materials area for the mill.
The Sida contribution has involved:
• the training by Swedish experts (in Sweden and as advisers in Vietnam) of
teachers and managers at the school;
• support to publish 84␣ 000 training books, which are now used by all forest
training schools in Vietnam;
• the provision of  training equipment; and
• the provision of  Swedish advisors at the school to help build its training
capacity.
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In addition to the technical training provided by the school, Scanmanagement
estimated that some 4000 forest workers received training in basic logging
skills such as use of  bowsaws and axes in the period up to 1990.
The Vocational Training School
In the latter stages of  the construction phase, the limited skills, both technical
and managerial, of  the workers being recruited for the mill were seen to pose
a major constraint to the speedy Vietnamese takeover of  the mill once it had
become operational. A more concerted training effort – encompassing
vocational, technical and on-the job training – was initiated.
While recruits were meant to come from within the existing paper industry,
equipped with some operational knowledge of  paper mills, most came from
high school via Vietnamese vocational training establishments, especially the
school established at Bai Bang by MOLI. This school suffered from a lack of
resources, and its graduates were poorly equipped to operate at the mill and
undertake the more demanding technical and special training required to
become effective workers. Recognising this, it was agreed that the project
would support establishment of  a Vocational School directly connected to
the mill.
This school (now called the Paper Industry Training School) was established
under a project side agreement signed in 1983. The school was inaugurated
in October 1986. The school has modern teaching facilities, well equipped
workshops and laboratories, and a highly trained teaching staff  (trained by
northern European technical pedagogic methods).
Originally belonging to BAPACO, since 1993 the school has been jointly
managed by BAPACO and the Ministry of  Education and Training under
VPC.
The school is meeting the vocational training needs of  the Bai Bang project
and the entire Vietnamese pulp and paper industry through formal training
courses and seminars and workshops (box 5.1). The training school is an
excellent and sustained output of  the project. There is little doubt that the
quality of  workers in the paper industry throughout Vietnam is higher than it
would have been without such a school.
Over 20␣ 000 courses have been conducted at the school (table 5.2). The number
of  workers trained there is considerably less as many workers have undergone
a number of  training courses. About 70 per cent of  long term training is now
for mill workers (100 per cent in earlier years) and nearly all short term training.
Skilled mill workers have often done a long degree and three or four short
courses at the school. More than 70 per cent of  current mill workers have
undertaken multiple training courses at the school. Mill workers must complete
short courses and examinations to upgrade their status and move to higher
salary levels.
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• Trains 300–400 students per year.
• Provides two year vocational training and also 70 short term training courses.
• Short term training courses cover management training, foreign language training, a
production block, a maintenance block, a transport block and training for different sections in
the mill.
• Important venue for national seminars and workshops on paper industry matters.
• Has become Vietnam’s national paper industry training school:
– 70 per cent of students trained for work in Bai Bang mill and
– 30 per cent of students trained for work in other companies (list includes Hanoi Water
Supply Company, Pha Rung Ship Yard, Da Nang Polytechnical University, Cogido, Thanh
Son Paper Mill, Muc Son Paper Mill, Lam Son Paper Mill, Hoa Binh Paper Mill, Viet Tri Paper
Mill, Lua Viet Paper Mill, Van Dien Paper Mill, Hanoi Polytechnical University, Tuyen Quang
Province and Son La Province).
• School operates under a budget by the Ministry of Education and Training, but teachers are
salaried employees of the mill.
• Of the current teaching staff, 13 are engineers, one is a graduate from a technical school,
two are graduates from secondary schools, 11 are high school workers. Many teachers have
been trained in Sweden and most have passed first class and second class pedagogic
training. The 11 high school worker teachers will be trained to become engineers.
• The school has a strong physical base with most of the equipment provided under the Sida
side project. This equipment covers:
– a mini pulp and paper production line;
– equipment for repair engineering;
– machines for metal cutting, welding, automobile and motorcycle repair;
– electrical equipment for civil and enterprise needs; and
– automatic control measurement equipment.
• There is a need to upgrade some of this equipment and also expand the facilities of the
school to cater for the planned expansion in Vietnam’s domestic pulp and paper mill
production capacity.
• The school has 105 different manuals for training – there is a need to revise and update
these manuals, especially the process training document.
• Since the school was established 1158 students have graduated with a third level certificate
and 360 students have graduated with a second level certificate. Trained students can go
straight to work at the mill. There are two stages to the training, with one stage involving on-
the-job training at the mill.
• Both men and women are trained at the school. The proportions depend on the type of
training. In the process training area about 75 per cent of students are female and 25 per
cent male. In the mechanical areas about 10 per cent are female and 90 per cent male.
In the electrical areas 20–30 per cent are female and 70–80 per cent are male. Females
have made up about 30 per cent of all students.
• As at the end of 1997, some 20,184 participants had undergone training at the school, of
which 11,225 were trained during the life of the mill project.
• The school plans to expand its student intake substantially in the next few years up to about
800 students per year. They also plan to update teacher training.
• The school is regarded in Vietnam as an excellent training centre and has won many awards.
5.1 Vocational Training School: key facts
73
Transfer of knowledge
As the various components of  the mill became operational, attention turned
to developing Vietnamese capacity to run the mill. A series of  evaluations of
training and capacity building activities in 1979 and 1980 led to a revamped
program and new arrangements. The main elements of  the new arrangements
were:
• establishing the Vocational Training School to better prepare recruits for
employment at the mill;
• integration of  the previously separate Swedish and Vietnamese training
departments to better coordinate job instruction and theoretical training;
• use of  aptitude testing to identify candidates for training;
• linking training and career planning functions;
• formulation of  specific training programs for managers, superintendents
and supervisors;
• emphasising training of  job instructors to spearhead a systematic approach
to on-the job training;
• maintaining a strong emphasis on English language training; and
• intensive training by equipment suppliers overseas and in Vietnam.
The integrated training department trained Vietnamese workers in short
courses for construction and mill operation. Activities included classroom and
on-the-job training as well as special courses and study trips with the help of
5.2 Training at the Paper Training Schoola
Before 1990 1991–97 Total
No. No. No.
Full-time
Process workers level 2 and 3 796 565 1 361
Mechanics, welders/repairers 246 330 576
Electrical repairs 161 218 379
Short courses
Process workers 2 664 3 240 5 904
Maintenance – electrical, mechanical,
instrumentation, automatic control 2 399 1 820 4 219
Other specialisations 3 213 1 674 4 887
Transfer of knowledge 275 275
Management and supervision training 1 400 883 2 283
Information/computers 0 176 176
Teacher training 71 53 124
Total 11 225 8 959 20 184
a  Excludes English language training.
Source: Training school brochure.
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Swedish educational specialists. In the nine years 1981 to 1989, some 8061
students received training in 572 courses run by the Department. From 1986
onwards, this included in-plant training for graduates from the Vocational
School. Table 5.3 presents a breakdown of  the training organised by the
training department(s) over the period 1977 to 1996.
Transfer of  knowledge became the primary objective of  the final five year
contract with Scanmanagement, from 1986 to 1990. The transfer of
knowledge system developed during this phase of  the project was structured
around the preparation of  job descriptions, identification of  knowledge
requirements, knowledge assessments and knowledge profiles, development
and execution of  individual programs, and evaluation. It encompassed three
broad classes of  education:
• formal education, such as pre-service training in full time courses, such as
provided by the vocational schools;
• non-formal education, including pre-service and in-service part time and short
duration training in courses and seminars; and
• informal education, unstructured learning on-the-job and through discussions
with colleagues and interactions between advisors and counterparts.
In the latter stages of  the project, the last of  these became a critical component
of  the process. As the transfer process unfolded, increasing emphasis was placed
on ‘process management’ issues, and the inculcation of  a maintenance, repairs
5.3 Training results from 1977 to 1996
Type of training Number of participants
Training for operation phase (1975–79) 309
Training for middle ranking managers 90
Training for top managers 11
Training for operators 5 895
Training for maintenance workers 4 219
Training for transport personnel 4 887
Training by knowledge transfer method 275
Training for floor level managers 2 282
Paper Industry High School training 86
On-the-job training for economists 25
Training for teachers 124
Overseas training 465
English training 1 732
Informatics training 176
Training courses for outside peoplea 1 260
Total 21 836
a Trainees came from the Hanoi Water Supply Company, Pha Rung shipyard, Da Nang Polytechnic
University, Cogido, Thanh Son Paper Mill, Lam Son Paper Mill, Hoa Binh Paper Mill, Viet Tri Paper
Mill, Lua Viet Paper Mill, Van Diem Paper Mill, Hanoi Polytechnical University, Tuyen Quang Province
and Son La Province.
Source: Toi, Nghiem, Thai and Hoa (1997).
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and cost awareness culture. Rather than technical knowledge in the production
sections, the critical gaps likely to jeopardise successful handover of  the mill
were found to lie in management of  labour intensive support activities. And a
perceived problem was that there were significant constraints on the application
of  what the advisers perceived to be best practice:
… shortcomings may less reflect missing knowledge on efficient management
than an inability for one reason or another to apply existing knowledge.
Although no one explicitly said so, it might even be that some aspects of
what is seen as efficient, production promoting management in Swedish
eyes may encounter cultural, social, economic or even political constraints
in a Vietnamese perspective and therefore be difficult to execute (Hamilton
and Hultin, 1986).
Swedish advisers considered that attitudes and behaviour could only be
changed gradually through daily interactions and adviser–counterpart
cooperation on the floor. Effective communication became a key issue,
warranting continued emphasis on English language training, and addressing
cultural awareness among advisers. (One concern expressed to Sida reviewers
of  the knowledge of  transfer program and the performance of  advisers related
to cultural sensitivity – specifically criticising individuals in public (Hamilton
and Hultin, 1986).)
An institutionalised transfer of  knowledge system was less systematically
pursued in the forestry components of  the project. This was partly because
training and advice, rather than addressing operational responsibilities,
constituted a more central focus of  the forestry support activities.
Effects of training on mill workers
As revealed by our analysis in chapter 6, the most obvious effect of  the training
has been to make workers more productive, raise their wages substantially
and improve their life choices and social position. This benefit is an important
part of  the social cost-benefit analysis in chapter 7. The result is a workforce
with the depth of  skills needed to operate and manage the mill facilities
independently from outside advice and a capacity to continually deepen those
skills to keep abreast of  technical developments in the industry. Without access
to trained workers the mill would not have been able to function efficiently
and achieve its current profitable level of  operations.
Table 5.4 records the views of  workers interviewed about the value of  their
training. Mill workers acknowledged their better remuneration. Graduates of
the training school working elsewhere in Vietnam acknowledged that their
living conditions would have been worse without their training – which enabled
them to obtain jobs in the state sector. The cost of  failure, for most, would
have been to stay on the farm.
76
Each year up to
300 persons are
trained in courses
lasting up to two
years. The
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Spillover effects
The training has had two types of  spillover effects:
• a direct effect from the movement of  trained workers into other activities,
mainly other pulp and paper mills in Vietnam; and
• an indirect effect as other enterprises emulate training and work practices
carried out at Bai Bang.
As documented in the Scanmanagement (1990) report, the transfer of  workers
to other construction projects once they had received on-the-job training was
a feature of  the construction phase. Swedish construction managers at the
5.4 Trainee opinions about relative pay and training opportunity Percentage of responses
Compared with similar workers how is your pay?
Less The same A bit more Much more Total
Bai Bang mill workers 4.7 31.1 57.5 6.7 100.0
School graduates elsewhere 54.2 37.3 8.4 0.0 100.0
If you never did the training at the Bai Bang school, would your living conditions be:
much worse a bit worse the same better total
School graduates elsewhere 42.3 44.2 12.3 1.2 100.0
Source: Survey of 2546 mill workers and 164 graduates not working at the mill.
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time interviewed during our research indicated that the number of  such
instances was large (many hundreds), though we have been unable to obtain
precise estimates.
Departed skilled workers
About 100 graduates a year from the two year training courses are currently
gaining employment at the mill. Others find employment in other paper
enterprises as the quality of  the Bai Bang school training is highly regarded in
Vietnam.
The school director estimated that about 3000 training school graduates were
not working at the mill. We conducted a postal survey of  these graduates. Out
of  500 persons sent questionnaires, one third replied. All replies came from
persons working in other paper industry state enterprises in Vietnam. Most
completed only one year courses at the school, though 31 per cent were there
for two years or more (table 5.5).
The graduates were all young, as are present day students. The Paper Training
School is a vocational extension of  secondary school for most full time students.
Most of  the workers graduated from the school during 1988–92, when they
would have been only about 18 years of  age (chart 5.6).
The average reported income was low compared with Bai Bang mill workers,
although it varies significantly between enterprises (table 5.7). Most of  the
workers were from Muc Son Paper Enterprise, which, like most paper
enterprises except Bai Bang, does not make a profit. Only workers from the
Tan Mai Paper Company in southern Vietnam reported average incomes
close to Bai Bang workers. In Vietnam state enterprise employment is lifetime
employment and highly desired. Even unprofitable state enterprises can offer
security and incomes well above agriculture sector alternatives. There is no
active labour market in the state sector.
Workers rarely move from one state enterprise to another. Consequently, their
fortunes are tied to their enterprise and if  it prospers (Bai Bang) so do they. If
not (all other paper enterprises) then they must accept modest salaries.
5.5 Details about mill graduates not working at the mill Months of training undertaken
at the Bai Bang school
1–3 8–10 18–20 22–24 30–42 Total Average Average
persons monthly age
incomes
Months Months Months Months Months No. VND Years
Males 4 61 7 15 8 95 528 421 28
Females 5 43 5 8 8 69 474 638 24
Total 9 104 12 23 16 164 505 671 27
Source: Postal survey of 164 graduates not working at the mill.
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The Scandinavian management model
A major emphasis of  the transfer of  knowledge program was on how to
manage a large commercially oriented industrial operation.
Under the rubric of  the ‘Scandinavian management model’, the project
introduced managers and workers to a wide range of  concepts and practices
used in managing and operating a similar mill in an industrialised market
economy.
The main point of  departure in identifying how the Scandinavian management
model differed from prevailing practice in Vietnam was the concept of  the
role and functions of  a company. Training material used by the project defined
a Scandinavian company as an independent economic unit that makes its
Data source: Postal survey of 164 graduates not working at the mill.
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5.7 Employment and salaries of training school graduates
Name of company Province Number of Average
trainees reported salary
No. VND
Muc Son Paper Enterprise Than Hoa 106 505 189
Tan Mai Paper Company Dong Nai 12 983 333
Viet Tri Paper Company Phu Tho 19 393 684
Lam Son Paper Company Thanh Hoa 17 341 176
Thanh Hoa Paper Enterprise Thanh Hoa 7 478 571
Lua Viet Paper Company Phu Tho 3 316 667
Source: Postal survey of 164 graduates not working at the mill.
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own decisions on what to do and how to do it, inside certain general restrictions
and rules. This means that the company:
• has immediate access to its own funds and customer revenues without higher
approval;
• can independently decide how it uses the money and other resources at its
disposal;
• is subject to strong financial constraints – the need to generate cash flows
and accounting profits to guarantee survival; and
• takes responsibility for the outcomes of  its decisions, with closure or takeover
as a consequence of  too many mistakes.
This would have contrasted very strongly with Vietnamese notions of  an
enterprise under the centrally planned subsidy system prevailing in the early
1980s.
The main attributes of  Scandinavian management taught in the formal
training sessions are as follows.
• Result orientation:
– emphasis on quality and competence;
– efficiency and productivity as a means of  survival;
– flexibility and ability to plan and follow up changes;
– openness in criticism and feedback of  demands as means for achieving
results; and
– approach to recruitment and delegation.
• Value orientation:
– emphasis on values rather than outward behaviour;
– local and individual responsibility and self  control, linked to shaped goal
setting; and
– concern for equality of  opportunity and fairness.
• People orientation:
– team work as a management tool;
– cooperation and mutual support to strengthen resource integration;
– continuous personnel and management development;
– focus on motivation; and
– emphasis on negotiation before open conflicts.
While the overall orientation of  the Scandinavian approach to management,
with its focus on commercial viability, is common to all market economies,
there are special emphases that may not be so evident in management styles
and orientations in other countries. Management trainers were keen to stress
management attributes and goals that went far beyond notions of  ‘the bottom
line’. Management training necessarily dealt with ‘mainstream’ issues of
production planning, cost accounting, inventory management and
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administration. But it also emphasised discussions of  organisations, leadership,
purposes and goals, delegation, human resources, motivation, cooperation
and information, and managing change. It is possible that these emphases,
and their practical application by the expatriate project personnel, made the
introduction of  fundamentally different approaches to the role and functions
of  enterprise and management more palatable to the Vietnamese.
It is clear from our analysis of  social and cultural impact in chapter 6 that the
Scandinavian approach to issues of  personnel management left a strong
impression – and legacy – on Bai Bang and its workers. The approach stressed:
• the need to ensure that promotion decisions should be driven by the needs
of  the job and the skills of  the worker, rather than ‘friendship, kinship, sex,
beauty or political beliefs’;
• the ‘negative list’ approach to responsibilities – workers should assume that
a problem is their responsibility unless expressly told otherwise; and
• effective team work, emphasising participation, open definition of  goals,
openness to ideas, utilisation of  different opinions and consensus decision
making.
For much of  the transfer of  knowledge period the Scandinavian model was
applied – to a greater or lesser degree – alongside the standard Vietnamese
model. Generally speaking, internal procedures and processes (such as
requisition management, costing, operational planning, training and career
development) followed the Scandinavian system, while external interactions
(such as reporting and financial management) followed the Vietnamese model.
However, when some of  the state owned enterprise reforms began to take
effect under doi␣ moi, granting greater autonomy to enterprise managers and
shifting measures of  enterprise performance away from meeting production
targets to profitability, BAPACO was uniquely placed to benefit. The
implementation of  doi␣ moi provided a context in which the principles of  the
Scandinavian management model could flourish – it is doubtful if  the model
would have survived the departure of  the advisors without the change in the
external environment of  the mill.
This said, the legacy of  the model is evident in how BAPACO is managed
today. As was noted in chapter 2, management practices in BAPACO differ
quite significantly from standard practice in other state enterprises.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the impact of  the Scandinavian
management model spread beyond the confines of  BAPACO. Technical
aspects of  mill management did seem to percolate through to other enterprises.
Officials from other paper mills visited BAPACO on many occasions and
Swedish experts provided advice on rehabilitation and management issues to
two of  the larger mills – Cogido (Dong Nai) and Cogivina (Tan Mai).
It is also likely that the operation of  the model at Bai Bang influenced the
direction of  reforms implemented under doi moi. Scanmanagement enlisted
the support of  the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) in its
management training efforts – and CIEM was responsible for drafting much
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of  the pathbreaking legislation ushering in enterprise reform in Vietnam.
CIEM was organising seminars with the Swedish management consultants
for managers at Bai Bang at the same time that they were drafting some of
the early state owned enterprise reforms at the outset of  doi moi.
But there is little evidence that the Scandinavian management model has had
much impact on operations of  the Vinh Phu Materials Company.
Technical assistance program
The program of  Swedish advisers to the mill came to an end just as Vietnam’s
transition to a market economy began to gather pace. Recognising the
challenges that this transition would pose to the management of  BAPACO,
Sida agreed to fund a technical assistance program targeted at the demands
of  operating as a fully autonomous company responsible for operation,
investments, marketing, pricing and personnel matters.
In practice, the reforms did not grant BAPACO complete autonomy in these
areas, and some of  the advice offered during this project was not fully acted
on. A review of  the project in 1994 cited, for example, reluctance of  mill
management to implement suggestions regarding production and cost
accounting and management information systems (Chalk 1994). This response
seemed to be driven by a perception that such systems were not yet appropriate
to the Vietnamese system. However, it seems that as the economic reforms
have progressed, and as state enterprises have been granted further autonomy
and responsibilities, these suggestions have increasingly been acted upon.
The current situation
Currently, some 45 per cent of  BAPACO’s 2850 strong workforce are classified
as skilled and 42 per cent semiskilled. Management and administrative staff
account for 12 per cent of  total employment. Nearly all, if  not all, of  the
skilled and semiskilled staff  have received training – classroom, or overseas
training and on-the-job training – provided by the mill and the vocational
school. Some 1200 workers in other paper enterprises throughout the country
are drawing on training received at the school. Thousands of  forest workers
are using the basic and more complex skills obtained through the Phu Tho
training school and the other training activities support by the forestry
component of  the project.
In all, tens of  thousands of  workers who received training in the construction
and operation phase of  the mill and associated projects have benefited from
the human resource capacity building activities of  the Bai Bang project.
Impressive though these numbers are, they give no indication of  the quality
and impact of  the human resource capacity building supported by the project.
Inappropriate or irrelevant training does not add to people’s – or the nation’s
– capital stock.
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In a market economy some measures of  the impact of  this training could be
assessed by identifying increments to income streams attributable to the
increase in human capital. If  society valued the increase in human capital, it
would be reflected in higher incomes to those undertaking the investment in
training. In Vietnam, however, remuneration is still only partly linked to
productivity and scarcity of  skills, so this kind of  measure is not available.
The relatively higher incomes that BAPACO employees receive is partly
attributable to their skills. But some part should also be attributable to the
returns that should accrue to a large stock of  physical capital, or even to the
effects of  protection and other benefits accorded to the operation of  the mill.
As well as the impact on wages, other indicators of  the value of  training can
be obtained from:
• the assessments of  the quality and relevance of  the training delivered by
the project, as made by professionals operating in the international forestry,
pulp and paper industries; and
• the success – or otherwise – with which the mill and associated enterprises
are operating.
According to both of  these indicators, the project’s performance ranks highly.
Our technical evaluation of  the mill reported in chapter 2 identified
experienced management, a professionally planned plantation establishment
program and a well equipped training centre among the strengths of  the Bai
Bang mill. A 1990 evaluation of  the vocational school ranked it as one of  the
most cost effective and professionally organised training institutions the mission
had ever seen (Wallberg and Hagman 1990).
Since the departure of  the advisory team, management has implemented
significant capital investments. The mill has managed to reach, and exceed,
its technical production capacity of  paper. Advisors visiting the mill in 1997
observed that it is much better run now than when the advisors were present.
In addition, there is evidence (albeit rather indirect) of  spillovers from the
human resource development activities. Training during the construction phase
of  the project clearly had an impact on the nation’s reconstruction effort, as
skilled workers were taken from the site to work in other projects around the
country. The same thing happened with road building and transport operators
trained under the forestry component of  the project.
Workers and managers trained in mill operations were transferred to other
pulp and paper enterprises around the country, adding to the workers and
managers from these enterprises that received training at Bai Bang facilities.
Indeed, some senior Vietnamese officials indicate that a key objective for having
the project was to access Swedish technological skills for the country as a
whole, rather than just the mill and forestry.
It is also clear that training and exposure to the Scandinavian management
model influenced attitudes towards management in key training, research and
policy making institutions that played a major role in the formulation of  the
economic and state enterprise reforms.
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6 Social and
cultural impact
The project has delivered a substantial and sustained improvement in the living
standards of mill and forestry workers – higher incomes and improved access
to consumer goods, improved health, housing, transport, education and training
opportunities, and a richer cultural life. The benefits have been achieved without
adding to social problems. Both Kinh and ethnic minorities have shared in the
benefits. But the number of beneficiaries is small in relation to the region’s
population. The most enduring Swedish influence is a showcase Western style
management system at the mill, and trust and openness among management
and workers in dealing with outsiders.
HOW HAS THE PROJECT AFFECTED THE LIVES of  people in the
provinces? How have these people viewed the social and cultural changes
that have taken place – through changes in living conditions and through the
Swedish influence? Have there been conflicts between the project’s objectives
and the concerns of  local people about their cultural values, livelihood
strategies and customs?
We conducted a series of  surveys, interviews and focus group discussions with
mill and forest workers and their families to pursue these questions. Our
methodology and detailed findings are set out in appendixes 6A and 6B. We
review the findings first for mill workers at Phong Chau then for forest workers
and farmers in the mill’s wood supply regions.
In the early 1970s when the project was being negotiated, the raw materials
area initially assigned to the mill had a population of  around 85␣ 000 people,
living mainly from farming. A significant proportion were ethnic minorities
relying on slash and burn agriculture for daily subsistence. Health conditions
for these people were poor. There was widespread malnutrition and diseases
associated with inadequate and insufficient diets. And families had a lack of
cash to pay for treatment and medicines. As a result, the life expectancy of
mountain peoples was low relative to Kinh.
Continuous campaigns had been conducted in the region to promote sedentary
farming from shifting cultivation. These were only partially successful.
Government sponsored resettlement of  large numbers of  Kinh from the high
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population density Red River Delta began in the highlands in the early 1960s.
This resettlement was on a sufficient scale to significantly alter the demographic
balance of  the uplands by the time of  the project.
There does not appear to have been much thought given in the design of  the
Bai Bang project to how it would affect the people of  the mountain regions,
though it was recognised that the planting of  plantations and management
of  natural forests would clash with traditional lifestyles. Nor was there a clear
statement of  what the project should contribute to the living conditions and
lifestyles of  the mountain people.
Despite this, the social and cultural impact of  the project has been of
considerable ongoing interest since production commenced at the mill.
Controversy surrounding the project was heightened upon release of  the
Larsson and Birgegard (1985) study, which drew attention to the poor living
conditions for forest workers. That study was primarily concerned with how
to improve the then inadequate and irregular supply of  logs to the mill. It
identified the very low and irregular incomes of  forest workers and their
appalling living conditions as the principle reasons. Inadequate housing, severe
health problems and social problems arising from the persistence of  a
demographic pattern of  high numbers of  single women and unmarried
mothers were highlighted.
In addition to concerns at the time about the poor living and working
conditions of  workers, concerns were also being expressed that ethnic
minorities may have been further marginalised socially and economically as a
result of  the presence of  the mill.
A 1985 study (Sevefjord) focused on the impact of  the project upon women
working at the mill. She found that women were disadvantaged in numerous
ways; through lack of  training, employment clustering in manual and childcare
work, and a lack of  involvement of  women in decision making processes. The
study also revealed the low living standards of  workers, low quality housing
and inadequate and unhealthy childcare facilities.
Follow up reports on the situation of  forest workers were commissioned in
1986 and 1987. Bostrand’s 1986 report concluded that some improvements
had occurred. In particular, families had been encouraged to settle in the
forest areas. Workers stated they liked working in the forests because they
could save money and have some land (unlike other workers in state
enterprises). Although working hours were the same as they were in 1984,
there were new and better houses being built, the furniture was better, and
there was an improvement in food self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, respondents
still complained about difficult working conditions, poor childcare facilities,
lack of  electricity and a dearth of  cultural activities.
Liljeström’s study (1987b) revealed that in forest brigades there was a
demographic pattern in which women predominated with many women as
the single-head of  households. She also reported on the low standard of  living,
inadequate diet, poor health and early retirement of  workers.
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In response to the above reports, Sida undertook to improve the situation for
workers, and instituted numerous programs to reverse the situation, particularly
for women workers. We re-examined each of  the areas of  previous concern
with a focus on the present social and economic position of  women workers,
ethnic minorities and forest brigade workers.
The harsh working and living conditions of  most workers in the 1980s were
retold to us during our fieldwork.
Each meal consisted of  just two bowls of  glutinous rice served with bitter
bamboo sprouts soup. Workers had no proper accommodation. They had
to spend the night in a tent put up by the side of  a stream or ask for
lodging at a local house.
The Phong Chau district today
What was Vinh Phu province was split into two new provinces in 1997 – Vinh
Phuc and Phu Tho (the mill falls in Phu Tho). The Phong Chau district
surrounding the mill is one of  nine districts in the new Phu Tho province.
There would have been minimal development in the district without the
presence of  the mill. Only 20 years ago about 90 per cent of  Phong Chau
houses were cottages with thatch roofs and mud walls (table 6.1). The
population of  the immediate district at the time was very small.
It was desperately poor like most of  northern Vietnam. Today, however, Phong
Chau district stands out as a pocket of  wealth in what remains a relatively
poor province (table 6.2).
6.1 Population and income
Persons per
square Food per Paddy GDP per
Population kilometre capitaa yield capita
1995 1997 1997 1995 1995 1997
No. No. No. kg Quintal/ha US$
Vinh Phu 2 329 646 1 100 000 802 226.0 28.2
Phu Tho 1 250 000 362 192
Ha Bac 2 675 705 272.9 28.5
Son La 865 914 221.5 22.8
Hoa Binh 747 171 744 000 158 229.8 29.6 190
Tuyen Quang 657 111 657 000 113 265.1 33.2 250
Yen Bai 698 379 671 000 101 234.4 31.4 130
Bac Thai 1 254 045 228.7 29.8
Ha Noi 2 424 274 2 300 000 2 519 96.4 31.6 695
a Gross output of food converted into paddy per capital. Note: Provinces in italics border Phu Tho
province.
Source: General Statistics Office (1996); Vietnam Economic Times (January 1998).
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The state enterprise sector employs nearly 8 per cent of  workers in Phong
Chau district – more than double the provincial average – and largely because
of  the mill. About half  of  the district population are employed in agriculture,
with each agricultural worker growing about half  a tonne of  rice per year.
There are several hundred small businesses in Phong Chau township selling
foodstuffs and offering services such as repairing and tailoring.
Migration from the overpopulated Red River Delta has been a persistent
feature of  northern society for centuries. The construction of  the mill and
associated infrastructure brought many migrants to the region and significantly
improved their income prospects. More than 80 per cent of  the present workers
were born in the local province (table 6.3).
The presence of  migrants from elsewhere in Vietnam is a common feature of
the northern Vietnamese midlands and mountainous societies and the
population is well adjusted to the experience of  being uprooted. There are no
obvious social problems as a result of  this internal displacement. Our interviews
in Bai Bang and in the north-western provinces of  Yen Bai and Tuyen Quang
revealed that those who have migrated, rather than being concerned about
having left their home villages, perceive their move as a desirable one that in
most cases led to domestic stability and economic security.
From the mid-1980s onwards there have been substantial economic and social
benefits for mill workers and the township due to a combination of  factors,
which include deliberate policies of  management to enrich the social and
material lives of  workers. Business start ups in Phong Chau surged after the
economic reforms of  1989, which expanded opportunities for private
household enterprises and substantially improved living standards.
6.2 Percentage of brick dwellings in Phong Chau district
1970 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997
% % % % % % %
Brick dwellings 3.58 7.49 14.98 31.60 50.16 70.03 79.48
Source: Local government statistics.
6.3 Place of birth of mill workers
No. %
Northern mountains and midlands
• Phu Tho province 1 925 77.6
• Vinh Phuc province 114 4.6
• Other provinces 78 3.1
Red River Delta region 246 9.9
North Central Coast 116 4.7
Rest of Vietnam 1 0.0
Total 2 480
Source: Survey of 2546 full time mill workers.
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The provincial data illustrates the limited industrialisation of  Vinh Phu
province. Bai Bang mill, which employs less than 3000 people directly, cannot
therefore be expected to significantly influence the economic development of
the entire province. Despite the mill being the focus for state industrialisation
in the northern areas, Vinh Phu remains among the poorest provinces in
Vietnam. Vinh Phu also does not stand out in terms of  social indicators such
as in health facilities, number of  teachers and education levels.
Living standards of mill workers and their families in
Phong Chau township
The mill workforce is prosperous – job security, training programs, attractive
housing, social welfare initiatives, cultural and sporting activities and incomes
much higher than the provincial average and the average for state owned
enterprises. Average wages including productivity-linked bonuses are over
VND1 million per month, which is about double the average for state owned
enterprises.
Our surveys revealed that all but a few worker homes were of  brick construction
with an average of  three rooms per house. About one quarter of  worker homes
had two stories. The average block of  land for their houses was 60 square
metres, although this average is biased due to a small number of  households
having large gardens. Almost two thirds of  worker households reported having
a garden of  some size – 6 per cent reporting gardens of  500 square metres or
more and 33 per cent reporting gardens of  up to 100 square metres. Household
gardens generally provided only a modest supplement to income earned at
the mill.
The mill is not burdened with a large proportion of  elderly workers as in
many state enterprises. State enterprise employment in Vietnam is typically
for life. It is also highly desired employment. Consequently, state enterprise
managers are stuck with the workforce that was recruited when the enterprise
began operations – with a uniformly youthful workforce becoming uniformly
aged over time. This demographic ‘hill’ is evident from the age frequency
distribution of  Bai Bang workers – although, as most were only recruited
about 15 years go, they are now in their late 30s. In fact, 37 per cent of  the
mill workforce is between 38 and 42 years of  age. The expansion of  capacity
in recent years has also enabled a gradual increase in employment of  young
workers and now workers under 33 years of  age constitute 17 per cent of  the
mill workforce. The mill is able to provide jobs for up to 100 training school
graduates each year.
In our interviews and focus group discussions workers repeatedly expressed a
sense of  pride and achievement in being associated with the Bai Bang project.
The perceived success of  the mill has also resulted in a high level of  loyalty to
BAPACO. Mill workers and inhabitants of  the town all expressed a sense of
hope about their futures.
The inhabitants of  the township have directly benefited financially from the
mill’s presence, but also have access to improved health care, education, and
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social and cultural activities provided to the district. About 80 per cent of
local business sales may be attributed directly or indirectly to the mill or
indirectly to mill generated demand.
The high level of  prosperity of  workers and the district is a recent phenomenon.
In the construction phase of  the project Vietnamese workers were very poorly
paid. It was not until the economic reforms of  1989 that the mill was able to
grasp economic opportunities, increase output and reap benefits for itself
and its workers. In the 1980s mill workers were not much better off  than
average state enterprise workers (which was still a much higher standard of
living than farmers). Workers today generally report that they are
comparatively better off  than other similar workers (table 6.4) and that their
living standards relative to the average in Vietnam are increasing.
Satisfaction about employment at the mill was also reflected in the aspirations
of  mill workers for their children. Some 83 per cent of  workers surveyed
wanted their children to get jobs at the mill. Managers had higher aspirations
for their children. They were divided in their desire for their children to work
at the mill or to pursue careers in Hanoi.
Township businesses
Of  the 211 Phong Chau township businesses we surveyed (80 per cent of  the
total), 63 per cent were selling goods and foodstuffs with the remainder offering
services such as repairs, sewing and hairdressing. Almost all were small scale
family businesses with 78 per cent of  owners living in the same dwelling.
Employment was shared between household members. Township businesses
were sharing in the mill’s prosperity. About 80 per cent of  their sales were
attributable directly or indirectly to expenditure by mill workers. Average
turnover was about VND8 million per month, average profits about VND2.2
million per month and average tax payments about VND130␣ 000 per year.
Most business persons wanted their children to get jobs at the mill.
6.4 Worker and manager opinions about relative pay and opportunity costs
Compared with similar workers, how is your pay?
Total
Less The same A bit more Much more responses
Workers 118 764 1 424 161 2 467
Managers 2 24 36 8 70
Total 120 788 1 460 169 2 537
If you never worked at the mill, would your living conditions be:
Total
Much worse A bit worse The same Better responses
Workers 297 1 351 765 36 2 449
Managers 7 39 24 0 70
Total 304 1 390 789 36 2 519
Source: Survey of 2546 full time mill workers.
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Household ownership of  assets was higher than for mill workers (table 6.5).
6.5 Local business and mill worker asset ownership ratios Percentages of households with
these assets
Colour Video
Motorbikes televisions Refrigerators players
% % % %
Mill workers 63 74 19 8
Local businesses 71 94 32 27
Source: Results from survey of 2546 full time mill workers and 211 local businesses.
Social differentiation among mill workers
Social and economic differentiation has intensified over time. Mill managers
have become a wealthy elite with many obvious material benefits from their
employment (such as new cars and spacious housing). But the general
improvements to regional living standards, the power of  workers to influence
the decision-making processes of  the mill, and the social stability of  the district
have offset any tensions that may have arisen because of  social and economic
differentiation.
The economic prosperity of  the district has led to a politically stable situation
in which workers, managers and local party officials work constructively
together to make economic and social reforms – although these are limited by
the overall political system. Political differentiation has not been intensified
by the presence of  the mill as the disadvantaged and less powerful groups
(such as women and ethnic minorities) have significantly benefited from the
consensual reforms.
Education and training of mill workers
Education is highly valued in Vietnam and provides opportunities for social
mobility. In the case of  those trained at the mill, the opportunity to gain skills
and improve their English has given many individuals increased job prospects
and occasionally even allowed them to travel overseas for mill-related business.
The beneficiaries of  the Bai Bang project include those who went through
the Paper Training School (box 6.6). This school was officially founded in
1986, although formal training for mill workers has been ongoing since the
1970s. The school maintains about 300 to 400 full time students each year,
some doing the two year course to become certified skilled workers and others
doing a single year or less for lower degrees. About one third of  students are
women. According to the director, about 100 graduates gain jobs at the mill
each year. The others generally find employment in other paper enterprises
as the quality of  school training is highly regarded in Vietnam.
For those who have sought employment elsewhere in Vietnam, having had
training at the mill has given them a significant advantage in job procurement
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   6.6 The Vocational Training School
The school is active and well managed. The buildings are clean and the machinery well
maintained. The school is overflowing with lively and enthusiastic young students. English
language lessons are taught, as well as numerous specific courses for mill workers such as how
to use the computer software programs.
The accommodation and school facilities are excellent. The student housing consists of brick
and tile houses. Rooms are equipped with electric fans, vacuum flasks and desks. The water and
power supply is reliable. Infrastructure facilities such as classrooms, laboratories, library, etc.
are convenient for learning and teaching. There are playgrounds for volleyball, badminton and
gymnastics.
We had informal interviews with some students studying electrical engineering, mechanics,
welding and motor repair who are not relatives to employees of the paper industry. They were
happy about the studying and living conditions at the school because the training was done in a
systematic manner. However, they all commented that the equipment in these laboratories was
produced in the 1970s and 1980s and is out of date.
over others. Training at Bai Bang is held in high regard and Bai Bang graduates
enjoy high incomes (table 6.7).
6.7 Incomes and assets of Bai Bang workers and training school graduates
Average Rooms in Dwelling
incomes dwelling size Assets per 100 households
Bicycles Motor- Colour Video
bikes televisions players
VND No. m2 No. No. No. No.
Bai Bang workers 770 414 2.98 55.9 84 63 74 8
Graduates working
elsewhere 505 671 2.32 47.8 85 10 29 2
Source: Survey of 2546 full time mill workers and 164 training school graduates working elsewhere.
A number of  workers commented that the training provided by the mill
significantly improved their life choices and social position. Some also mentioned
that there needs to be more emphasis upon developing diverse training beyond
the mill’s needs so that the impact of  training can extend to more people.
Access to consumer goods by mill workers and their families
In the 1980s food shortages and difficulties in obtaining consumer items were
major concerns at Bai Bang and throughout Vietnam. Food productivity in
the region and throughout the country has increased markedly since the move
to a market economy, and food availability is no longer an issue.
There has been a big increase in the number of  motorbikes and televisions in
the province. About three-quarters of  workers reported having colour
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televisions, although few had video players. Manager households not
surprisingly reported higher rates of  more valued assets with lower rates of
bicycles and black and white televisions. The official data for Phong Chau
district in 1997 shows very low motorbike ownership rates which reflects the
fact that the majority of  district workers are farmers who would have little
more than a bicycle (table 6.8).
Living room of  Bai
Bang worker in
the Phong Chau
township.
Photo A. Berlin.
The rise in the number of  motorbikes has led to greater mobility and exposure
to the world beyond the district. Television has also had a big impact providing
entertainment and educational value.
6.8 Asset ownership by mill households
Number of Average year LSMS urban Phong Chau
Assets households of purchase areas data district
Worker Management
households households 1993 1997
No. Year % % % %
Bicycle 2 148 1986 13.6 12.1 15.2
Motorbike 1 614 1994 62.3 88.6 36 14.7
Black and white
television 281 1991 11.3 0 51 38
Colour television 1 889 1994 73.5 100.0
Refrigerator 494 1993 18.6 47.1 18 3
Video player 207 1994 7.4 32.9 14 4
Source: Survey of 2546 mill workers and General Statistics Office.
Percentage of such
assets in:
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Health of mill workers and their families
There are continued occupational health hazards at the mill associated with
high temperatures, noise and dust (box 6.9).
   6.9 Occupational health hazards at the mill
Some workers said that working conditions in earlier years were far from satisfactory. The
workplace was subjected to high temperatures, noise, paint dust and chemical smells. Most
workers suffered from diseases such as sore throat, asthma, ear-nose-throat problems and
chemical allergies. The incidence of these diseases has been reduced considerably. In recent
years, more attention has been paid to the working conditions of workers. For example,
previously the pulp and collection workshops were equipped with airconditioners, but not air
ventilators. As a result, it was always hot and suffocating inside the workshops. In recent years,
a network of ventilation has now been put in place and airconditioners have been put outside.
Workers feel much more comfortable during their working hours. However, the problems have
not been entirely alleviated.
Table 6.10 indicates the high number of  respiratory illnesses in Phong Chau.
A comparison with the Vietnam-wide figures is difficult to make, as it is
impossible to determine how these health indicators were measured. Smoking
in Vietnam is so widespread (more than 80 per cent of  adult males smoke)
that it is difficult to calculate how much the Vietnam-wide figures on
respiratory illnesses are affected by it. In Phong Chau the incidence of
smoking is not known. Nevertheless, the mill clinic informed us of  the high
rate of  respiratory illnesses as did numerous workers and the local People’s
Committee.
6.10 Incidence of diseases and illnesses in Phong Chau
Illnesses 1995 1996 1997
No. No. No.
Infectious disease and parasitosis 284 440 414
Tumor disease 18 21 34
Hematopoietic/blood forming organ disease 5 24 73
Endocrine disease 2 12 5
Psychiatric disease 11 24 18
Neuro disease 19 45 50
Facial disease 41 48 66
Ear disease 116 120 148
Cardiovascular disease 164 304 401
Respiratory tract disease 1 013 1 468 1 500
Digestive disease 547 604 823
Skin and subcutaneous disease 64 98 112
Osteo-myo-arthro disease 117 126 248
Urogenital disease 22 64 92
Intoxication and accident injuries 124 134 276
Source: Phong Chau District People’s Committee.
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Interviews with workers at the mill revealed that the company has made special
efforts in primary healthcare for women and children. The company’s medical
section has undertaken immunization for children and expectant mothers. As
a result, in recent years the number of  women absent from work to look after
sick children has been considerably reduced. Since 1992 kindergartens and
crèches have been upgraded. The kindergarten and crèche attendants have
been trained and retrained to raise their proficiency. For three years running,
the kindergarten of  the Bai Bang Paper Company was recognised as being in
the vanguard of  preschool education by the Vinh Phu Provincial Education
Department.
Women employed at the mill
The mill employs three men for every two women (table 6.11). Despite the
egalitarian ethos of  management, the power of  the Women’s Union and the
socialist ideology of  equality for women, only 24 percent (17 persons out of
70) of  the managers are women. ‘Managers’ in this context include deputy
department heads and above. Almost all the most senior management positions
were men, although there were some female department heads. While 76
percent of  the managers were members of  the Communist Party, only 12
percent of  workers were members.
Although there is no active discrimination against women, women at the mill
and at VPMC are at a disadvantage in employment and promotion
opportunities. The bulk of  the female workforce remains in the unskilled area.
Much recent research indicates that women throughout Vietnam have not
benefited from doi moi as much as men mostly because of  the influence of  a
Confucian ideology in which a strict hierarchy based upon gender and age
have placed women in consistently inferior positions.
6.11 Mill workers by gender and Communist Party membership
Number of Average monthly
persons incomes
Yes No Unspecified
No. No. No. No. No.
Workers
Female 1 030 67 855 108 707 000
Male 1 516 223 1 127 166 754 000
Managers
Female 17 12 5 0 1 473 000
Male 53 41 10 2 1 781 000
Total 2 546 343 1 997 276 781 896
Source: Survey of 2546 full time mill workers.
Party members
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Average incomes for women workers and managers are less than for men.
This reflects differences in skill composition as wages for men and women are
the same for each job classification. In the recent shedding of  jobs in direct
production activity within VPMC, women bore the brunt of  retrenchments
at a ratio of  4.6:1. Women have benefited from all the changes that have
taken place at the mill since 1974, but to a lesser degree than their male
counterparts.
Women cite fewer employment and training opportunities and lower incomes
as their major concerns. Nevertheless, most women commented that they
were very hopeful when thinking of  their economic and political futures and
felt that great strides had already been taken in their push for equality in the
workplace.
Ethnic minorities at the mill
Ethnic minorities constitute only 0.2 per cent of the Phong Chau district
population. This has not altered considerably over the last two decades (table
6.12). The area was largely Kinh before 1979. It appears that, in Phong Chau,
the small numbers of  non-Kinh have been integrated into the wider
community for some time. The impact of  the project on the ethnic minorities
in Phong Chau is therefore not an issue.
The situation for forest workers and farmers
In the 1970s increasing food demands from high population pressures and the
need for wood led to expanded clearing and cultivation in upland areas. The
result was extensive environmentally damaging deforestation in many of  the
provinces now supplying wood to the mill. But over the last two decades the
northwest region of  Vietnam has been environmentally and economically
transformed through forestry projects to provide logs for the mill and other
enterprises.
6.12 Ethnic origins of Phong Chau district population
1 October 1979 1 April 1989
No. No.
Kinh 160 375 205 236
Tay 98 130
Muong 72 85
Han 31 1
Nung 30 8
Cao lan 19 0
San chay 16 23
Thai 0 5
Others 26 51
Total 160 667 205 539
Source: General Statistics Office.
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Afforestation
Through regional educational projects farmers have been made aware of  the
benefits of  growing trees, and many have invested in forest planting and hill
cultivation with the assistance of  local forestry programs (box 6.13). The
Forestry Cooperation Program between Vietnam and Sweden has made an
important contribution to afforestation while significantly improving the
welfare of  farmers in the region.
   6.13 Forest cover is increasing in some areas
The Director of Yen Son Forest Enterprise, Mr Ngo Duy Dan, said that previously the provincial
forest cover was 30 per cent, now nearly 60 per cent, the forested area managed by the
enterprise is 95 per cent and the cover area of five communes under the enterprise’s control is
65 per cent. Before the project, it was only 45 per cent. In Yen Bai, the provincial forest cover is
32 per cent and for the raw material forest enterprises, the area is over 60 per cent.
Through afforestation soil erosion problems have decreased in all the provinces
providing raw materials. Tree planting throughout the northwest has attracted
labour from elsewhere in the country and continues to be regarded as an
attractive supplement to other farming. The social benefits have been to provide
employment and to increase income levels, and the work is viewed as personally
satisfying.
Would afforestation have occurred without the mill? Forestry products are
used for numerous commercial purposes other than for paper pulp and so the
development of  forests became an important economic policy of  both the
national and local governments. And soil erosion and associated loss of
moisture had been a concern of  many policymakers in the region as it was
having a negative impact upon agricultural productivity. The presence of  the
mill, by creating a clear commercial value for logs, has been the catalyst for
the vast replanting of  bare hillsides that has occurred over the past decade.
This tree planting is now also delivering substantial agricultural benefits
through retention of  water in upland areas, allowing the growing of  paddy
rice and horticultural activities. The result is more secure rural enterprises
built around a mixture of  commercial trees, upland rice, horticulture and
livestock. But the mill was not the only reason for the successful and widespread
afforestation.
Land allocation for forest growing
With the land allocation reforms forest enterprises have assigned land to worker
households and entered into revenue sharing contracts between the household
and enterprise (box 6.14). Allocating land, and contracting afforestation and
forest protection to households has provided them with strong incentives to
succeed.
There is evidence that some workers resisted being allocated land and that
some who were allocated land have handed it back to the forest enterprises
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Photo: D. Vincent. for management and protection. It is only since 1995 that land ownership has
been popularised in some areas.
Living standards of forest workers and their families
All persons interviewed acknowledged that their living standards had increased
sharply in recent years. Assistance programs and policy reforms (especially
the handing back of  land for tree growing to households) were viewed as
important contributors.
   6.14 Log growing arrangements
Workers for the forest enterprises know that they can sell logs to the Bai Bang mill. There are several
models of planting. One model involves paying people so many dong per year to plant and look after
the trees then, upon harvest, all of the proceeds go to the forest enterprise which does the harvest-
ing. The second model shares the investment in trees – 50 per cent to the forest enterprise and 50
per cent to the farmer – and splits the proceeds at harvest 50/50. At harvest, the forest enterprise
helps the farmer sell his product. In all cases the forest enterprise provides guidance for the farmers.
Local people like to cooperate with the forest enterprise on the 50/50 rule.
Tuyen Quang province
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Worker living standards have greatly improved due to better working and
living conditions. During the Swedish project, each brigade had only four
buffaloes managed by the enterprise. Now each enterprise has its own
buffalo. Before 1990 the whole brigade had only three black and white
television sets. Now 21 of  the 26 households have television and many of
them are colour. (Head of  Brigade 17, Viet Huong Forest Enterprise)
Improvements in the situation of  one forest enterprise are described in box
6.15.
6.15 The Ham Yen Forest Enterprise
The enterprise consists of eight brigades employing 208 workers of which 125 are women.
There are 25 administrative personnel, 11 women looking after children and 172 persons
working in the forest.
The local land area is about 22␣ 000 hectares of which 4061 hectares belongs to the forest
enterprise and the rest to local communities. Each year the enterprise plants about 250
hectares of trees. The annual harvest for Bai Bang is 150 hectares. In 1997 only 71 hectares
were harvested for Bai Bang, as the mill did not want to purchase any more trees.
In addition to tree planting on forest enterprise land, there is now considerable planting on other
land. There are several models of planting. One model involves paying people an agreed amount
per year to plant and look after the trees. Upon harvest all of the proceeds go to the forest
enterprise that does the harvesting. A second model shares the investment in trees 50:50
between farmer and forest enterprise, and shares the proceeds 50:50.
The enterprise makes the land available to households who can involve all family members in the
planting and caring process. Considerable support is provided to farmers through forestry
programs for seedlings and extension services. As well as sharing in the log proceeds, workers
also get access to firewood. In addition to the permanent workers, about 200–300 labourers
are hired for part time jobs, which injects money into the farming system.
Average wages of forest workers have increased from VND320␣ 000 per month in 1996 to
VND405␣ 000 per month in 1997 – considerably more than the earnings of local farmers not
growing trees.
One hundred and fifty-three families have their own separate houses. Seventy houses are brick
with tiled roofs and cement floors, and 59 houses have roofs of thatch. Fifty-one households
have a motor bike and 75 have television.
The forest enterprise makes a small profit, which it invests in cultural activities, sporting
activities and trips for workers.
Because of the mill’s demand for logs, paid employment has been created for large numbers of
workers in the area who would otherwise be engaged in farming. The road system has been
greatly improved (45 kilometres of road for cars and 107 kilometres of road for forest access),
as has housing and community infrastructure.
In a study of  the living condition program for forest workers, Thi and Bendz
(1993) found improvements in the supply of  electricity, housing (especially for
single mothers) and kindergartens. The development of  home gardens was
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also noted. All the households interviewed by us in early 1998 acknowledged
these improvements, but emphasised the importance of  their being able to
develop agroforestry and the assistance they have received to grow trees through
credit and knowledge transfer.
The salaries paid by forest enterprises have increased sharply over the 1990s
(table 6.16). However, as shown in chapter 4, they are well below the salaries
received by mill workers.
The rapid increase in worker salaries has been accompanied by a sharp decline
in the numbers employed in forest enterprises. Income from land ownership
through cultivation of  crops such as tea and rice, the development of  gardens
for vegetables and fruit trees, and through animal husbandry and fishponds
has added to the incomes of  forest workers. Income from the household
economy now accounts for 40–50 per cent of  total household incomes.
   6.17 Advances in hospital care
Hospitals were built in project areas such as a clinic in Bac Quang and a spa house in Ham Yen.
And since 1990, clinics in Yen Son have been upgraded into a regional hospital. The hospital has
30 beds and provides medical treatment and check ups not only for workers and their children,
but also for the population in seven communes in the region, including ethnic people. Each forest
worker has a health insurance book. When they are sick, they are provided with free treatment
and check-ups at the enterprise clinics or hospitals. Women workers interviewed said they were
given regular prenatal check ups and had access to maternal leave as stipulated by law
(previously six months, but four months from now on).
Health of forest workers
Our interviews and group discussions revealed that the project supported
healthcare programs which have improved the health of  both male and female
workers, but especially females – particularly in the areas of  primary healthcare
and family planning (box 6.17).
All female workers interviewed said that their health and working conditions
had improved. The enterprises provide free health care to workers. But health
6.16 Worker salaries in Ham Yen Forest Enterprise
Year Monthly salary
VND
1990 25 000
1991 32 000
1992 89 930
1993 83 000
1994 128 000
1995 271 487
1996 332 000
1997 405 000
Source: Forest enterprise records.
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concerns remain because of  the heavy nature of  the work – carrying young
plants uphill, digging holes, and crossing streams to cultivate and protect forests.
As a consequence, women workers suffer from illnesses such as rheumatism,
joint pains, gynaecological complaints and sore eyes. Regulations set out for
female workers specify the retirement age of  40 or 45 (which is about 10 to 15
years younger than normal standards as defined by the Labour Code). Female
workers also commented that due to the heavy work required of  forestry
workers, even male workers should retire about ten years earlier than normal
standards. The poor occupational health status of  women forest workers
remains a significant blight on the otherwise substantial improvements in living
standards.
Forest worker housing
Workers recalled their living conditions a decade ago in single family room
apartment complexes. Separate houses for worker families are now the norm.
They have tiled roofs and are of  wooden or brick construction. By contrast,
the bulk of  farmers in the region still live in thatched cottages. Forest enterprises
have provided financial support (through loans) to workers to build their own
houses. Housing standards are, however, considerably below those enjoyed
by mill workers and their families.
Transport in the forest regions
The northwest region presents particularly difficult conditions for
communications and transport due to the terrain (Donovan et. al. 1997, pp.
22–4). Today, not all villages can be reached by road. The roads from the
enterprises to the forest brigades have been substantially improved in recent
years. The project has helped upgrade the main highways – for example, the
portions from Vinh Phu to Ha Giang and Vinh Phu to Lao Cai – and helped
forestry enterprises open many inter-roads linking the headquarters of  the
enterprises with brigades and from brigades to planting sites. The inter-roads
of  forestry enterprises have been not only very useful for afforestation and
forest exploitation, but also economic and cultural exchanges between local
villages. Workers frequently mentioned the benefits to them of  reduced
travelling times.
Education and training opportunities for
forest workers and their families
Many workers commented that Sida projects had previously provided funding
for childcare facilities and schools. Increasing population in these provinces,
and the ageing of  the buildings and educational resources, means that ongoing
funding is essential to maintain the standard of  the original facilities. Many
childcare facilities and kindergartens are now shabby, overcrowded, under-
resourced and suffer from a shortage of  qualified staff  who are poorly paid.
Enterprises have sought funding to upgrade facilities.
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Our interviews revealed that farmers (including ethnic minority people) have
been given training courses in their communities. Trainers are not only those
from the agricultural extension centres, but also from local hamlets and villages.
However, there remain few educational and training opportunities for youth
in these areas. Education and training opportunities are much better for mill
workers and their families.
A 1994 survey (Nguyen, Nguyen and Huynh 1995, p.10) in the forestry
development area supplying Bai Bang with logs revealed that women are given
very few opportunities to make decisions, and to learn new technologies. This
accords with our findings.
Cultural life of forest workers
The orest enterprises make a small profit, which they invest in cultural activities,
sporting activities and trips for workers. The supply of  consumer goods as
well as newspapers and magazines to the mountainous areas is still irregular,
but it is a vast improvement from the situation previously. This reflects not
only higher incomes, but also the changes that have taken place throughout
Vietnam. As one informant reported, ‘In the 1970s and 1980s, even if  we had
money to spend, there was nothing available to buy’. Television relay
transmitters in the region have been widely established and television has
proved enormously popular.
The lack of  a permanent power supply remains a problem in log supply regions.
The project provided power generators and electrical devices. Most were still
in operation. Several brigades had generators that did not operate and many
households still had to resort to oil lamps when there was no water in the
streams to generate hydropower. Houses with televisions often use batteries to
power them.
Despite the big improvement relative to the situation in earlier years, the
cultural opportunities for forest workers and their families are considerably
more limited than those for mill workers and their families.
Social differentiation among forest workers
Some forest workers reported increasing social differentiation between
households in the region. Forestry workers in all areas are significantly better
off  than private farmers. They have regular incomes from forest enterprise
employment and have benefited from a series of  projects to improve their
housing and health. Many in the northern provinces see working in forest
enterprises as a good job and it is easy to recruit workers. And farmers
receive less for their trees than the forest enterprises – the reason being that
trees grown by farmers are dispersed as buyers must go to different places to
collect them.
Farmers in Vietnam are the poorest and most populous group. With or without
the mill, private farmers will continue to experience economic hardship and
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poverty among farmers in the provinces of  the raw material area remains
widespread.
With the advent of  private forestry, social differentiation is also emerging
between households within forest enterprises. And our interviews revealed
considerable sensitivity among forest workers to the large gap between their
incomes and those of  mill workers (box 6.18).
   6.18 Forest enterprise worker views of their parity with mill workers
Workers at Brigade 203 said that, for all the improvement in their living standards, their monthly
income was much lower than that of the workers at Bai Bang Paper Company. They said that the
average monthly income of workers at Brigade 203 was VND315␣ 000 while that of the Bai Bang
Paper Company’s workers was over VND1 million or three times higher. Workers of Brigade 203
were only awarded the 13th month’s salary as a bonus while workers at Bai Bang Paper Company
were rewarded both in cash and in kind (such as televisions or radio sets). The housing situation of
Bai Bang’s workers is much more comfortable than that of brigades. Workers at Bai Bang worked
only eight hours a day while workers at Brigade 203 had to work ten hours a day and to be at
work from dawn to dusk. Worse still, workers at Brigade 203 did not have access to a mid-shift
meal as at Bai Bang.
Many participants to the group discussions made it clear that there was a widening gap in
cultural attainment between workers of the raw material areas and those working at Bai Bang.
For example, only some households at Brigade 203 had black and white television sets, which
could only receive a single channel of the local station. Whereas, at Bai Bang most workers had
television sets, mostly colour sets that could receive all the channels of the central television
station. At Bai Bang, billions of dong were invested in building swimming pools, gymnasium,
tennis court, cultural houses. At the brigade, entertainment opportunities for workers were
restricted to playing volleyball or badminton in the yard of the Brigade’s head office.
Ethnic minorities in the forest regions
Although there has been massive Kinh migration to the northwest area since
the 1950s, the populations of  mountain minorities have also grown quickly.
The demographic changes have impacted upon the minority groups
substantially. They have been encouraged to change their land use patterns
away from shifting cultivation through various government programs to
resettle them. Many ethnic minority workers have changed their livelihood
strategies from slash and burn to forest growing and protection. They have
been encouraged to develop gardens and are given loans to invest in livestock.
The 1994 study results (Nguyen, et al. 1995) of  the relative incomes of  ethnic
minorities in the forestry development areas of  the north west provinces
revealed that the average Kinh incomes have accelerated more rapidly than
those of  the ethnic minorities. The poorest group was the Hmong, with an
average income one third of  the average Kinh income. Incomes were higher
among the Thai, Dao and Muong, with the Tay people having the highest
incomes of  any ethnic group (averaging 70 per cent of  the average Kinh
incomes in the region). These income variations are the result of  differences
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in livelihood strategies, land quality and accessibility, as well as education and
training. Illiteracy rates remain high among the ethnic minorities of  the region
and this is likely to widen the gap between their income levels and those of
the Kinh. And some groups such as the Hmong are disadvantaged
economically, through cultural and historical reasons, which also relate to
their location on the higher slopes and peaks and not as a result of
discrimination.
The forestry projects associated with the mill have had a beneficial effect on
the many different ethnic groups in the northwest provinces in providing
employment, training, a source of  income for logs and access to numerous
social services provided to the entire region. The improvements to the living
standards of  these groups have in many cases been able to enhance traditions
and community stability.
No overt discrimination against ethnic minorities was recorded in any of  our
interviews, although the popular perceptions of  ethnic minorities as ‘backward’
may have influenced how policy has been implemented. As a 1997 study
indicated, ‘The most important constraint that the official culture places on
development efforts is the lack of  receptivity it engenders among Kinh cadre
to genuine participation by ethnic minorities in the planning process’ (Donovan
et al., p. 28).
The farm level plantation project has provided considerable help to farmers,
whether Kinh or ethnic minority, to build farming models which are suitable
in the mountain region. Many of  the local training courses were designed
particularly for the participation of  ethnic minorities. Although there has been
some erosion of  their traditional cultural life, most ethnic minorities interviewed
reported that their previous lifestyle (shifting cultivation) led to food shortages
every year and that the changes had benefited them substantially economically
and culturally. They regarded their change in livelihood as having improved
the health and welfare of  their families.
Before the project we lived mostly on shifting cultivation and our main
income sources were hilly rise, cassava roots and maize. And every year
each household had food shortages for three to four months and in those
months they had to go to the forests to seek roots for food. (Farmer from
the Dzao minority group)
Some workers from ethnic minorities are also employed in forest enterprises
and they and their families have shared in the benefits from increased wages
to forest workers.
Before doi moi my family had a difficult time. We lived in a living quarter
flat and I received my salary once every three to four months, sometimes
even six months. In December 1997 I now earn VND 407␣ 000 per month.
With savings from the income of  myself  and my wife I have purchased
buffaloes, land for orange cultivation, orchard seedlings, and some goats
and pigs. I now also earn considerable income from breeding buffaloes
and goats, and from producing oranges. (Worker of  the Tay ethnic group in
Brigade 203, Ham Yen Enterprise)
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Impact of the debate on compulsory
employment of forest workers
In Larsson and Birgegard’s 1985 study the authors suggested that recruitment
to forest brigades was not a matter of  free choice. Among the complaints of
the workers at the time were that payments for work were very late and there
was much pressure placed on workers to stay in the brigades. The authors
also reported a strong technical and male bias in the project.
Two years later, Fforde’s (1987b) report on forestry workers disagreed with
the findings of  earlier reports on the issue of  compulsory employment. Fforde
argued that people in the Bai Bang forests mostly come from the delta region
of  north Vietnam because of  a centuries old tradition of  emigration to
alleviate overcrowding. He found that, for these workers, there was no
‘compulsion’ to work because labour is not a scarce resource and farming is
unreliable as an income source. He reported that there was a perceived
attractiveness of  life in the forests, a relatively high value of  state incomes
over income from outside sources and overcrowding in the home areas of
the migrants who came to the raw material areas. In Le’s 1987 study it was
also found that there was no pressure placed on workers to remain in the
brigades (pp. 8–9).
Our interviews suggest that the debate on compulsory employment in the
mid-1980s had some impact upon the living standards of  forestry workers. It
is generally understood by forest workers that Swedish investment since that
time has helped improve working conditions, and raise productivity and income
levels. The reports on the living conditions of  female forestry workers in the
mid-1980s stimulated numerous programs to assist them, which included the
provision of  loans and improved housing, health and education. But reform
leading up to the allocation of  land, and the higher incomes that this has
generated, has been much more important in improving livining standards.
The project’s objectives and political goals
Pulp and paper mills are capital intensive. The number of  jobs created by the
project is small for such a large injection of  donor funds. We estimate that
around 25␣ 000 jobs are being sustained through the activities of  the mill –
mill employment, forestry employment, employment in input supplying
industries and employment in other local businesses closely dependent on the
mill and forestry. Nevertheless, that this many people are enjoying sustained
higher living standards due to the project is a commendable achievement and
contributes positively toward our overall assessment of  the project.
Schoolbooks, education and technology transfer were a high social priority in
the 1970s and 1980s. The benefits from establishing a pulp and paper mill
were perhaps more important to the Vietnamese planners at the time than
the employment opportunities that may have been created. Economically,
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particularly in the more favorable economic policy environment of  the 1990s,
the investment is proving both profitable and sustainable.
What if  the Swedish funds had been directed instead to achieve integrated
rural development for Vinh Phu province? This would have involved
electrification, water supply, and road and bridge building and repair. It is
highly probable that such investments in rural infrastructure would have
generated high and widespread social returns. But whether such investments
could have stimulated sustained higher rates of  growth in the province is
difficult to determine. And, in Vietnam in the 1970s, the policy environment
was not conducive to effective aid of  this type or indeed to investment in
general.
The hindsight from 50 years of  development experience has seen a distinctive
trend towards donor support for rural ‘poverty focused’ development assistance.
But it is hardly fair to expect the Swedish development planners of  the 1970s
to have the vision of  those in the 1990s. In the context of  its time, central
planning seemed to somehow work, and the proposal to build a paper mill for
schoolbooks was in many ways attractive.
The Swedish influence
The exchange of  cultures and ideas was greatly restricted by the bureaucratic
cordon imposed around the Swedish camp in the early years of  the project.
While many Swedes and Vietnamese who worked at Bai Bang report on the
positive relations between the two groups, others comment that there were
numerous tensions and misunderstandings.
It was never an easy project. The economic and cultural differences, and the
peculiar circumstances of  the time, made working and social relations tense
(box 6.19). From the Swedish side there were many stories of  delays, losses
and bureaucratic incompetence by the Vietnamese. Vietnamese contributions
to the project were generally delivered late, if  at all, and were rarely of  the
standard promised. ‘Electricians’ turned out to be workers who dug trenches
for electrical cables. Genuine skilled workers, sometimes trained in Sweden,
   6.19 Intercultural tensions did arise
When asked about the inevitable intercultural tensions that may have arisen during the course
of the project, one informant mentioned that these were infrequent and often laughed about by
people today. One memorable incident of a Vietnamese worker chasing a Swedish worker
around the mill with a big stick is remembered with pleasure rather than rancor. The early
stages of the project produced numerous difficulties for the Swedes because of the restric-
tions upon their interaction with the local people who were curious and interested in the
European visitors, and often crowded around them when they were in public. On several
occasions people threw items at Swedish women in the street, not to harm them, but out of
interest in their response. These early tensions soon settled into a more stable and relaxed
environment for both the Vietnamese and the Swedes.
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were reallocated to other parts of  Vietnam. Swedes were not permitted to
walk the 2 kilometres from the camp to the mill, but when buses failed to
arrive sometimes weeks of  work were lost. When motorbikes were imported
the Swedes were finally able to break some of  the controls on their movements.
Having a Vietnamese girlfriend was an invitation for harassment.
The Vietnamese also had problems. The intense indoctrination of  wartime
had to be modified to accept these ‘friendly capitalists’. Ideologues had trouble
in communicating beyond the language barrier. Those who did befriend
Swedes were visited by the police and held in suspicion. The wealth and brash
consumerism of  the Swedes was overwhelming. The Vietnamese knew little
about the outside world, but the Swedes brought them face to face with their
poverty.
That both sides persevered through the difficulties is remarkable. In hindsight,
and over time, resentments and confusions have dissolved. Today, both Swedes
and the Vietnamese are proud of  their achievement. Visiting Swedes and
Finns, and those resident in Hanoi, are all impressed with the present condition
of  the mill. Some of  those who attended the 15 year celebrations in November
1997 had not even expected to see the mill operational, let alone at full capacity
and with manicured gardens. They all noticed how much cleaner the mill
looks today. Planning is coordinated and there is a clear sense of  responsibility.
The town, they observed, is much bigger and much wealthier.
In the forest areas there were very limited opportunities to communicate with
Swedish workers. Workers we interviewed in the forest brigades said that only
The exchange of
cultures and ideas
was greatly
restricted by the
bureaucratic cordon
imposed around the
Swedish camp in
the early years.
Children of
Swedish and
Finnish experts are
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in the 1970s.
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on very few occasions did they see Swedish experts. Even if  they met, they
could not communicate because of  the language barrier. There was not direct
influence of  Swedish culture on them.
Changes in management practices
As reported in chapter 2, the management style of  the Swedes has had a
permanent impact on how the mill functions. Mill managers nominated styles
of  work and management as key attributes they learned from the Swedes.
The Swedes were admired for their professionalism, management of  time
and organisational abilities. Several managers also mentioned clarity and
coordination of  responsibilities and important lessons learned.
Swedes interviewed during research on this issue emphasised that the mill
exhibited the typical features of  weak management in the early days. In
particular, mill departments operated as discrete ‘empires’ due to the lack of
top down coordination and planning. One department might stop the whole
production process without notice to solve a minor problem. This, they noted,
has now changed and the mill is tightly managed to optimise the quality and
quantity of  output. The only criticism of  existing practice was that more time
should be allocated for preventative maintenance of  the machines.
Mill managers today see themselves as models in management practices for
other state enterprises to study and follow. Managers are well aware that the
open approach to management practiced at BAPACO is unique among state
owned enterprises. The mill management takes great pride in the performance
of  the mill and in its own professionalism. This is not just professional
management in a technical sense, but also in the approach to sharing information
and dealing with external authorities and visitors. The mill is acknowledged
throughout Vietnam as a good example of  management style, and delegates
from other state enterprises regularly visit the mill to study its operation and
management. This ‘demonstration effect’ may be important in promoting
enterprise level reform as the market economy develops in Vietnam.
Table 6.20 reveals that ‘management skills’ were rated as the most important
determinant of  promotion at the mill with ‘education’ also rating highly. Most
state enterprises rate ‘years of  experience’ as a more crucial factor in
determining promotion.
Forest enterprise managers also reported that they learned many lessons from
the different ways of  thinking, working styles and professionalism of  the
Swedish experts. They report that the Swedes were always very open and
ready to share their experiences and knowledge with their Vietnamese
colleagues.
The impact of  the Swedes was greatest with managers and much less with
other workers at the mill, who report infrequent direct contact between the
two (table 6.21). The table shows that 44 per cent of  present mill workers who
provided such answers said they had worked with or been trained by Swedes.
One third of  present mill workers had worked with Swedes for more than six
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months. Some workers received training in Sweden and these are included in
the 119 workers (6 per cent of  total workers) who reported working with Swedes
outside the mill.
More workers and managers thought the Swedes were ‘too soft’ than those
who reported that Swedes were ‘sometimes rude’. Most, however, considered
the Swedish style of  work to be ‘fair’ or ‘sympathetic’.
The generation of goodwill
The enduring perception is that the presence of  the Swedes benefited the
region and the lives of  its inhabitants. There is enduring goodwill towards
Sida and the Swedish people who worked on the project. Apart from the
obvious impact of  Swedish management practices at the mill itself, in the
provinces the Swedes impressed people with their social welfare ethos. The
Swedes were perceived as thoughtful and caring to workers. The granting of
loans to unmarried women to build their houses, the allocation of  land to
disadvantaged women to build houses (which was done by some forest
enterprises) and the donations of  aid to nurseries and schools stem from the
Swedish influence. Forest workers we interviewed had fond memories of  how
Swedish experts paid attention to the lives of  their children by giving toys and
clothing to the creches.
6.20 Total responses to determinants of promotiona Worker and manager answers
Determinants of promotion No influence A little influence A bit important Important Very important
Years of work experience 17.9 29.4 33.5 12.5 6.8
Level of education 1.1 3.8 7.4 39.2 48.4
Management skills 0.7 1.5 4.9 21.3 71.7
Personal and family connections 17.8 40.8 20.0 12.6 8.8
Communist Party membership 13.2 20.1 16.4 22.2 28.1
Total 10.1 19.1 16.4 21.5 32.8
a Figures in table represent percentages and add to 100 across the rows.
Source: Results from survey of 2546 full time mill workers.
6.21 Working and training with Swedesa
0 1–2 3–6 7–12 13–24 25–63 Over 64
months months months months months months months
At the mill 55.9 5.2 5.6 6.5 6.4 11.2 9.2
Outside the mill 94.3 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.6
a Figures in table represent percentages and add to 100 across the rows.
Source: Results from survey of 2546 full time mill workers and 164 training school graduates
working elsewhere.
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Responses to outsiders: trust and openness
A consequence of  the Swedish presence has been familiarity, trust and openness
in dealing with foreigners. Even the local government authorities are receptive
and informative. Our research benefited greatly from this aspect of  the Swedish
legacy. Mill managers were courteous, helpful and provided all the information
we asked for.
The project engendered trust at several levels. Respondents reported that the
positive impact of  the Swedes was largely due to their long term involvement
in the region and to their ability to fulfil promises on both a personal, group
and national level.
There are also high levels of  trust in the mill and in the institutions and
organisations associated with the mill. Workers feel secure and consider that
managers are doing their best to promote worker welfare. Cooperation between
the mill and local authorities is high. Although trust is not directly measurable,
it was a factor frequently mentioned in interviews and can be seen in the
apparent absence of  high level corruption and deceit that mark many other
enterprises in Vietnam. Recent civil unrest in some areas of  the country has
demonstrated that lack of  intercommunal trust is a major factor in eroding
social stability. Trust is an important Swedish legacy.
The exposure to different world views, aesthetics and cultural differences such
as language and social behaviour was also beneficial to mill workers in assisting
them to adjust more readily to social and economic change since the advent
of doi moi.
Social problems
Interviews and focus group discussions revealed that social problems were more
severe in the past when workers were more isolated from mainstream Vietnamese
society and many women had difficulty finding marriage partners.
Very few people in the region feel that there have been any social disadvantages
of  the Swedish presence. The few who report disadvantages believe that social
problems have increased, but this is not supported by the statistics. We were
informed by the authorities that there is minimal criminal activity in Phong
Chau township and little or no prostitution and drug use. Outside of  Phong
Chau, the large township of  Viet Tri has become the site of  a significant
number of  brothels. This situation cannot be directly linked to the presence
of  the mill as Viet Tri is situated at the intersection of  several highways that
link the entire northwest region to Hanoi. Recent studies of  prostitution in
Vietnam indicate that truck drivers are the major client group of  prostitutes.
High level crime, social fragmentation and civil unrest are not apparent in
Phong Chau.
The surveys also asked about an apparent problem of  children in the province
who had Swedish fathers. We were told by several Swedes who had worked
on the project that there were ‘maybe 90’ such children. We therefore included
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a question about these children, although subsequently found evidence of
only a single child whose mother claimed had a Swedish father. The local
authorities said they had no knowledge of  any other than the single known
case. Others told us that the typical practice in such circumstances involved
pressure by local and village authorities for the woman to have an abortion.
We therefore doubt that this was an issue in the past. It is certainly not an
issue today.
Throughout Vietnam today social problems are emerging in response to
nationwide changes. These problems include migration of  youth to the cities
for employment and the subsequent dissolution of  family ties, rising crime
rates, increasing reports of  local government corruption and rising social
unrest. By contrast, we found a high degree of  social stability in the Bai
Bang region.
Ongoing issues
The social and economic benefits of  the mill are readily apparent – through
improvements in housing and working conditions, job security and social life.
But our interviews have highlighted several areas of  continuing concern. These
relate to worker health, equal opportunity for women, difficulties faced by
private farmers in selling their logs and the dearth of  training opportunities
for farmers in the forest regions.
Mill workers receive excellent health care and mill management has made a
concerted effort to improve the occupational health and safety of  workers in
recent years. Despite increases in ventilation and the installation of  more
effective air conditioning, the incidence of  respiratory diseases needs attention.
And more needs to be done to improve the health of  women forest workers.
It appears that women are still at a disadvantage in their employment
opportunities throughout the region. More positive steps to improve this
situation could be implemented with the development of  a deliberate mill
policy to enhance equal opportunity in relation to employment and training
matters.
Forest enterprises have more secure arrangements in supplying wood to the
raw materials company than do private farmers. Farmers are reporting that
this is a major disincentive to planting more trees. The planned increase in
capacity of  the mill will assist in resolving this situation. Private farmers, being
the most disadvantaged group, would benefit from clearer signals about what
to plant and how to market their logs.
Although living conditions have improved throughout the northwest, there is
still widespread poverty and low levels of  education among farmers. The
Vocational Training Centre has proved extremely successful in meeting the
training requirements of  the paper industry. The centre could broaden its
curriculum to provide a wider range of  training opportunities to help foster
commercial developments in the region.
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7 Comparing social
benefits and costs
The mill contributes social benefits through a number of avenues – mill profits,
taxes, payments for logs above their value in other uses, payments to workers
above what they would earn elsewhere, additional agricultural production from
hillside rehabilitation, higher earnings to workers throughout Vietnam from their
Bai Bang training and the provision of medical and other services to the wider
community. Offsetting these benefits are costs imposed through emissions to
the environment. Protection against paper imports also imposes costs on
Vietnamese consumers. Whether such protection costs should be debited
against Bai Bang depends on whether, in the absence of Bai Bang, such
protection would continue.
WHAT ARE THE COSTS AND BENEFITS to Vietnam from the operation
of  the mill? Do the benefits exceed the costs? Cost–benefit analysis is the
appropriate technique for exploring these questions. Cost–benefit analysis
typically focuses on the stream of  benefits and costs throughout a project’s
lifetime. By contrast, our snapshot approach is confined to benefits and costs
in one year.
Chart 7.1 illustrates how the snapshot approach compares with the typical
dynamic approach of  cost–benefit analysis. The chart shows an illustrative,
but typical, profile of  costs and benefits of  large projects. Costs are higher
than benefits in the early years of  a project, leading to the net costs shaded.
As the project proceeds, benefits may increase more rapidly than costs and at
some point will exceed costs. Then, as the project reaches completion, the
benefits may remain higher than costs or the two may converge again as shown
in the chart.
Cost benefit analysis is typically concerned with adding up, over time, the
shaded areas (using an appropriate discount rate) and making a judgement
about whether the total benefits exceed the total costs.
The snapshot approach makes an assessment of  the costs and benefits from
the operation of  the project within a single year (1996) and determines whether
the benefits exceed the costs. This approach implicitly recognises that the
investment in the Bai Bang project is now history. The relevant issue today for
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Vietnamese decision makers is whether BAPACO should be allowed to
continue operations. And that depends on whether these questions add to or
detract from Vietnamese living standards.
There are, of  course, limitations to the snapshot approach. Vietnam has
changed dramatically since the beginning of  the project and continues to
change rapidly. The effects of  the mill are also likely to be changing. Whether
any particular cost or benefit from the mill, seen from a single point in time,
will persist depends on the changes Vietnam continues to undergo.
A similar point can be made about benefits in the past. A number of  people
interviewed insisted that the mill must be viewed from a historical perspective.
The sheer lack of  infrastructure of  any kind in Vietnam following the war
with the United States meant that any capital project would have a huge
effect. The benefits from the training that went with the mill construction
were also likely to have been very large in the early years of  the project.
However, these effects are likely to have declined as Vietnam has embraced a
series of  reforms and has allowed increased foreign investment.
It may also be the case that potential costs from the mill (such as pollution)
could be increasing over time as the production from the mill increases so that
future costs may be greater than revealed in a single snapshot. The underlying
dynamics of  the mill’s benefits and costs need to be kept in mind when
interpreting the results of  the snapshot evaluation.
The project in a rapidly changing Vietnam
The planning, construction and operation of  the mill have taken place in a
rapidly changing Vietnam. This makes a typical dynamic cost–benefit analysis
1996
Costs
”Snapshot”
Value
Net costs
Net benefits
Benefits
7.1 The snapshot approach
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virtually impossible. It is more practical to ask the question: is the mill today
generating net benefits for the Vietnamese?
Understanding the changes that have occurred in Vietnam since the project
began is crucial to understanding why a snapshot approach is necessary and
to avoiding the potential dangers of  the snapshot method. It is also necessary
to begin to construct the baseline. Chart 7.2 puts the mill’s developments in
the context of  the changes taking place in Vietnam.
Negotiations on the form the Swedish aid would ultimately take ocurred during
the war with the United States. This would have exerted a strong influence on
decision making, especially on Vietnamese views about the most appropriate
form of  aid for their nation.
The construction of  the mill took place shortly after reunification, a time of
great challenge for the Vietnamese. As well as trying to establish a single nation
from two opposite economic paradigms (central planning in the north and a
market economy in the south), the administration was managing a large
number of  industrial aid projects. Most of  these projects failed and the targets
of  the first national plan were nowhere near met.
The strains of  the period culminated in a famine shortly before the
commencement of  production at the mill. This economic crisis led to some
initial reforms. However, many of  these were subsequently reversed.
In 1979 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, resulting in an embargo on Western
aid and trade, which continued to the mid-1990s. Throughout the early years
of  the mill’s production, Vietnam had continual border clashes with China,
received concessional trade credits from the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) countries and had no access to trade with the West.
Another economic crisis starting around 1985 saw the beginning of  the
comprehensive reform process that Vietnam is still undergoing. Significant
increases in mill production thus took place in an atmosphere of  doi moi –
opening to foreign trade and investment, and significant changes in private
property rights. All of  these factors have had a significant influence on mill
operations.
Evaluating costs and benefits
If  Vietnam had a well functioning market economy, and if  the mill did not
involve any costs and benefits which occur outside of  the mill, then the social
value of  the mill would simply be the annual profits (revenues less costs) it
generates. Neither of  these conditions applies, however, and so the task of
social cost-benefit analysis is to set out estimates of  where there are costs and
benefits not reflected in the mill’s profits.
The magnitude of  the costs and benefits from the mill will depend on what
would have happened in the absence of  the mill – the counterfactual or
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baseline. To see why this is the case, consider the question: what is the value to
Vietnamese consumers of  the paper produced by Bai Bang? Answering this
requires a view about what would have happened in the absence of  Bai Bang.
One possibility is that, without Bai Bang, consumers would have unrestricted
access to imported paper. In this case, the value of  Bai Bang, from the
perspective of  consumers, is the difference between the price of  Bai Bang
paper and the landed import price of  paper. If  Bai Bang paper were more
expensive than imported paper, then the value to consumers of  Bai Bang
would be negative.
Another possibility is that, without Bai Bang, consumers would not have free
access to imports (a not uncommon situation in Vietnam), and would have to
buy more expensive and poorer quality paper produced elsewhere in Vietnam.
In this case Bai Bang is likely to generate significant positive benefits to
consumers.
Which one of  these is most appropriate for the evaluation? Arguments can be
put both ways. But the important point is that the choice of  the baseline will
have a significant influence on the magnitude of  costs and benefits, and so
should be made explicit in the analysis. The illustration provided above is one
of  many choices that must be made throughout the analysis.
The mill’s economic interactions
Chart 7.3 summarises the mill’s key interactions by taking a production
perspective – moving from inputs to outputs and showing how various indirect
effects occur along the way.
The production chain begins with forestry to farm activities that produce
logs and bamboo chips for transport to the mill. The mill is divided into a
number of  components and purchases chemicals, coal and other materials
as well as the services of  workers. The mill combines these inputs to produce
paper, some of  which is sold to converters for further processing and some
of  which goes direct to consumers. The mill also produces solid, liquid and
gaseous emissions that are discharged into the air and nearby waterways.
Each point in this chain involves a number of  effects on the wider community.
• The mill is associated with two training schools: a forestry training school
and a vocational training school. The main intent of  these schools is to
train either workers for the mill (in basic paper making and maintenance
techniques) or farmers and workers for forestry enterprises. Both these
schools have the indirect effect of  providing workers with skills that are
used elsewhere in Vietnam.
• Planting trees under the forestry and farm forestry activities has rehabilitated
significant areas, leading to improved water retention and higher agricultural
production than would otherwise have been the case.
• The mill provides a variety of  amenities to workers, including a gym and
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social club, a school and a medical centre. While mostly used by workers,
these facilities provide benefits to the wider community. Similarly, the mill’s
maintenance team, while mostly concerned with work in the mill, also
provides services to the wider community – through, for example, improving
local infrastructure and providing storm emergency help.
• The mill’s management system is in many ways unique in Vietnam, and
some of  the management techniques (including environmental monitoring
techniques) have been transferred and adopted elsewhere in the country.
• The mill also pays a significant amount of  tax, which contributes to the
national and regional government budget.
As discussed in chapter 3, the Bai Bang project also involved transport and
housing subprojects to help facilitate mill operations. The benefits of  the
transport subproject are captured through enhanced mill profits. As indicated
in table 2.11, housing taxes are collected from workers who stay in company
staff  houses.
Table 7.4 summarises the costs and benefits associated with each point in
the chain presented in chart 7.3. In principle, these various costs and benefits
could be added up to give an overall indication of  the benefits of  the project.
Table 7.4 also identifies reasons why there may be a divergence between the
benefits and costs arising from a particular point in the chain. Unless there
is a divergence, the benefits and costs will cancel out. Consider the purchase
of  chemicals from suppliers outside the mill. While this generates income
for these suppliers, these chemicals have a so-called opportunity cost – they
could have been sold elsewhere or the resources used to produce them could
have been used to produce something else. The chemical suppliers are
compensated for this opportunity cost through the price they receive from
the mill. In a well functioning market, the compensation and the opportunity
costs will ‘cancel out’ and will not be a source of  net benefit to the community.
However, if  there are any ‘distortions’ in the market, perhaps through taxes
or subsidies or quantitative restrictions, there may be a divergence between
the costs and benefits. An important divergence arises through tariff  protection.
With a tariff  the price of  the domestic product is raised and so the opportunity
cost of  the resources used to produce the product is greater than the community
value of  the output.
Divergences also arise if  the mill generates costs on others which are not met
by the mill (externalities) or provides public benefits. Externalities such as
pollution may result in costs not reflected in the profits of  the mill. Public
benefits such as leisure facilities for the wider community are not reflected in
the mill’s profits.
We consider in turn each of  the categories in table 7.4 where the evidence
suggests a divergence between benefits and costs.
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The cost of logs
There are a number of  reasons why the cost of  logs to the mill may not
reflect their true social costs. Forestry workers and farmers may not have
alternative employment opportunities, or may only have opportunities that
are less productive from an economic viewpoint. This means that the true
wage costs of  these workers are lower than the actual money wages paid.
From the point of  view of  the mill it means that the social cost of  logs is
lower than the price actually paid. On the other hand, logs purchased by
the mill may have alternative uses. They could, for example, be chipped
and then exported.
The average economywide value of  logs is VND308␣ 242 per cubic metre
(estimated from GSO 1998). The price of  logs at the mill door averages around
7.4 Benefits and costs from the project
Category Benefits Costs Reasons for divergence
Inputs
Logs Income to forest workers Alternative use of Forest workers or farmers
and farmers resources may not have alternative
employment opportunities
Chemicals Income to suppliers Alternative use of Taxes or subsidies or quantity
resources restrictions
Imported pulp Foreign exchange
Workers Income (wages) Opportunity cost of Lack of employment
time, that is, em- opportunities. The donated
ployment elsewhere capital (mill) and associated
training may increase the
marginal product of labour and
so allow higher wages than
otherwise
Outputs
Paper Sales revenue Resources used to Tariff protection. It may be
produce paper cheaper to import the paper
than to produce it domestically
Emissions Effects on health, Not counted in mill costs
farm production etc except in cases where
compensation has been paid
Converters Income Opportunity costs Lack of alternative opportunities
Taxes Government revenue Cost to the mill Government provision of public
goods elsewhere in the
economy
Other effects
Training schools Higher skills for workers Opportunity costs of Potential public good
time and resources
Worker amenities Services to workers Cost to mill Potential public good
Maintenance team Services to township Cost to mill Potential public good
Hillside rehabilitation Allows agricultural Benefits not counted in mill
production to increase revenues
Management system System adopted else- Cost of training Public good
where in Vietnam
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VND400␣ 000 per tonne. We assume, on this basis, that the social opportunity
cost of  the logs used by Bai Bang is around 75 per cent of  what the mill is
paying for them. The mill spent VND77␣ 666 million on logs in 1996, which
have a social opportunity cost of  VND58␣ 250 million. This means that the mill
generates additional benefits of  VND19␣ 416 million from its log purchases.
Do the logs have alternative, higher value uses than their current pulp uses at
the mill? If  allowed, would it be possible to profitably either chip the logs and
export them or export sawn timber? In US dollars, the mill pays around $76
per bone dry tonne. This same wood could potentially earn US$115 per tonne
chipped at the export fob port. However, chipping and exporting logs requires
a large investment in infrastructure. Chipping is a low value, high volume
activity so scale and turnover are essential for profitability. This in turn requires
low transport costs (from the point of  harvest to the port) and efficient bulk
handling facilities at the port. Vietnam has neither of  these, and it would not
be possible to establish profitable chipping activities.
While it is possible that the resources devoted to the mill have crowded out
the possibility of  establishing a viable chipping industry, it is important to
remember that the forest resources available today exist because of  the pulp
and paper mill project. The resources were established in order to supply the
paper mill. Thus, even if  the logs had alternate and profitable uses today, the
profits from these uses would be attributable to the project itself.
Hillside rehabilitation
As suggested in table 7.4, tree planting in some regions through enhanced
water retention in upland areas may have allowed agricultural production to
be higher than otherwise. This is an external benefit from the mill’s production
process and is not counted in the mill’s profits.
There is no formal measure of  the amount of  land added to production in
this manner. A conservative estimate is that hillside rehabilitation has allowed
rice production in 250 hectares that would not have taken place in the absence
of  the forestry program associated with the mill. Rice yields in the northern
mountain regions of  Vietnam are around 3 tonnes per hectare. Thus, hillside
rehabilitation has allowed the production of  an additional 750 tonnes of  rice.
At a farm price of  VND1900 per kilogram, this means additional farm revenue
of VND1.4 billion.
Costs associated with growing this rice are around VND0.4 billion, resulting
in a net gain from hillside rehabilitation of  VND1 billion.
The wages of mill workers
As in the case of  forestry workers, the wages the mill pays to its workers may
not reflect the social opportunity cost of  labour. If  workers have few
employment opportunities elsewhere (at similar wage levels), then the social
benefits of  their employment will be higher than the wages paid. Equivalently,
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the social cost of  the workers will be lower than the wages paid. Either way,
mill profits will understate the benefits of  the mill.
Workers at the mill earn an average of  VND1 million per month. Table 7.5
provides data for monthly income from sources other than the mill. Two key
points emerge from this table. First, for all Vietnam average monthly income
is considerably lower than the VND1 million per month paid to Bai Bang
workers. Second, incomes in the northern mountain regions are lower again.
Table 7.5 suggests that the opportunity cost of  mill workers is around half  the
wage actually paid. The mill’s total wage bill for 1996 is VND32␣ 234 million
(this is the total wage bill excluding social insurance, health insurance and
trade union fees – see tables 2A.2 and 2A.9). If  the social opportunity cost of
this is half the actual wage bill, then an additional VND16␣ 117 million is
contributed by the mill.
Worker amenities
The mill provides significant non-wage remuneration to its workers through
the provision of  a variety of  amenities, including a gymnasium, a school and
medical facilities. Some of  these amenities are also provided to the wider
community and many have a public benefit. To the extent that this occurs,
the valuation of  the wider community benefit should be added to the mill’s
profit.
It is important to note, however, that the size of  this benefit is likely to be
limited because each of  the amenities is subject to congestion. And it is likely
that the workers capture most of  the benefits.
The medical centre provides medical facilities for around 1500 people in
addition to mill workers. These facilities are likely to increase the productive
life of  the people treated by potentially lowering the burden of  disease they
face.
According to the World Bank (1993), the burden of  disease in low income
Asian countries is 260 DALYs per 1000 population. A DALY is a ‘disability
adjusted life year’, which measures the years of  life lost to premature death
and years lived with a disability of  specified severity and duration. Thus, in
low income Asia, 260 years of  healthy life are lost due to death and disease.
7.5 Income alternatives per worker
Income source Northern mountains All Vietnam
VND per month VND per month
Agriculture and forestry 315 000 238 000
Non-farm self-employment 99 000 242 000
Wage employment 56 000 143 000
Pensions, etc. 28 000 22 000
Other income 2 000 12 000
Total 500 000 656 000
Source: CIE estimates based on GSO (1997 and 1998).
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Applied to the population with access to Bai Bang’s medical facilities, this
translates to 390 DALYs per year in the absence of  medical care.
The World Bank also estimates that a minimum health care package of  the
kind provided by Bai Bang’s medical facilities lowers the burden of  disease by
around 30 per cent. Applied to Bai Bang, this is a reduction in DALY’s of  117.
If  we value each DALY as one year’s work, and if  we apply either the average
regional wage rate or the Bai Bang average wage rate, then the value of  the
medical facilities translates to between VND702 million and VND1404 million.
The value of the paper produced
Vietnam does not currently allow the free import of  paper. Imports are
controlled both through a tariff  (currently set at 40 per cent for writing paper)
and through the occasional application of  quantitative import restrictions.
The existence of  these barriers raises the possibility that the unit value of  the
paper sold by Bai Bang does not reflect the social value of  that paper.
Adjustments must be made to account for this.
Comparison with international prices suggests that Bai Bang’s prices are up
to 10–20 per cent above import parity. One interpretation of  this is that,
without protection, consumers could get cheaper paper. That is, if  the
alternative to Bai Bang paper is imported paper, then consumers are paying a
higher price than necessary. The total payment for Bai Bang produced paper
made by Vietnamese consumers in 1996 is VND574␣ 262 million. The value
of  this at world prices is VND459␣ 410 million. This means that Bai Bang
could be costing consumers VND114␣ 852 million.
The above comparison implicitly assumes that, without the project, the
Vietnamese economy would be able to obtain the equivalent to Bai Bang’s
production at world prices. This is a key comparison for any project evaluation.
However, in the case of  Bai Bang, it is worth considering an alternative.
Vietnam’s attempts to achieve self-sufficiency for a variety of  ‘essential’
products illustrates that, without Bai Bang, tariffs, or the tariff  equivalent
(extent to which the tariff  plus quantitative restrictions on imports raises the
domestic price above the world price), on paper are likely to be considerably
higher than they are currently.
This means that consumers would need to buy even higher cost domestic
paper and Vietnamese resources would have been used for more inefficient
local paper production. Thus, if  Bai Bang has displaced higher cost domestic
production, rather than imports, it could have in fact resulted in a net welfare
gain compared with what would otherwise have been the case. For the analysis
here, we assume that this alternative comparison means that the welfare cost
of  Bai Bang to consumers is zero.
Government revenue
As set out in chapter 2, the mill pays a variety of  taxes, some related to its
capital, some on the land it uses, some on its turnover (purchases of  goods
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and services) and some on its profits. In addition, the mill pays ‘depreciation’
into a fund which, in principle, could be accessed by other mills in Vietnam
according to VPC plans.
While these various taxes are costs to the mill (reducing its overall profit) they
are transfers to other parts of  the economy. The value of  these taxes should
be added back to mill profits to give an indication of  the social value of  the
mill. The following taxes should be added back to the mill’s profits:
• the turnover tax (VND10␣ 611 – see table 2.11);
• the capital tax (VND21␣ 486 – see table 2.11) and
• the profits tax. In allocating a value to the profits tax we need to adjust the
amount reported in table 2.11 to reflect the fact that the analysis is being
done for a snapshot production year (1996) rather than an accounting year.
Because some of  the accounting costs refer to production in future years,
the production year profit (before tax) of  the mill is VND68␣ 135 million
rather than the VND42␣ 849 million reported in table 2.1. The profit after
tax is therefore VND44␣ 287 million (35 per cent profit tax). Thus, for the
production year the profit tax is VND23␣ 847 million rather than VND14␣ 997
million as reported in table 2.11.
The land tax and housing tax have not been added back to the mill’s profit as
they are likely to reflect a charge for the use of  resources which could be used
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elsewhere. Total taxes to be added to the mill’s profits are therefore VND55␣ 944
million.
The cost of capital
The social profits of  the mill need to reflect the fact that operation will involve
the consumption of  capital that requires replacement. The mill profits used
here are net of  a VND48␣ 100 million depreciation charge. As the book value
of  the capital is VND509.1 billion, this reflects a depreciation charge of  9.4
per cent.
The effect of emissions
Does waste from the Bai Bang mill have harmful environmental effects leading
to disease in humans or to reduced production in other industries (particularly
fisheries and agriculture)? If  so, how large is this effect and how costly is it?
Answering these questions requires an understanding of:
• the nature of  emissions from the mill;
• the magnitude of  emissions from the mill;
• the toxicity of  these emissions; and
• the ability of  the environment to absorb and neutralise the emissions.
Like all pulp and paper mills, the Bai Bang mill emits a variety of  waste products
into the environment. Table 7.6 summarises the emissions and their potential
effects and chart 7.7 summarises the major emission flows to rivers and nearby
rice fields and fishponds.
A number of  studies have measured the magnitude and toxicity of  the
emissions from the mill. These include a major environmental impact
assessment of  the mill sponsored by Sida from 1993 to 1996 as well as an
7.6 Mill emissions and their potential effects
Emission Potential effect
Bark and wood pieces Solid. Used as fuel by farmers. No harmful effects.
Lime mud Affects agricultural land and groundwater systems. Can destroy water in
wells.
Sodium hydroxide Present in liquid effluent. Kills fish in dry season. Smells unpleasant.
Affects groundwater system.
Organic chlorides, A range of compounds present in liquid effluent. Known to be toxic and
may halogens and dioxins accumulate. May affect flora and fauna
depending on concentration.
Heavy metals Emitted through liquid effluent originating from the coal. Can accumulate
in environment and may be ingested by humans through the aquatic
food chain.
Hydrogen sulphide (gas) Potential respiratory effects on humans. Potential to affect crop growth.
Sulphur dioxide (gas) Potential respiratory effects on humans. Potential to affect crop growth.
Dust Potential respiratory effects on humans. Potential to affect crop growth.
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environmental audit undertaken in 1993. In addition, our interviews with the
district and provincial People’s Committees indicated a concern with the effect
of  the emissions.
The quality of emissions
Table 7.8 summarises information on the quantity of  emissions from Bai Bang.
To place these in context, Bai Bang’s emissions are compared with one US
emission standard for the same variety of  pulp mill.
In each case, Bai Bang’s emissions are considerably higher than the US
standard. These measures, however, do not provide a direct indication of
the toxicity of  emissions. The BOD and COD measures provide an
indication of  the extent to which the discharge of  organic material from the
mill is absorbing the dissolved oxygen in the effluent (and hence the river) as
it oxidizes, or as its chemical bonds break down. Since a healthy river should
have almost 100 per cent saturation of  oxygen, the absorption of  oxygen
may cause problems for fish and plants. Suspended solids potentially cause
a problem by limiting light penetration into the river. But apart from these
oxygen and light effects, the effluent may have poisonous effects not captured
by either of  these measures. The AOX measure is designed to give an
indication of  the presence of  organic effluent, but does not give an indication
of  its toxicity.
Toxicity of  emissions
Testing the toxicity of  emissions requires a technique that measures the ability
of  the effluent to kill living organisms. There are a number of  techniques for
this. One used comprehensively for Bai Bang is the Microtox test. This involves
exposing a luminescent marine bacterium to effluent samples and measuring
(by the extent to which the light output of  the organism decreases) the toxic
effect of  the effluent. The test result is normally expressed as the percentage
7.8 Emissions from Bai Bang compared with a US standard
Emission Unit Bai Bang US standard
Liquid effluent
CODa mg/l 400 250
BODb mg/l 180 50
Suspended solids mg/l 280 60
pH 4–8 6–9
AOXc mg/l 8.3 to 13.8 7.5
Gas
Hydrogen sulphide mg/Nm3 185 60
Dust (particulate matter)mg/Nm3 1 548 100
a Chemical oxygen demand – measures the amount of oxygen required to oxidise the organic matter
in the effluent. b␣ Biochemical oxygen demand – measures the amount of oxygen used by microbes to
decompose the organic matter in effluent. c␣ Absorbable organic halogens – measures dissolved
organic matter in effluent by the amount that is absorbed by carbon.
Source: Kim Oanh (1996); Kim Oanh and Bengtsson (1995); AF-IPK (1994); US Ex-Im Bank (1998).
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concentration of  effluent required to reduce the light output of  the bacterium
by 50 per cent (after either 5 or 15 minutes of  exposure). Results for Bai Bang
(reported in Kim Oanh and Bengtsson 1995) were highly variable (depending
on the time of  day and the day chosen) and ranged from 15 per cent to greater
than 100 per cent. This means that on some days a 15 per cent solution of  the
effluent is sufficient to reduce the light output of  the bacterium by 50 per
cent. At other times, greater than 100 per cent solution would be required to
do this. On the basis of  these (and other) test results, the analysts concluded
that ‘no acutely toxic effects should be expected on the fauna of  the receiving
bodies’, although ‘it is still considered possible that the effluent may cause
sublethal ecological effects in these water bodies’ (Kim Oanh and Bengtsson
1995, p. 398).
To provide some context to these numbers, table 7.9 compares the toxicity of
bleach effluent from the Bai Bang mill with that from another mill in Vietnam
(GOGIDO in Dong Nai) and a mill in Thailand. The results show that these
other mills are considerably more toxic. The toxicity of  the GOGIDO mill is
1.5 times higher than that of  Bai Bang. The Thai mill is almost 20 times more
toxic than Bai Bang.
This comparison has an interesting implication. Even if  the effluent from Bai
Bang is toxic, if  the presence of  Bai Bang allows a reallocation of  paper
production away from even more toxic mills, then the total environmental
damage for a given level of  paper production would have been reduced, leading
to a social benefit.
Absorption of  the toxic emissions
Can the environment cope with the toxic emissions? Evidence on this is mixed.
A calculation in Kim Oanh and Bengtsson (1995) shows that, using a rule of
thumb, the Red River has a sufficient flow rate to absorb and dilute the toxins.
The same study found that samples taken either from the outlet to the Red
River when it is submerged or from 100 metres downstream from the outlet,
show no toxic effects when tested using Microtox. Similarly, samples taken 2
kilometres upstream of  the outlet and 7 kilometres below show no difference
in water quality when tested for pH, suspended solids and chemical oxygen
demand (AP-IFK 1994, p. 12).
Tests also show limited evidence for accumulation of  toxins in fauna. A study
of  fish in the Red River (Nilsson 1991) found evidence of  chlororganics in the
fish bile. However, some of  the physiological effects were not consistent with
7.9 Toxicity of bleach effluent: Bai Bang versus GOGIDO and a Thai mill
Mill Microtox result Toxicity emission factor
%
Bai Bang 14–24 800
GOGIDO (Dong Nai mill) 8–10 1 200
Thai mill 0.4 15 000
Source: Kim Oanh (1996).
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those previously found to be associated with pulp mill effluent. In any case,
the cause of  the abnormalities could not be linked to the mill alone because
of  the nearby Viet Tri industrial estate and because of  the tendency of  the
fish to migrate in the river.
To avoid the problem of  attributing the source of  toxins in fauna, Kim Oanh
et al. (1995) studied the effects of  effluent on rice, fish and molluscs in the
nearby rice field and fishpond. They found no accumulation of
organochlorides in the biota in the field or the fishpond, although they left
untested the possibility that sediment containing toxins could be washed down
the Red River and may accumulate at the delta. The same study found some
evidence of  accumulation of  heavy metals (originating from the coal ash basin
overflows) in molluscs. While there was also evidence of  metal in rice grains,
it could not be attributed to the mill, as the same accumulation was found in
control rice samples.
Evidence of  effects on humans
Despite the majority of  scientific research being on the effect of  liquid effluent,
most of  the concerns for human health (expressed, for example by the district
and provincial People’s Committees and doctors) related to airborne particle
and gas emissions. As table 7.8 illustrated, Bai Bang’s emissions of  hydrogen
sulphide and particulate matter are considerably higher than one US standard.
Evidence from the US suggests that high emissions of  particulate matter can
lead to serious heath problems (Pope 1989). While there is anecdotal evidence
from workers and doctors that these emissions are causing health problems,
the direct statistical evidence (chart 7.10) illustrates that people in the township
near the mill are considerably healthier than the nationwide average.
Overall assessment
While the liquid effluent does not appear to affect the region around the mill,
the effluent must end up somewhere. Researchers have suggested that it may
accumulate in the Red River delta, although there are no studies testing this.
Such a test is likely to be impossible in practice because Bai Bang is only one
of  many polluting factories located on the Red River.
Effluent may ultimately affect fish production in the Red River delta. Currently,
value added from fisheries in this region is VND221.8 billion (3␣ per cent of
nationwide value added from fisheries). If  the effluent from Bai Bang resulted
in a 1 per cent reduction in this value added, then the cost would amount to
VND2218 million.
Value added from food production in the Red River delta is currently
VND10␣ 780 billion (18 per cent of  nationwide value added from food
production).
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Data source: Appendix 6B
The training schools
The benefits of  education to the workers employed at the mill have already
been accounted for in the adjustments made to the opportunity cost of  the
wages paid to the workers. It is education (in combination with the mill’s
capital stock) that allowed these workers to be employed at a higher wage
than otherwise. What has not been accounted for so far is the benefit delivered
to those trained that are not subsequently employed at the mill or in the forestry
enterprises.
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The mill training school has trained approximately 3000 workers that are
now working elsewhere in Vietnam. Based on our survey of  these workers,
their average wage is VND505␣ 671 per month. If  their training was successful,
then it should have allowed them to earn a higher wage than otherwise. An
estimate of  how much higher can be obtained by looking at relative monthly
wages by educational attainment (chart 7.11).
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Average wages increase with educational attainment. Particularly important
for this assessment is the difference of  7.5 per cent between lower secondary
and technical qualifications, and the difference of  30 per cent between lower
secondary and vocational training.
If  the training provided by the mill allowed the 3000 workers to earn an
additional 7.5 per cent, this translates to total additional earnings of  VND1.4
billion. If  the training allowed 3000 workers to earn an additional 30 per
cent, this translates to total additional earnings of  VND5.5 billion.
The mill’s management system
Improved management systems are a form of  productivity growth. To the
extent that Bai Bang’s management has influenced other enterprises in
Vietnam, this productivity improvement is a positive external benefit not
counted for in the mill’s profits.
7.11 Relative wages by education achievement in Vietnam Average wage = 1 unit
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The extent to which Bai Bang’s management approach has been adopted
elsewhere is unclear, although there has been considerable discussion of  this
possibility. As noted in chapter 3, the Vinh Phu Raw Materials Company, the
company most closely associated with BAPACO, does not appear to have
adopted any of  the modern management techniques used at BAPACO. If  the
techniques cannot diffuse this relatively short distance, then the extent to which
they can travel further is questionable.
Adding up the benefits and costs
Table 7.12 adds up the benefits and costs quantified in the discussion above.
In 1996, the mill generated net benefits of  between VND21␣ 796 million and
VND143␣ 668 million. This is equivalent to benefits of  between US$2.2 million
and US$13 million.
Some limitations of our analysis
Because of  data limitations we have not made some of  the comparisons
typically used in this type of  analysis. In particular, we have not attempted to
evaluate the mill at a competitive, free market exchange rate. Calculating this
exchange rate in an economy such as Vietnam is an almost impossible task. It
would require an economywide analysis of  all the various taxes and subsidies
on trade – a task well beyond the scope of  this project.
Our analysis is likely to underestimate the net social benefits to Vietnam from
the Bai Bang project. By definition, it includes only those items that lend
themselves to quantification.
7.12 Adding up the benefits and costs
Category Minimum benefit Maximum benefit
VND million VND million
Mill profits (after tax)a 44 287 44 287
Benefit from logs 19 416 19 416
Wage benefits 16 117 16 117
Effect of protection to mill –114 852 0
Effect of emissions –2 218 0
Payment of taxesa 55 944 55 944
Effect of training school 1 400 5 500
Effect of medical centre 702 1 404
Hillside rehabilitation 1 000 1 000
Total 21 796 143 668
a As noted in chapter 3, the Vinh Phu Raw Materials Company made a profit (around VND1 billion) in
1996 and made small payments of taxes in 1996. Because of the smallness of these figures and
the limited financial information we were given for VPMC, we have not included these estimates in
the table.
Source: CIE estimates.
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The project has also delivered many intangible benefits. We have not, for
example, valued the contribution of  the project to the economic rejuvenation
process in Vietnam through the examples of  Western ways in production and
management that were introduced.
In conclusion
To some it may seem surprising that a capital intensive aid project in a labour
intensive country and in a highly protected sector could result in net benefits
to the community. This conclusion certainly was at odds with our expectation.
The Bai Bang project has some special features, however. The mill is working
and is working very efficiently. And, while there is a tariff  on paper, it is unlikely
that Bai Bang actually needs this tariff  to be profitable. Indeed, far from being
subsidised, it is likely that Bai Bang is being taxed by Vietnam’s policy
environment. The VPC is a major constraint to Bai Bang’s operations and is
using Bai Bang as a source of  cross subsidy for other mills.
Further, the capital injection from the aid has allowed Vietnam to exploit
(and to create) a sustainable forest resource – which is unlikely to have been
exploited otherwise – which in turn provides gainful employment for its labour.
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8 Future financial viability
Mill profitability is most sensitive to the price of paper and domestic pulp
production. Only small cost reductions are needed to maintain profitability if
tariffs are removed provided strong domestic production can be achieved.
If allowed complete financial independence from VPC BAPACO can generate
sufficient profits to fund a new power boiler and expand its production to
100␣ 000 tonnes per year. The mill should be able to cope with a range of
challenges such as exchange rate changes, tariff removal and higher log
prices and remain viable over the longer term.
THE ANALYSIS IN CHAPTER 2 showed the mill is currently being well
maintained, operating satisfactorily, meeting its taxation obligations to
government, rewarding its workers generously and generating a profit. But
will it remain financially viable over the longer term? Can it generate sufficient
earnings to fund new investments required for it to remain competitive against
imports? And what would it take for the mill to remain profitable if  tariffs and
quantitative restrictions against imported paper were removed? How sensitive
is the mill’s profitability to changes in exchange rates, which have become
extremely volatile in the wake of  the Asian financial crisis?
We constructed a simple financial model of  the mill and used it to address
these questions. The model is built around a set of  representative accounts
that describe the mill’s operations for the snapshot year.
Constructing representative accounts
The first step in the financial analysis is to construct ‘representative’ accounts
for the mill’s operations for 1996, the snapshot year. A full set of  information
was available for this year at the time of  preparing our analysis. We use three
main data sources for this:
• the technical evaluation of  mill performance presented in appendix 2C;
• the analysis of  BAPACO financial accounts presented in appendix 2A; and
• field visits and interviews we undertook in late 1997 and early 1998.
For a variety of  reasons, information from each of  these sources was not always
consistent. Where possible, we have used technical information to form the
backbone of  the representative accounts. This involved deriving costs by
estimating technical unit requirements and combining these with unit price
information.
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In doing this, we have had to ensure that the costs and revenues all refer to the
same physical production of  pulp and paper. That is, we have abstracted
from the build up or run down of  stocks. For example, our cost estimates for
wood use in a given year are lower than those presented in the financial
accounts because we have only included wood actually used in the production
of  pulp. We have not included the cost of  wood added to the stockpile. Similarly,
the costs for imported pulp refer only to the pulp actually used in production
and not the build up of  stocks of  pulp.
The fibre balance
A key technical relationship on which we build the financial model is the
‘fibre balance’. This traces the fibre use from the logs through to the final
production of  paper with appropriate allowance being made for the losses at
each stage (table 2C.16 in appendix 2C). Table 8.1 summarises the key elements
of  the fibre balance used for 1996.
Technical requirements and unit costs
The fibre balance information is combined with other key technical
requirements (summarised in table 8.2) to give a picture of  the key material
input requirements for the mill. This is combined with the unit price
information (summarised in table 8.3) to generate material costs for the mill.
Other costs, including taxes, overheads and labour costs, are taken from the
BAPACO financial records (appendix 2A).
8.1 Elements of the fibre balance for 1996
Element Value used Comments
Purchase of logs 209 004 tonnes: Based on the aggregate relationship between logs
65% eucalyptus and acacia, and pulp production of 5.05 tonnes of logs per tonne
5% styrax and 30% bamboo of pulp. Wood shares taken from mill records.
Domestic pulp production 41 387 tonnes Taken from pulp mill records.
Imported pulp used 8 797 tonnes Derived from expected relationship between total
pulp usage and paper production. From the technical
analysis this should be 1.13 tonnes of paper per
tonne of pulp. Although 17␣ 158 tonnes of pulp were
imported in 1996, it was not all used in the 1996
production year. The financial statements confirm
that at the end of 1996 there was approximately
8360 tonnes of pulp in stock.
Total paper production 57 027 tonnes From pulp mill records.
Source: Appendix 2C; pulp mill records; CIE estimates.
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8.2 Summary of key technical requirements Per tonne of pulp
Item Unit Requirement
Caustic soda for cooking kg 460
Caustic soda for bleaching kg 85
Chlorine kg 75
Electricity Mw 0.45
Steam Tonne 3
Water m3 100
Requirements per tonne of paper
Limestone kg 700
Fuel oil kg 65
Salt kg 246
Rosin kg 9.5
Sodium sulphate kg 70
Allum kg 17
Water m3 460
Coal Tonne 3.6
Clay kg 20.28
Source: Mill records.
8.3 Summary of key unit prices
Item Unit Price
VND
Eucalyptus Tonne 420 000
Acacia Tonne 340 000
Styrax Tonne 330 000
Bamboo Tonne 360 000
Caustic soda for cooking Tonne 1 368 327
Caustic soda for bleaching Tonne 3 542 492
Chlorine Tonne 3 909 036
Electricity kW 626
Steam Tonne 77 620
Water m3 844
Limestone Tonne 70 277
Fuel oil kg 1 598
Salt Tonne 559 787
Rosin Tonne 8 467 248
Sodium sulphate Tonne 1 348 070
Allum Tonne 1 820 610
Coal Tonne 77 620
Imported pulp Tonne 7 344 000
Average paper price Tonne 10 070 000
Source: Mill records.
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Cost structure of the mill
Chart 8.4 summarises the cost structure that emerges from these various
estimates. Total costs are defined to equal the value of  production of  paper
ex mill and include a profit component. Several key points emerge.
Data source: CIE estimates; Bai Bang accounts; field visits.
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• The mill is profitable. It generates a surplus of  revenues over costs equivalent
to around 8 per cent of  total costs. Given the mill does not have to repay
the initial capital investment (which was funded by aid), there is no need for
the mill to generate a return to past capital. This means that profits can be
used for future investment.
• The various material costs account for just under 50 per cent of  total costs,
with chemicals and logs being the largest items.
• The largest single cost item is imported pulp, accounting for 11 per cent of
total costs. The importance of  this will become clear in the analysis that
follows.
• Various taxes account for around 10 per cent of  total costs, and overheads
account for 27 per cent. Salaries account for 6 per cent of  total costs.
8.4 The cost structure of the Bai Bang Company
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Table 8.5 summarises the various costs per tonne of  pulp and paper. Note
that in this table the cost of  pulp does not include any overhead costs, all of
which have been allocated to the total cost of  papermaking. The cost of  pulp
is $US335 per tonne and the cost of  paper is US$805 per tonne.
Static analysis
The first step in the financial analysis using the information derived above is
to use a snapshot approach to examine the impact of  various changes on the
mill’s profitability. The snapshot or static approach takes a single year (in this
case 1996) and examines the effects of  various changes on the profits in that
single year. In this snapshot analysis, no account is taken of  the need for
investment spending to increase output.
Sensitivity of profits
The snapshot financial model can be used to examine the sensitivity of  profits
to changes in cost and revenue items. Chart 8.6 summarises this sensitivity. It
shows, for example, that a 1 per cent increase in the price of  paper would lead
to an 8.3 per cent increase in profits. Similarly, a 1 per cent increase in the
price of  logs would lead to a 1.1 per cent decline in profits.
To generate these sensitivities we have assumed that total paper production
remains at the 1996 level and that all that varies is the individual cost or
revenue item.
These ‘elasticities’ give an indication of  where the mill is most sensitive to
future developments, and where future investment should be focused. Clearly
the price of  output is crucial in determining the profitability of  the mill. This
price is determined by a number of  factors including the amount of  protection
the mill receives through tariffs and other import restrictions.
8.5 Summary of costs per tonne of pulp and paper
Cost item VND US$
Cost per tonne of pulp 3 699 260 335
Costs per tonne of paper
•  Logs 1 361 917 123
•  Chemicals 1 745 422 158
•  Energy 756 741 69
•  Imported pulp 1 132 856 103
•  Overheads 2 663 984 242
•  Salaries 610 237 55
•  Taxesa 604 067 55
Total 8 875 223 805
a Excluding profits tax.
Source: CIE estimates.
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The production of  domestic pulp is also important. Domestic pulp is cheaper
than imported pulp, so producing more adds to profits. A one per cent increase
in local pulp production adds more to profits than does a one per cent increase
in paper production. While there is some scope for increased domestic pulp
production as outlined in the technical report of  Appendix 2C, this is limited
in the short term.
The effect of tariff reductions
What would it take for the mill to remain profitable if  tariffs and other import
restrictions were removed? Because of  the periodic use of  quantitative
restrictions against imports and the varying effectiveness of  these restrictions
in conjunction with the tariff, the exact extent of  protection the mill faces
varies over time. Chart 8.7 illustrates the reduction in costs that would be
required for the mill to remain profitable assuming a variety of  effective tariff
rates. The effective tariff  is the percentage by which the domestic price in
Vietnam of  imported paper is raised above the world price at the port of
entry to Vietnam as a result of  both the tariff  payable on imported paper and
quantitative restrictions on paper imports.
The chart shows, for example, that if  the tariff  is currently 40 per cent (or
equivalently, if  the current import restrictions have the effect of  raising
domestic prices 40 per cent higher than they would otherwise have been), and
if  domestic pulp production remains at its current levels, then it would require
a 40 per cent reduction in costs for the mill to remain profitable.
8.6 Sensitivity of ‘profits’ to cost and revenue item Percentage change in profits for a
1 per cent increase in cost or revenue item
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The mill is profitable and generates a surplus of  about 8% of  total costs. Welders working at the mill.
Photo © Herldur Netocny/PHOENIX.
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Because the selling price of  paper (which includes the effective tariff) exceeds
the cost of  paper production, a proportionately smaller reduction in unit costs
is required for the mill to remain profitable at lower levels of  effective tariffs.
For example, if  the effective tariff  were only 20 per cent, and domestic pulp
production remained at current levels, then the mill would only require an 11
per cent cost reduction to remain profitable. Whether the mill could remain
profitable after a tariff  change depends on whether these cost reductions could
be achieved.
Chart 8.7 also shows the importance of  the level of  domestic pulp production
in determining the cost reductions needed to remain profitable after tariff
changes. The extreme right hand point on each of  the curves refers to annual
production that could be achieved if  the best daily production through out
1996 were achieved each day of  the year. In this case, the cost reductions
required to cope with tariff  changes are relatively low, and potentially zero.
The middle point on each of  the curves refers to the design production capacity
of  the mill. If  this production were achieved, the cost reduction needed to
cope with the tariff  changes could be as low as 5 per cent.
The available evidence suggests that the effective tariff  for Bai Bang is around
20 per cent. Given this, the analysis presented here suggests that in the short
term, Bai Bang would need cost reductions of  between 0 per cent (if  it manages
to increase domestic pulp production to pulp mill design capacity) and 11 per
cent (if  domestic pulp production remains at current levels). The evidence
presented in the technical report suggests that cost savings of  this order of
magnitude are feasible.
Data source: CIE estimates.
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8.7 Cost reductions required to deal with tariff changes
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Government policy towards BAPACO
As discussed in chapter 2 VPC exerts a strong influence on BAPACO’s financial
operations. In particular, BAPACO pays into a depreciation fund that is
effectively controlled by VPC. While BAPACO may get access to this fund,
there is no guarantee of  this. In the analysis presented above, monies paid to
this fund were treated as a tax on BAPACO.
If  BAPACO were to have total control over this depreciation charge, allowing
it to contribute to profits, then BAPACO’s profits would increase by around
70 per cent. This would have a significant influence on how BAPACO can
respond to future economic developments.
For example, if  the depreciation payment were retained by BAPACO (that is,
not charged against its operating costs) and if  the tariff  faced by Bai Bang is
20 per cent, then breaking even in the absence of  the tariff  would only require
a cost reduction of  1 per cent (assuming domestic pulp production remains at
its current levels), rather than 11 per cent as presented in chart 8.7.
Alternatively, further taxation of  BAPACO could seriously affect its viability.
A doubling of  the depreciation ‘tax’ would reduce profits by around 70 per
cent and would mean that coping with the removal of  a 20 per cent tariff
would require a cost reduction of  24 per cent. Such a large reduction is
probably outside the bounds of  what is achievable in the short term.
Dynamic analysis
The previous analysis used a single year snapshot to look at the potential
impact of  cost and revenue changes. Here we extend this analysis by looking
at a 20 year horizon. We account for the investment that is needed to add a
new power boiler, which was identified in our technical analysis as the major
constraint to additional production. We also account for the investment needed
to expand total paper production to 100 000 tonnes a year.
We assume that a new power boiler will cost US$15 million and that the
investment needed to increase paper production to 100␣ 000 tonnes per year
will amount to US$55 million. The boiler is assumed to be purchased in 1998
and the investment for increased paper production is assumed to take place in
1999. Paper production is assumed to increase steadily from 2001, reaching
100␣ 000 tonnes in 2003 and remaining at the same level until 2020. Domestic
pulp production is assumed to increase steadily from 1999 and to reach 80␣ 000
tonnes in 2001 and remain at that level until 2020.
We assume that unit requirements remain constant throughout the period
1998 to 2020 and in the base run we assume that all prices remain the same in
real terms. We also assume that the mill continues to pay the depreciation
charge to BAPACO.
Under these assumptions, the present value of  the net cash flow is positive at
either a 5 per cent or 10 per cent real discount rate. That is, under these
assumptions the mill can afford to pay for the investment needed to expand
and will in fact generate a surplus over the years 1998 to 2020.
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Sensitivity of the net present value calculation
Chart 8.8 shows the sensitivity of  the present value of  the net revenue stream
from the mill (revenue minus all costs including the investment outlay) to
changes in cost and revenue items. As before, the price of  paper is the most
important item, although local pulp production remains important.
The effect of tariff changes
Chart 8.9 shows the cost reduction required for the mill to continue to break
even in net present value terms following a reduction in tariffs. The analysis
assumes the mill must also fund the above investment of  a new power boiler
and paper capacity expansion to 100␣ 000 tonnes in 2003.
As before, these cost reductions are sensitive to the level of  the tariff  and to
the total level of  domestic pulp production. Where 90 per cent of  pulp is
domestically produced the cost reductions range from 32 per cent (if  the
effective tariff  is 40 per cent) to 3 per cent (if  the effective tariff  is 20 per cent).
With an effective tariff  of  20 per cent, the likely cost reductions required are
in the range of  3 to 10 per cent depending on the percentage of  pulp produced
domestically. Cost reductions in this range should be easily achievable by
adopting the suggestions set out in appendix 2C. And, as was noted in the
static analysis above, the size of  the cost reduction required would be lower if
VPC did not require BAPACO to set aside the depreciation charge.
a Assumes real discount rate of 5 per cent.
Data source: CIE estimates.
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Changes in exchange rates
Recent experience in Asia shows the possibility of  large changes in exchange
rates which in turn have implications for BAPACO’s profitability.
A large devaluation in pulp and paper producing countries (such as Indonesia)
relative to the Dong would have a number of  implications. First, it would
make paper imported into Vietnam appear cheaper, putting downward
pressure on the prices received by BAPACO. But it would also make imported
pulp appear cheaper, offsetting to some extent the decline in price.
A 20 per cent foreign devaluation (hence appreciation of  the Dong) would
decrease imported pulp prices by around 20 per cent. Assuming no change in
the price of  paper, this would increase the NPV of  the mill by between 40 and
50 per cent (depending on the discount rate). While this could be offset by a 4
per cent decline in the unit price received by the mill, the mill would still break
even in present value terms even if  the price fell by 13 per cent (with a discount
rate of  5 per cent) or 10 per cent (with a discount rate of  10 per cent).
The future price of logs
As Vietnam develops, it is possible that the real price of  logs will increase.
This may result, for example, from increasing wages for forest workers or
a Assumes real discount rate of 5 per cent.
Data source: CIE estimates.
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from an increase in the price of  land generated by alternative and more
profitable cropping opportunities. As the mill expands, it will need to get access
to more and more logs, and may need to offer a higher price to induce this
additional supply.
The price of  logs would need to increase by more than 70 per cent (relative to
their current value) and then remain at that price for each year of  the mills
future operation to drive the mill’s profit stream to zero and destroy its financial
viability.
Some combinations of events
There are many plausible scenarios that can be written about how the key
external drivers of  Bai Bang’s profitability – the world price of  paper in US
dollars, the exchange rate between the dong and the US dollar, the effective
tariff  on imported paper and the price the company must pay for its logs –
will change over the medium to longer term. One possible scenario has the
following dimensions.
• world price of  paper declining by 1 per cent per year in real terms;
• an exchange rate of  VND16␣ 000 to the US dollar (30 per cent
devaluation relative to 1997 and 45 per cent devaluation relative to
1996);
• an effective tariff  on imported paper declining from 20 per cent now to 5
per cent from 2006 onwards; and
• prices for logs about 20 per cent above current prices.
Under these assumptions the dong price of  paper increases significantly despite
the fall in the US dollar price and the decline in tariff. The price increase is
more than sufficient to offset the increase in the price of  logs and the cost of
imported pulp for the mill to remain profitable over a 20 year projection period.
A second scenario which we analyse involves:
• world price of  paper declining by 1 per cent per year and effective tariff  on
imported paper declining from 20 per cent now to 5 per cent from 2006
onwards;
• prices for logs 30 per cent above current levels; and
• the dong remaining at its 1996 level against the US dollar
(US$1 = VND11␣ 100).
Under this scenario the mill would need to achieve productivity improvements
of  3 per cent per year to break even (discounted present value of  revenues to
equal discounted present value of  costs) over a 20 year projection horizon.
The required rate of  growth in productivity is small relative to the scope for
productivity gains at the mill.
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9 Achievement
of objectives
All the stated objectives for the Bai Bang project and its side projects have been
met. Paper is being produced, and the mill and forestry operations seem to be
operating on a sustainable basis. Implicit political objectives are also likely to
have been met, although it is not clear that Sweden has translated the goodwill
created by the project into strong commercial ties. Whether Sweden or Vietnam
got value for money for the SEK6.5 billion (in 1996 prices) depends on what the
alternative uses of the funds were and the valuation placed on the broader and
more intangible benefits of the project.
DID THE BAI BANG PROJECT achieve all the objectives set during its
life? Did the side projects achieve their objectives? How do the project’s
achievements line up against Sweden’s financial contribution? Most of  the
answers to these questions lie in the assessments of  the project presented in
earlier chapters. But, like all large development cooperation projects, Bai Bang
embraced a range of  implicit objectives, which shifted over time as perceptions
of  the role of  development cooperation altered and as challenges and
opportunities emerged to confront the project.
Chart 9.1 shows how the explicit objectives for the project (as built into project
memoranda) evolved over time. The design and implementation of  the project
would also have been influenced by the general objectives for Sida’s
development cooperation activities and a range of  implicit aims related to
broader domestic and international concerns.
Achievement of explicit objectives
Raise living standards by increasing domestic production of paper
The assessments presented in chapters 2 and 7 confirm that the overriding
objective has been met along with the project objectives identified at project
outset. However, the delays in meeting breakeven production levels mean
that the benefits to Vietnam have been less valuable than originally envisaged.
(Early project documentation spoke of  achieving the turnkey position in 1978
rather than 1982. An evaluation of  the project carried out in 1982 forecast
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9.1 Evaluation of project objectives
Main project
• Align all parts of the mill and put them into
production
• Establish a Vietnamese organisation able to run the
mill independently
Overriding objective
• Raise the standard of living in Vietnam by increasing
the supply of paper, mainly for educational purposes
Project objectives
• Complete investment phase and start operations
• Improve conditions so that Vietnam can run the
operation independently in a rational, smooth and
viable manner, and thereby slowly increase its
production of paper
Overriding objective
• Through production of paper mainly for educational
purposes, contribute to an increased standard of
living
Project objectives
• Create feasible conditions for sustainable
operations by Vietnamese management
• Create forestry organisation capable of supplying
mill with enough fibrous raw material in an
environmentally acceptable manner
Side projects
Initial overriding objective
To satisfy the country’s demand for paper from domestic production by expanding the existing
paper industry
Project objectives
• Investment in a pulp and paper industry
• Development of forestry activities, harvesting and transport
• Development of social infrastructure such as housing, roads and dispensaries
Subsequent objectives
1980
1973
1983 Housing project
• Supply employees with housing of good Vietnamese
standard
Training project
• Prepare Vietnamese labour for employment at the mill
Transport project
• Ensure transport facilities to and from the project
Soil and conservation project
• Ensure raw material supply to mill
• Maintain ecological balance
• Engage population in forestry to increase firewood
supplies
Training project
• Ensure availability of operational and maintenance
personnel with basic education at level appropriate
for modern processing industry
Technical Assistance Program
• Assist Bai Bang Paper Company in its transition to a
free market economy
1984
1986
1991
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that the mill would reach capacity annual production of  55␣ 000 tonnes in
1986 rather than 1996.)
The mill produced in the range of  30␣ 000 to 35␣ 000 tonnes of  paper for the
first time in 1986. It has sustained rates at or in excess of  this target since the
Swedish advisors left in 1990. In 1996 production exceeded the design capacity
at the mill. So the domestic production target has been met. The mill appears
to be financially viable in that it is able to finance from the retained profits the
additional investments required to maintain and increase production. The
economic viability of  the mill – its ability to remain profitable in an
environment of  no industry assistance – is not such a clear cut issue. This is
because the mill benefits from protection against imports and the range of
privileges that are accorded to state owned enterprises in Vietnam. These
privileges are, however, offset in part by the constraints on commercial
operation of  the mill caused by its relationship with VPC.
Domestic paper production capacity and output are now much higher than
they would have been without the project (assuming that other pulp and paper
projects would not have taken Bai Bang’s place). On balance, this additional
production is currently contributing to a higher standard of  living in Vietnam.
The snapshot cost–benefit analysis reported in chapter 7 indicates that the
project generated net benefits to the community in 1996 ranging from
VND23␣ 895 million to VND145␣ 857 million. If these net benefits had been
negative, it would have been possible to conclude that, while the project had
increased paper supply, it reduced standards of  living because the resources
employed could have generated a better return in other uses.
Swedish aid, and the Vietnamese contribution, could perhaps have been used
on activities with higher returns. However, while it is possible that other projects
might have generated higher benefits to Vietnam, it is highly unlikely – given
the small quantum of  Vietnamese resources used in the project – that the
project has reduced overall Vietnamese living standards over its life.
Subsequent objectives
Additional and amended objectives were articulated over time with the
conclusion of  successive contracts with the companies involved in
implementation of  various stages of  the project and with the initiation of  the
various side projects. As project implementation proceeded, significant
technical, social and economic challenges were encountered. This required
emphasising previously under-emphasised or subsidiary objectives. In addition,
shifts in the focus of  Sida’s general development cooperation program were
mirrored in additional objectives set for the project.
Broadly speaking, these additional objectives have all been met.
• BAPACO is running the mill now more effectively than at any stage when it
was reliant on Swedish advisors.
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• Overall, the forestry system is supplying the mill’s fibrous raw materials –
with positive environmental impacts through the extensive reforestation that
has been occurring.
• Mill employees enjoy housing standards equal to or better than their
counterparts throughout the economy.
• The training system – especially the Vocational Training School – is
producing well qualified workers across the range of  skills required by the
paper industry.
• The transport problems experienced in the early stages of  the project have
been countered.
• BAPACO was, compared with nearly all other state owned enterprises,
reasonably well equipped to operate in the new environment created by the
transition to a market economy. But the constraints imposed by VPC
jeopardise the viability of  the company, reflecting more than anything else
the incomplete nature of  the transition. It also reflects the difficulties of
state owned enterprise reforms and the conflicts created as Vietnam tries to
reconcile market orientation with a continued socialist ideology.
An important explicit objective on the Vietnamese side was that of  transfer
of  modern technology – to obtain a substantial upgrading of  Vietnam’s
technical capacity to produce pulp and paper. This objective has been achieved.
Implicit objectives
The creation of  a viable mill and forestry operation in the face of  very difficult
circumstances is attributable in large part to the enormous determination of
successive Swedish governments to make the project a success. While
stubbornness has been identified as a national characteristic, the commitment
of  the Swedish agencies and companies to making the project work, backed up
by a willingness to commit large expenditures, probably exceeds normal Swedish
resolution. Similar Swedish projects in other countries with less daunting objective
constraints have failed. The success of  Bai Bang is probably attributable to the
weight given to implicit objectives associated with the project.
Bai Bang was the flagship of  Sweden’s efforts to demonstrate solidarity with
the Vietnamese people in their efforts to end foreign intervention and later to
unify the country. As such, it had great political and, in the early days at least,
popular support.
Did the project meet underlying strategic and political objectives? Sweden’s
early commitment to Vietnam sent a strong signal of  the nation’s foreign
policy stance during the 1970s and may have yielded a significant payoff  in
cementing Sweden’s desired alignment during the Cold War.
In a narrower sense, the Bai Bang project certainly yielded significant benefits
to the pursuit of  Sweden’s bilateral relationships with Vietnam. The knowledge
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that Sida gained about Vietnamese institutional, social, political and economic
structures as the project worked its way through successive regions of  – for
Sida – uncharted territory, placed the organisation in a strong position to
develop other cooperation activities.
Bai Bang equipped Sweden to assist Vietnam in the ongoing process of  doi
moi. The project almost certainly made a direct contribution to the thinking
behind elements of  doi moi. As chapter 5 points out, Vietnamese agencies
involved in shaping state owned enterprise reforms were involved in the
attempts to inculcate the Scandinavian management model at BAPACO. More
generally, the knowledge and goodwill created by Sweden’s commitment to
the project earned Sweden an important ‘place at the table’ as a trusted source
of  advice on the transition to a market economy.
Promotion of  Swedish commercial interests would also have been an important
implicit objective of  the project. The choice of  forestry related activities for
the flagship project meant drawing upon technologies in which Sweden
specialised – increasing the likelihood that Swedish companies would win a
significant share of  the business created by the project. In the event, some 85
per cent of  the project outlays was paid to Swedish companies for supplying
equipment and services (Sandgren 1990).
Expectations about the outcomes of  the project would also be shaped by the
broader structure of  Sweden’s aid program for Vietnam and overall development
cooperation objectives. Given the very large expenditures on the project – and
the fact that the bulk of  these expenditures were beyond initial estimates – the
project had a significant effect on the structure and direction of  Sweden’s
development cooperation program. If  additional expenditures were financed
by reallocating funds from other aid projects, or from other expenditure
programs, then Bai Bang may have negatively impacted on the pursuit of  other
development cooperation or domestic socioeconomic objectives. In practice, it
seems that Bai Bang made it possible to meet ambitious aid delivery objectives
during the 1970s and early 1980s where there was growing pressure to identify
projects to which resources could be allocated and disbursed.
Achievement of objectives relative to the
Swedish financial contribution
Do the current achievements represent value for money for Sweden and for
Vietnam? Answering this question properly revolves very much around the
issue of  alternatives, and the evaluation of  the internal and external benefits
generated over the life of  the project. It is not readily answered by the snapshot
analysis around which the evaluation in this report is structured.
The net benefits that Vietnam received from the production of  paper at the
mill and associated processes in the production chain in 1996 have been
estimated using two different techniques:
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• the economywide model analysis (chapter 4); and
• the social cost–benefit analysis (chapter 7).
Each type of  analysis incorporates components the other does not have. In
particular, the economywide analysis incorporates multiplier effects and the
social cost–benefit analysis incorporates public benefits and costs.
The value for money question could be addressed in part by asking: would
Vietnam be receiving higher benefits if  the Swedish and Vietnamese resources
committed to the project over the years have been put to other uses? Nearly a
quarter of  a century after the key decisions on Bai Bang were made, it is
hardly possible to assess what other uses were possible – either then or at later
stages when decisions were made to commit additional resources to the project.
And value for money does not seem to have been an issue uppermost in Swedish
or Vietnamese minds at key decision points.
There is one crude measure, though, of  alternative uses. What if  the Swedish
funds had been invested in low risk financial investments and the interest used
to finance general imports into Vietnam? The SEK6.5 billion (in 1996 values)
expended on the project could have earned a rate of  interest of  around 8 per
cent in 1996 if  it had been invested in Swedish treasury bills. This would have
made some SEK495 million available to finance imports, equivalent to around
VND820 billion. This is over five times the estimated net benefit estimated in
1996 from the social cost–benefit analysis and nearly twice the national income
benefit estimated from the economywide model.
While this provides a possible benchmark against which to test the value for
money question, it does not represent a practical alternative – it would not
have been acceptable to either the Swedish or the Vietnamese authorities.
And there are also some important qualifiers to this comparison.
First, from the Vietnamese perspective, the real value of  the resources
transferred to Vietnam may have been less, perhaps much less, than SEK6.5
billion. It is distinctly possible that the supplies of  consulting services and
equipment earned excess profit from project contracts. Vietnamese accountants
valued the equipment installed at BAPACO in 1996 at much less than its cost
to the project. Cost padding is not unusual in aid contracts and the project
structure, using the principal contractor rather than an independent consultant
to advise Sida on project issues, would have reduced pressures to contain
costs. And there are numerous accounts of  equipment being damaged, stolen
and redirected from Bai Bang to other parts of  Vietnam. It would seem unfair
to ‘charge’ this against the Bai Bang project.
At the same time, there are significant spillover benefits from the project that
have not been captured in the cost–benefit analysis. For example, the major
reforestation efforts now underway in northern Vietnam may not have
occurred as quickly and as effectively without the mill demonstrating a
monetary value for timber. Less tangible, but perhaps more valuable, without
the project the Vietnamese authorities would not have had an operating
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example of  a commercially oriented industrial enterprise to turn to when
designing key reforms being implemented under doi moi.
From the Swedish perspective, the question boils down to how the implicit
objectives are valued and how well they are judged to have been met. Issues
here include:
• the values placed on having demonstrated solidarity with the Vietnamese
people; and
• the benefits for Sweden of  gaining a prominent ‘place at the table’ in the
dialogue with Vietnam and from being able to shape a more effective
development cooperation program from the lessons learned about conditions
in Vietnam (probably not an objective at the beginning of  the project).
Also important are the commercial benefits that Sweden has gained from the
project. There are two main elements to possible commercial benefits. The
first is the reflows to Swedish contractors. Whether these reflows delivered a
genuine benefit to the Swedish economy is not clear – depending upon the
possible alternative uses of  the resources devoted to meeting the contracts.
But there was most probably a benefit to the companies involved.
Swedish solidarity
movement demands
that USA stops
bombing Vietnam
in May 1972.
Photo © Jan
Colllsjöö/Pressens
bild AB.
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Country Number of Registered
projects capital
The project may also have generated commercial benefits by facilitating entry
for Swedish companies into Vietnamese markets, either as exporters or
investors. In practice, it does not seem that Swedish companies have taken as
much advantage of  the goodwill created by Bai Bang as might have been
expected. By the end of  1996, cumulative foreign direct investment projects
originating in Sweden accounted for just 1.4 per cent of  the registered capital
of  all foreign investment projects licensed in Vietnam since 1988 (table 9.2).
Similarly, Sweden accounted for less than 0.3 per cent of  Vietnam’s imports
in 1995.
9.2 Foreign direct investment in Vietnam by country of origin 1988–96
Country Number of Registered
projects capital
No. US$m
Singapore 151 4 322
Taiwan 286 3 917
Hong Kong 247 3 117
Japan 177 2 400
Korea 192 2 261
British Virgin Islands 53 1 486
Australia 67 1 074
France 98 979
USA 62 849
Malaysia 56 774
Thailand 94 761
Panama 6 665
Netherlands 31 560
Country Number of Registered
projects capital
No. US$m
Switzerland 21 551
United Kingdom 22 524
Sweden 8 375
Indonesia 17 316
Bahamas 1 264
Philippines 19 200
Russia 56 191
Bermuda 6 182
Cayman Islands 5 170
Canada 22 164
Germany 23 161
Others 148 708
Total 1 868 26 971
Source: GSO (1997).
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10 Is the project
relevant today?
As incomes grow in Vietnam, so does demand for paper. The project is
helping meet this demand in a sustainable fashion, and its technology, while
capital intensive, seems consistent with Vietnam’s needs. Hills denuded of
trees after the war are now being reforested, as the work on forestry interacts
with changes in land tenure arrangements. The mill has been relatively well
placed to cope with Vietnam’s increasingly market-based approach to eco-
nomic management. It faces problems, however, because reforms to the SOE
system still have a long way to go. Moreover, the mill is currently sheltered
behind high protection, and may face difficult adjustment problems as this
protection is phased out.
HOW RELEVANT TO VIETNAM is the project today, given the great
changes that have occurred in the 25 years since preliminary work began?
How do the structure and management of  the mill and the forestry system fit
in with the policies and reforms that are being implemented under doi moi? In
which areas is the project helping meet Vietnam’s main economic and social
policy objectives as the country enters the 21st century?
When the government of  Vietnam decided in 1986 to initiate the
comprehensive program of  restructuring and renovation known as doi moi, it
began a process that would fundamentally alter the economic landscape.
Profound changes have occurred in the institutions and policies surrounding
the forestry and paper industries. Many aspects of  the project that had fitted
poorly into the old system found a much more congenial environment, and
helped the mill thrive in ways that may have seemed impossible before the
last Swedish adviser left Bai Bang. But these changes also embraced a shift
away from self-reliance and autarky, and opened up the option of  relying on
foreign suppliers to meet the country’s demand for products like paper.
The project’s relevance to Vietnam today revolves around five issues:
• Vietnam’s need for paper – has an expansion in paper production capacity
been consistent with the country’s consumption priorities as the economy
has developed;
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• the sustainability of  the forestry base for the project – have the investments
in plantations and associated technology proved to be consistent with sensible
uses for the land and other resources that are involved;
• the mill technology – is it proving to be appropriate in the current
environment, and consistent with Vietnam’s underlying comparative
advantage;
• the commercial orientation of  the project – was the investment in inculcating
the Scandinavian management model worthwhile; and
• the overall competitiveness of  the project – is paper production at the mill
an efficient use of  Vietnamese resources?
Before addressing these issues, it is important to understand the scope and
depth of  the changes in economic management that have been occurring in
the last decade.
Vietnam’s economic reforms
Doi moi was not the first attempt at economic reform in Vietnam. In the decade
following formal reunification of  Vietnam the central planning system came
under great stress, prompting experiments with reform and partial
liberalisation. In 1981, for example, the government responded to a partial
breakdown of  the system with limited reforms, including a contract system
for agricultural production, legalisation of  ‘fence breaking’ by enterprises –
allowing some autonomy to trade in the open market after meeting centrally
planned targets – and some flexibility in setting salaries. But these changes
were insufficient to address the economic stagnation and macroeconomic
instability that characterised the period.
In 1986, the Sixth Party Congress adopted a program of  major reform of
the system of  economic management. This reform recognised the need to
abolish the system of  ‘bureaucratic centralised management based on state
subsidies’, and the move to ‘a multisector, market oriented’ economy that
included a role for the private sector. The decision in 1986 to undertake a
comprehensive restructuring and renovation process was made in the context
of  a gathering economic crisis. Partial liberalisation had failed to deal with
more deep rooted problems, and unsuccessful attempts to reduce
macroeconomic imbalances failed to stem a growing fiscal deficit and
accelerating inflation.
The initial focus of  reforms was on transforming economic institutions. Prior
to the Congress, a number of  decisions were issued on the family economy
and the role of  private cooperative and state sectors in agriculture.
Administrative constraints on private sector activity and domestic trade were
gradually relaxed, allowing rapid development of  private markets for
agricultural goods. In 1987 and 1988, the administrative structure was
rationalised and streamlined, and price reforms were accompanied by a
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reduction in rationing. Reforms in land allocation and the land use right system
formalised fundamental changes in the agricultural sector.
The reform process gained momentum as the crisis persisted, culminating in
a comprehensive break with the old system in 1989. Major institutional and
structural reforms were implemented. Some of  the key elements of  the
restructuring and renovation process are listed in box 10.1. These structural
changes have been accompanied by a strong stabilisation effort involving
hardening SOE budget constraints, increasing revenues, containing
expenditures and strengthening controls over monetary expansion. This effort
ended a long period of  hyperinflation, and increased confidence in the dong
and in the emerging financial system. The government has sought to cement
Vietnam’s entry into the multilateral and regional trading system, and to
regularise bilateral trading relations.
10.1 Key elements of the restructuring and renovation process
• Reversal of the process of collectivisation of agriculture by granting individuals and families long
term rights to use land
• price liberalisation to eliminate the ‘two price’ system that prevailed under central planning, and
removal of barriers to internal trade
• steps toward creation of a modern banking system, by splitting off the commercial banking functions
of the State Bank, and facilitating establishment of new foreign and domestically owned banks
• partial liberalisation of foreign investment and international trade
• foreign exchange market reforms and shifting to a more market determined exchange rate system
• reform of the state owned enterprise system through enterprise restructuring, introduction of new
approaches for management and oversight, and changing the relationship between SOEs and the
budget and the financial sector
• formal acceptance of the private sector and creation of a legal framework for the functioning of a
corporate sector
• budgetary reform, to change the basis of revenue raising to a more modern system of taxation,
and adoption of a more formalised expenditure planning and control system
Chart 10.2 shows some of  the main reforms that are affecting the operations
of  BAPACO.
• Trade and exchange reforms have opened the economy to international
trade and foreign investment. The imperatives for domestic production of
key commodities and reliance on aid to fund import of  capital and foreign
technology have been diluted.
• A market determined exchange rate has profoundly altered the relative prices
of  tradeable and nontradeable goods. These reforms have had a marked
effect on BAPACO’s operations. Before the reforms BAPACO was forced
to export to earn foreign exchange to enable it to purchase imported inputs.
Now it can exchange dong from domestic sales for foreign currency.
• SOE reforms are changing the structure of  the SOE sector, its governance
and links to the budget and the financial sector. They are also attempting to
place nonpublic service enterprises on a fully commercial footing and in some
cases, equitising them. At the same time, the reform process has involved the
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creation of  general corporations, such as VPC, with the supposed intention
of  assisting in the rationalisation of  SOEs, facilitating the termination of  line
ministry control, and realising economies of  scale in management. In practice,
however, the formation of  these corporations has had rather different effects.
The creation of  VPC has been associated with a diminution in the autonomy
and commercial functioning of  BAPACO.
• Under its process of  financial sector reform, Vietnam is creating a modern
financial sector out of  the old monobank system. SOEs are increasingly
only able to access credit on commercial terms but are also able to tap into
a wider range of  financial investments, including foreign exchange
borrowings. BAPACO, like other SOEs, is now subject to increasing financial
discipline as a result of  these changes.
• Revenue and expenditure reforms are changing the basis for funding the
activities of  central, provincial and local administrations, and changing the
interface between SOEs and the budget. Over time this could have important
implications for the financial viability of  BAPACO and the way it interacts
with the agencies of  government.
BAI BANG
PROJECT
Revenue reforms
• Replacing SOE contri-
butions by modern tax
system
• VAT, company tax
• Defining revenue base
of provinces, local and
central government
• Changing role of Natio-
nal Assembly, the
Executive and Provincial
People’s Committees
• Revising ministerial
structures and the civil
service
• Ownership
• Equitisation
• Budget links
• Structure
• Creation of General
Corporations
• Financing
• Commercialisation
• Tariffs and NTBs
• AFTA commitments
• WTO accession
• APEC membership
• Market based exchange
rate management
• Closing of access to
guaranteed loans
• Improved risk/credit
management in banks
• Access to forex loans
• Laws on foreign and
domestic investment
• Creation of legal frame-
work governing economic
transactions
• Labour laws defining
rights of workers
• Establishing formal role
for private sector
• Decollectivisation of
agriculture
• Establishing basis for
industrial land tenure
• End of direct subsidies
to SOEs
• Formalisation of public
investment program to
shape future investment
in SOEs
Public
administration
reforms SOE reforms
Trade and
exchange reforms
Financial sector
reforms
Legal reforms
Land tenure
reforms
Expenditure
reforms
10.2 Economic reforms impacting on the relevance of the Bai Bang project
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• Legal reforms are establishing the legislative framework for the operation
of  a market economy and providing a basis for legally enforceable contracts.
Laws on foreign and domestic investment mean that alternatives to state
investment in commercial sectors are now viable. These reforms are also
establishing the rights of  workers and the nature of  employment contracts.
• Land tenure reforms are having a profound impact on agricultural and
rural activities, and potentially could have important effects on BAPACO’s
access to workers and raw material as alternative occupations and uses
become easier to pursue. For example, allowing farmers to rent land for
forestry activities for up to 50 years and reducing government controls on
the growing of  logs has led to a strong move toward agroforestry and greatly
increased the potential supply of  wood to the mill.
• Public administration reforms are changing the roles of  the organs of  the
state, and redefining responsibilities and functions of  the various agencies.
Three elements of  these reforms are having a particular impact on the Bai
Bang project – land tenure reforms, trade and investment liberalisation, and
SOE reform. Their implications are discussed in more detail below. However,
the fundamental break with the system of  central planning, and the reliance
on the price system to shape the allocation of  resources have forced enterprises
like BAPACO to become market sensitive in ways that were not contemplated
in 1975.
The reforms implemented under doi moi have served to create an environment
much better suited to a large commercial operation based on exploitation of
the nation’s forestry resource than was the case when the project was developed.
In fact, the recent good production and financial performance of  the mill
would not have been possible without the reforms. In many ways, the project
is more relevant today than it ever seemed likely to be during the design and
development stage.
Vietnam’s demand for paper
In the early 1970s, when the Bai Bang project was being planned, Vietnam
was desperately short of  paper. Total annual paper production in the north
was about 25␣ 000 tonnes – about 1 kilogram per head of  population. The
project enabled Vietnam to substantially increase its paper production
capability and has made a major contribution to the future development of
this sector of  the economy.
Vietnam is a low income country experiencing rapid growth in per capita
incomes. As countries get richer, paper requirements increase. This is shown
in chart 10.3, which traces the relationship between per capita income and
per capita paper consumption across countries. The chart suggests that the
demands by Vietnamese citizens for paper will escalate rapidly over the next
decade should Vietnam’s strong growth continue. These paper demands will
need to be satisfied through a combination of  expansion in domestic
production and imports.
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Data source: Matussek and Stefan (1996).
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Vietnam’s 27 pulp mills and 93 paper mills have a current annual production
capacity of  about 240␣ 000 tonnes of  paper and 173␣ 000 tonnes of  pulp, with
Bai Bang being by far the most important contributor to this production.
Remaining needs are met by imports. By the year 2000 per capita consumption
of  paper will have reached between 4 and 5 kilograms per year, rising sharply
to about 12 kilograms per year by 2010.
The Bai Bang experience – in particular, the acquisition of  the full range of
skills and experience in domestic pulp and paper production, and the
establishment of  a successful program of  plantation development – has
provided Vietnam’s paper industry with the confidence to tackle an ambitious
domestic production expansion to help meet the increase in demand. This
experience has also shown that Vietnam has a number of  positive features
that should facilitate the development of  its domestic paper production
capability.
• It has a large forest region with climate and soil types capable of  generating
rapid wood fibre growth – trees such as acacia, styrax and eucalyptus can
be harvested for pulp logs on relatively short rotations of  8 to 10 years.
• It has a large, hardworking rural workforce located in these regions –
plantation development is labour intensive.
10.3 Per capita GNP and paper consumption
157
• It is well advanced in developing a technology and management system for
exploiting its wood resources in a sustainable way.
VPC (which is driven by executives who gained their industry experience at
Bai Bang) has ambitious production plans for the future. A production target
of  300␣ 000 tonnes of  paper per year has been set for the year 2000, with Bai
Bang producing one third of  this. The target for 2010 is 1.2 million tonnes,
with production at Bai Bang exceeding 200␣ 000 tonnes.
The major constraint to achieving this expansion in production is money to
finance the new investment required. Paper mills are highly capital intensive.
To boost Bai Bang’s capacity from 48␣ 000 tonnes to 61␣ 000 tonnes of  pulp
and from 55␣ 000 tonnes to 100␣ 000 tonnes of  paper by 2000 involves a
VND844 billion investment. To meet VPC’s production target for the year
2000 of  300␣ 000 tonnes of  paper will require investment capital of  over
VND1500 billion. Under VPC’s strategic development plan 85 per cent of
this capital will be from foreign sources. The expansion at Bai Bang is to be
debt funded through supplier credits or other forms of  financing. For other
projects the corporation sees joint ventures as the likely investment vehicle.
The extent to which the domestic economy will benefit from this expansion
will depend initially on the extent to which domestic paper production is
exposed to international competition. VPC’s production plans envisage a
continuation of  protection against imports for the sector to 2006, after which
Vietnam’s AFTA commitment will have required elimination of  non-tariff
barriers and a reduction of  tariffs on imports from ASEAN countries to a
maximum of  5 per cent.
Future demands in excess of  domestic production will be sourced from imports.
Global demand for wood fibres is projected to grow steadily over the medium
to longer term. Most forecasters are expecting global pulp and paper demand
growth of  between 2 and 3 per cent per year (average of  around 2.6 per cent)
to form a substantial part of  this wood fibre demand growth.
Some forecasters are expecting a significant global wood fibre deficit to emerge
by 2010. Any deficit will be closed by:
• increased use of  recovered paper;
• increasing supplies from existing and new plantations; and
• reduced demands through substitution with other products.
Unlike Indonesia, whose rapidly growing pulp industry will have to rely on
native forest fibre because of  inadequate supplies of  plantation wood,
Vietnam’s growth plans are based around plantation wood.
The strong global outlook for wood fibre demand is likely to make Vietnam’s
growing plantation industry increasingly valuable. The challenge for Vietnam’s
paper industry is to convert this wood fibre into paper in commercial operations
that do not require protection against imported paper to ensure their viability.
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The forestry base
As discussed in chapter 3, the current supply of  logs from the raw material
area is more than sufficient to meet BAPACO’s requirements. VPMC alone
has around 43 000 hectares under plantation, sufficient to support capacity
production at the mill, and there are substantial supplies available from private
growers, which already meet a significant share of  the mills needs.
The material supply position is thus markedly different from the situation
when the project was still receiving Swedish support. Plantation development
in the raw material area has accelerated over the past five years. This is
attributable to a number of  factors linked to the project and the economic
reforms.
The main impact of  the reforms has been through improvements in land
tenure arrangements, which have led to the allocation of  state forest land to
private individuals. The new arrangements, which can provide secure tenure
for up to 50 years, provide private farmers with a strong incentive to engage
in farm forestry. The reforms have also made it possible to experiment with
alternative forms of  land contracts based on subsidised seedlings, extension
services and revenue sharing arrangements with government and local
authorities. Together with changes in the pricing system (allowing market
valuations to shape log prices), these reforms addressed some of  the financial
constraints that farmers and forest workers would otherwise face.
These changes have removed many of  the impediments that stood in the way
of  forestry development in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, the project
itself  made a very important contribution by establishing a sustained,
commercial demand for logs. The benefits or reforestation may have been
much more difficult to pursue without the mill providing clear signals of  the
returns to be made from growing trees.
Mill technology and management
One of  the big concerns about the project was that it involved establishing –
in a low income, largely undeveloped, labour intensive, centrally planned
economy – a sophisticated, capital intensive industrial complex designed for
commercial operation in an industrialised economy. Past and concurrent
experience with other industrial projects being developed in cooperation with
the Soviet bloc provided little reason to be optimistic about the adaptability
of  the project to the prevailing system.
However, as discussed in chapter 2, technically, the mill is performing at
acceptable levels. It is a reasonable example of  a national mill oriented toward
the domestic market. There are now more sophisticated and capital intensive
industrial plants in operation in Vietnam – although few are run without joint
venture arrangements with foreign partners. Vietnam remains an economy
with a strong comparative advantage in labour intensive activities. However,
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it is also becoming clear that it has a comparative advantage in growing pulp
logs. A capital intensive mill may still be consistent with the country’s overall
resource endowment, if  it is the appropriate way to exploit the capacity to be
an economically efficient grower of  logs.
There are some aspects of  the mill design that with hindsight would not be
replicated. These include the provision of  only one power boiler, and the
mismatch between the capacities of  the pulp and paper units. The mill was
also designed to provide relatively low quality paper in an autarkic economy,
where the need to match the quality of  internationally traded product was
not considered. This has meant that additional investments have been required
as the markets demands have changed – especially the demand for higher
quality paper for copying and computer printers.
Fortunately, the liberalisation of  trade and exchange policy, and opening up
the economy to foreign investment has meant that BAPACO is able to address
investment and capital importation requirements on a reasonably commercial
basis. Before doi moi, the mill was obliged to find export markets for its output
in order to acquire foreign exchange for imported equipment. Now, it can (in
principle, at least) purchase foreign exchange from its bank.
Mill management
Another major decision element in the project concerned the choice of
management models to be associated with the mill. During the 1980s the
Swedish advisers and Vietnamese managers struggled to implement a
commercially oriented management system in the context of  a centrally
planned, subsidy economy.
These efforts were aimed at establishing management systems and cultures
consistent with an operating environment for the mill in which it would:
• have immediate access to its own funds and customer revenues without
higher approval;
• be able to decide independently how it uses the money and other resources
at its disposal;
• be subject to strong financial constraints – the need to generate cash flows
and accounting profits to guarantee survival; and
• take responsibility for the outcomes of  its decisions, with closure or takeover
as a consequence of  too many mistakes.
This approach to management has become increasingly relevant as Vietnam
has pursued deeper reforms to the state enterprise system. In fact, familiarity
with commercial management methods has placed the mill in a good position
to adapt to the new environment created by the reforms. However, as discussed
below, there are many feature of  the state enterprise system which continue
to constrain fully commercial operations at Bai Bang.
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Special orders are
prepared by women
in the mill.
Photo: A Berlin.
Competitiveness
The project was not originally designed with international competitiveness as
a major – or even incidental – consideration. However, with the steps being
taken to integrate Vietnam into the regional and world economy, the ability
of  the mill to meet international competition with minimal government
assistance is becoming a concern. And the economic efficiency with which
the mill uses the nation’s resources should always have been a concern, even
if  not explicitly addressed in the project objectives.
While all of  the policy changes described above are impacting on the project,
policies towards state enterprises and toward trade and exchange are having
direct effects on the competitiveness of  BAPACO.
State enterprise policies
Early state enterprise reforms introduced around 1986 aimed at increasing
autonomy and profit orientation in SOEs, reducing budgetary support and
the role of  central plan direction. While the enterprises remained under
ownership of  the people, their assets were placed under the management of
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the workers and directors. A second wave of  reforms starting in 1991 focused
on reorganising and consolidating the state enterprise sector. A large number
of  small enterprises were liquidated or merged with other businesses. The
Law on State Enterprises introduced in 1995 established SOEs as separate
legal entities with limited liability, and clarified responsibility and accountability
regarding management and exercise of  ownership rights. The law brought
state enterprises much more into line with the concept of  a commercially
oriented enterprise on which the Scandinavian management model was based.
In particular, the law:
• clarified rights regarding the establishment and dissolution of  SOEs and
the role of  the government in the exercise of  ownership rights in these
enterprises, which can be delegated to central government ministries or the
people’s committees of  provinces and municipalities;
• defined the rights and responsibilities of  SOEs, including rights regarding
divestiture and equitisation, and the disposition of  assets;
• defined rights and responsibilities of  chief  executives and boards of
management;
• required SOEs to produce annual reports, including financial reports, and
to be subject to audits; and
• clarified the rights of  chief  executives in day-to-day decision making, the
rights to consultation of  the workers’ collectives and the role of  state
management agencies.
The government has also initiated a process of  equitisation, through which
workers and other interested parties are able to take stakes in selected
enterprises, and more recently established the legal framework for leasing
and outright divestiture of  enterprises. To date, equitisation has been fairly
limited, and restricted to small businesses. It is not envisaged to include
BAPACO.
Another important element of  the restructuring of  the state enterprise system
was the process of  creating state corporations (of  which VPC is one). Some
eighteen general corporations and 64 smaller special corporations have been
formed since the enabling legislation was introduced in 1994, with hundreds
of  enterprises becoming members of  a corporation.
Trade policies
Vietnam’s approach to international trade has changed profoundly since the
1980s. The country’s earlier approach to economic development focused on
self-reliance. Foreign trade was subject to central planning decisions and carried
out by a few state trading enterprises that monopolised classes of  products.
International prices had little effect on domestic prices and foreign exchange
was allocated through a complex system involving multiple exchange rates.
Imports were controlled through licenses, quotas and administrative controls,
and exports were largely driven by government negotiated quotas.
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Trade is now much more market driven. Liberalisation of  the trade and
exchange system has proceeded on five main fronts:
• phasing out of  foreign exchange controls and adoption of  a more market
oriented exchange rate policy, accompanying large scale restructuring of
the financial system;
• relaxation of  controls on entry into foreign trading activities;
• relaxation of  controls used to manage imports and exports;
• creation and amendment of  a system of  taxation of  imports and exports,
as part of  a comprehensive change in the revenue raising system; and
• joining regional and multilateral trading arrangements.
These actions have accompanied efforts to create a legal and regulatory
framework to permit and encourage foreign investment.
Despite these actions, which are described in more detail in appendix 10A,
important features of  the old regime linger on. An intricate framework of
administrative and legislative barriers to trade is still in force. Current account
payments – interest, profit repatriations, etc. – are still not free of  restriction,
and capital repatriation for foreign investors is not guaranteed. Imports of
key inputs and consumables are controlled according to administrative
assessments of  the balance between domestic demand and domestic supply.
The import tariff  system provides high levels of  protection to a range of  local
production, and is subject to frequent changes and inconsistent
implementation.
More fundamentally, trade is still manipulated with a view to its effects on
other aspects of  economic and enterprise management. State owned
enterprises play a leading role in the economy, and remain important sources
of  resources and influence for central, provincial and local authorities and
agencies. The interests of  SOEs play a disproportionate role in the
determination of  trade policy, a situation facilitated by the continued close
links between certain enterprises and policy making ministries. But at the
same time it appears that trade policies are shaped with a view to controlling
SOEs in the absence of  full fiscal and financial disciplines as well as to
restraining competition and maintaining SOE revenues.
Paper is one of  the products for which imports are closely controlled – imports
of  the type of  paper products made by BAPACO and other mills are subject
to bans from time to time, and the tariff  has been raised to 40 per cent.
However, under its obligations as a member of  the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA), Vietnam is expected to eliminate quantitative restrictions on paper
imports by the beginning of  2003, and reduce the tariff  on imports of  these
products from ASEAN countries to 0 to 5 per cent by 2006.
Implications for the project
The implications for BAPACO and its suppliers of  the trade and state
enterprise reforms implemented to date are rather mixed.
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The paper industry remains somewhat insulated from the world market,
because of  the frequent use of  quotas and prohibitions on imports of
competing products. However, the impact of  these controls on BAPACO’s
ability to set prices in excess of  world prices and for the industry to sustain
much higher levels of  production is somewhat constrained. Paper is one of
the products that is explicitly managed by central authorities to (supposedly)
maintain financial and commodity balances in the economy.
For these products, the Ministry of  Trade, in consultation with the Ministry
of  Planning and Investment and relevant line ministries, develops an annual
plan for imports based on assessments of  likely demand and local production.
A physical quota/target for imports is announced, and the right and/or
responsibility to import set amounts is allocated to selected enterprises. But
once an importer receives a license to import paper there are no checks on
how much paper is imported under license. And some foreign paper is also
smuggled into Vietnam.
The approach to managing trade in this way causes a number of  problems.
The signals sent to producers and would-be producers seem to be that their
market may be guaranteed, regardless of  price or quality, if  sufficient capacity
is installed. This may be a particularly serious problem when new investments
are being contemplated, especially since all of  the products affected are
produced by state enterprises or foreign joint ventures with state enterprises.
As noted by Kokko and Zejan in a 1996 recent review of  developments in
Vietnam:
...Vietnamese import substitution takes a form that creates strong interest
groups that may oppose or delay the eventual shift to more neutral policies.
Import substitution is largely carried out by SOEs, often in joint ventures
with foreign MNCs, both groups of  firms wield considerable political
influence and are likely to become powerful supporters of  protectionism
since they benefit form the rents that are created by the policy. (Kokko
and Zejan, 1996)
In some cases where there are strong interest groups favouring access to cheaper
products, or to the rents that accrue from access to the right to undertake
restricted imports, the policies are often in a state of  flux. Sometimes the
quotas are set very high, and importers build up stock, expecting that quota
in later years may be reduced. In the case of  paper, quotas have been replaced
by outright prohibitions on imports of  paper that can be made in Vietnam.
However, such bans are manipulated and exempted on an irregular basis.
The effect is that – contrary to stated objectives – the domestic market is
destabilised, leading to windfall profits and losses for traders and consumers
alike. The paper market, like others subject to this kind of  management is
constantly subject to what are described in the press as ‘fevers’, ‘gluts’ and
‘stockpiles’.
The instability in the market, and the continued prospect of  adverse policy
intervention means that paper producers may not be able to exploit the
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protection apparently accorded by the presence of  import restrictions.
BAPACO’s relationship with VPC also erodes the benefit that BAPACO gains
from protection. As discussed in chapter 2, membership of  VPC hampers
BAPACO’s ability to operate on a fully commercial basis in a number of  ways.
• It cannot set its prices – all prices are set by VPC – severely restricting its
ability to adjust to changing international prices and to adopt marginal cost
pricing to meet competition.
• It does not control marketing or most of  its sales– the major markets are
controlled and served by agents of  VPC. And, since VPC sells on a
consignment basis, this impacts quite significantly on BAPACO’s cash flow.
• It does not retain its depreciation fund – VPC appropriates the fund and
allocates according to its priorities.
• It must seek approval for all investment projects from VPC (as well as line
and central ministries).
• It is obliged to surrender a share of  after tax profits to VPC – a proportion
of  the various funds to which profits are allocated is taken by VPC.
• It cannot engage in international trade on its own behalf. All imports of
inputs are undertaken, on commission, by VPC’s trading arm.
• It cannot source its raw materials freely – all fibrous raw material must be
purchased through VPMC, another member of  VPC.
• It can be obliged to absorb unprofitable members of  VPC, and transfer
management and staff  to other mills in the group.
The restrictions on BAPACO’s autonomy are almost certainly impacting on
its market position. Unless this situation is changed, the problem may become
more severe as Vietnam phases out paper protection according to its
international trade agreements.
As the analysis in chapter 8 has indicated, the mill may have to achieve
significant cost reductions if  it is to break even in net present value terms after
protection is phased out. Further and perhaps more radical reforms in the
state enterprise management system may be required if  the mill is to remain
financially viable in the longer term.
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11 Lessons – understanding
conditions for sustainable
development
Against many expectations, Bai Bang has proved to be an example of a sustain-
able development cooperation project. Commitment and perseverance on the
Swedish and Vietnamese sides were essential elements of its success. But
more important have been the fundamental changes in economic management
that occurred as the project developed. The project carried an extensive set of
implicit political and strategic objectives that ensured continued funding despite
extraordinary cost overruns. It is unlikely that a similar project would be consid-
ered today, given the shift in development cooperation paradigm since the
1970s. But it is also unlikely that projects consistent with the new model would
have been feasible when Bai Bang was being developed.
WHAT LESSONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION can be
learnt from the Bai Bang project? What are the lessons about the fundamental
conditions for sustainable development?
The evaluation presented in this report suggests that the Bai Bang project has
met most criteria of  sustainability.
• The pulp and paper mill is technically sound and financially viable (when
the original capital costs are treated as sunk).
• The handover to local management has been very successful with the mill
achieving its best performance long after the departure of  the Swedish
advisers.
• The forestry activities have helped promote a major reforestation of
previously bare hills with limited alternative uses.
• The environmental damage caused by industrial processes is relatively small.
• The training activities have helped expand Vietnam’s stock of  essential
industrial skills, and the Vocational Training School is maintaining a supply
of  appropriately skilled labour for BAPACO and the paper industry overall.
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• The project has produced a significant localised improvement in living
standards.
• The mill is probably economically viable, although it is difficult to measure
the full effect of  the policy distortions surrounding its operation. While
protection against imports may be high, other elements of  the environment
offset the benefit that is accorded by protection. So, by producing paper
with a positive social value, the project is helping to improve living standards
of  the Vietnamese people generally.
The question we are unable to answer effectively is whether alternative uses
of  the Vietnamese and Swedish resources consumed by the project would
have generated a greater impact on living standards. However, compared
with many other development cooperation projects, Bai Bang appears to be a
success. This leads to the subject of  this chapter: what aspects (if  any) of  the
project selection, design, management and implementation processes
associated with the project are responsible for this apparent success? In turn
this leads to the question: can any answers to this question be used to guide
future development cooperation?
Models of development cooperation
At the outset, it is important to recognise that Sida is unlikely to fund a project
like Bai Bang again in Vietnam or anywhere else. This is partly because the
approach to development cooperation and the theories of  development that
underpin it have changed markedly since the 1970s. It is also because, with
the increasing reach of  private capital flows into developing economies, the
case for aid funding of  large industrial projects – never strong – has diminished
markedly in the last couple of  decades.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, when the project concept was being developed,
much, though not all, of  the development literature focused on the idea that
limited availability of  physical capital, investible funds and foreign exchange
were the major determinants of  slower development in some countries.
In this framework, capital intensive projects using large injections of  imported
equipment seemed to be appropriate vehicles for delivering development
assistance. Development was seen to be commensurate with industrialisation
so that resources were channeled away from agriculture into secondary
industry. Pessimism about the export prospects for developing countries and
the emphasis placed on conserving foreign exchange fuelled a strong preference
for import substitution strategies for industrial development. And prevailing
views about the relative role of  the private and public sector made it easier to
accommodate directing large amounts of  aid at state owned enterprises within
planned economies.
One (admittedly rather jaundiced) view on development economics
characterised the then prevailing theories of  development in the following
terms.
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External trade is at best ineffective for the economic advance of  less
developed countries (ldcs), and more often it is damaging. Instead, the
advance of  ldcs depends on ample supplies of  capital to provide for
infrastructure, for the rapid growth of  manufacturing industry, and for
the modernisation of  their economies and societies. The capital required
cannot be generated in the ldcs themselves because of  the inflexible and
inexorable constraint of  low incomes (the vicious circle of  poverty and
stagnation), reinforced by the international demonstration effect and by
the lack of  privately profitable investment opportunities in poor countries
with their inherently limited local markets. General backwardness,
economic unresponsiveness and the lack of  enterprise are well-nigh
universal within the less developed world. Therefore if  significant economic
advance is to be achieved, governments have an indispensable as well as a
comprehensive role in carrying through the critical and large-scale changes
necessary to break down the formidable obstacles to, and initiate and sustain
the process of, growth. (Bauer 1984, p. 1)
Current approaches to development cooperation are informed by a very
different set of  views about the determinants of  improved wellbeing in poorer
countries. The World Bank – not the only source of  thinking about
development cooperation, but perhaps representative of  elements of
mainstream ideas – stresses that development is about much more than higher
incomes, and:
…encompasses, as ends in themselves, better education, higher standards
of  health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality
of  opportunity, greater individual freedom and a richer cultural life. (World
Bank 1991)
Accordingly, development cooperation has shifted to addressing these ends
more directly, and assisting in the development of  institutions and capacities
that are consistent with a more focused view on the role of  the state and the
benefits of openness and competition.
Given this shift in thinking about development cooperation, and the limited
role that projects like Bai Bang have in Sida’s current approach, there are
limits on the usefulness of  the lessons from Bai Bang. Many have already
been incorporated in the change in the structure and focus of  Sida’s
cooperation programs. Even so, some key messages do emerge from the Bai
Bang experience and they are worth documenting. And it is worth pointing
out that it is unlikely that the kind of  project that Sida is now supporting in
Vietnam would have been conceivable in the early 1970s. In some important
ways, the Bai Bang project paved the way for a different type of  cooperation
activity in Vietnam, if  only because it helped to cement confidence about the
intentions of  countries approaching cooperation from very different cultural,
political and economic perspectives.
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The lessons of Bai Bang
Policies and institutions matter – a lot
One compelling lesson from the Bai Bang experience is that the development
of  market institutions, prudent macroeconomic management, open trade
policies and promotion of  competition are really important. Much of  the
reason why the mill and associated forestry activities are sustainable is because
of  the changes brought about by doi moi.
It is open to question whether the successful creation of  sustainable forest
development would have been possible without the changes in land tenure
and the decollectivisation of  the forestry system. The mill would almost
certainly not be financially viable – independent of  subsidies from the budget
or the financial system – without the liberalisation of  the pricing system and
the expanded autonomy given to state enterprises. Nor would its productivity
performance have been achievable without the shift toward performance based
remuneration. The recent investments that have improved quality and
productivity may not have been possible without the adoption of  more market
oriented trade and exchange policies. And the spread of  improved incomes
in the districts surrounding the mill would not have been possible without the
sanctioning of  private business activities.
As discussed in chapter 9, the project almost certainly helped the economic
reform process. It helped directly by exposing policy makers to alternatives –
in enterprise management, technological capabilities, and wealth. It helped
indirectly because it gave Sweden a place at the table in advising Vietnam as
it attempted to chart the difficult waters of  economic and institutional change.
But, overall, it was very fortunate for the project that Vietnam embarked upon
its profound reforms just as the operational phase was being started.
Perseverance and commitment pay
Perseverance clearly can pay off. Without it the project would not have been
brought to a successful conclusion. Support at the highest political levels, and
throughout lower levels of  government and society, is necessary if  a venture of
Bai Bang’s scale is to be successful. It is not only the perseverance and optimism
of  the Swedish side that is important. The failure of  similar projects in other
countries (such as the Mufindi pulp and paper project in Tanzania, which was
part sponsored by Sida) shows how strong the commitment and dedication by
the cooperation partner has to be to make complex projects work.
Receptivity and flexibility are important
Both Swedish and Vietnamese participants in the project had to make
considerable adjustments during the course of  the project. Mechanisms for
adjusting project elements, accommodating shifting priorities and responding
to profound changes in the project environment are important in long term
projects. So are processes for quickly achieving mutually acceptable outcomes
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when there are conflicts. This points to the importance of  structures for
interactions between cooperation partners.
Research is essential
Sweden’s willingness to provide additional resources to address each problem as it
arose was also important in bringing the technical aspects to a successful conclusion.
But the cost overrun experience of  the project highlights the risks of  making
commitments without first gathering good information about the physical and
socioeconomic context for projects. It must be recognised, however, that the
circumstances prevailing at the time that the project decisions were made would
have made it very difficult to address the information problems and still move
quickly to give effect to the political imperatives in play at the time.
Local ownership of projects is essential
The institutional framework for project implementation is very important.
The transfer of  implementation responsibility to local institutions seemed to
make a big difference to progress in completing project construction activities
and the ultimate handover process. Operation of  the mill improved when the
mode of  foreign involvement shifted from operational responsibility to
provision of  advice. This was assisted by the adoption of  an explicit strategy
for phasing out Swedish assistance, which focused attention on empowering
Vietnamese managers and workers to take control of  the mill.
Cultural differences should be prepared for
Project planners had a poor understanding of  what Vietnamese society looked
like in social and cultural terms at the time. As a consequence, the enormous
cultural gap between Swedes and Vietnamese was not appreciated, leading
to frequent cultural misunderstandings.
Project design and implementation modalities should address the management
of  cultural issues. The clash of  approaches to many aspects of  industrial
management, accountability and responsibility within enterprises experienced
during the project was unavoidable and, in the longer term, probably very
productive. However, there were clearly problems in communication and
addressing mismatched expectations that hindered progress. Advisers and
foreign workers may need to be trained in handling cross-cultural
communication and project managers need to be informed about the
institutional, socioeconomic and cultural context in which they will be
operating.
Conditions for sustainable development
Our analysis in earlier chapters shows that the mill meets most conditions of
sustainability.
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• The mill is technically and financially sustainable.
• Its associated forestry operations are ecologically sustainable.
• Mill and forestry activities are socially sustainable.
• Because of  its reliance on tariff  protection, the mill is not yet economically
sustainable. But we are optimistic that, if  the mill is allowed to operate as an
independent financial enterprise, it has good prospects for funding the
necessary new investment and achieving the required cost reductions to
ensure its economic sustainability.
The Bai Bang project is in many ways both a good and a bad example from
which to draw conclusions about the conditions for sustainable development.
It is a bad example because it was such an unusual project, driven by strong
political imperatives that transcended many normal considerations of
development project design and implementation. Its success is attributable in
large part to the perseverance that the political commitment carried in its
train. It is a good example because it demonstrates that improvements in
economic wellbeing in developing countries has as much to do with institutions,
policies and building human capital as it does with individual industrial projects
and transfers of  physical capital.
As this report states in a number of  places, it is open to question whether any
other kind of  project would have been possible at the time that Bai Bang was
being conceived. And, by sticking with the project through enormous
difficulties, Sweden and Vietnam learnt a great deal that was useful in pursuing
other forms of  cooperation and in facilitating the great adventure of  doi moi
on which Vietnam is now engaged. But the time and place for projects like
Bai Bang is clearly past.
After the Swedes left
the project the
Vietnamese fine
tuned the mill to a
seemingly
sustainable entity.
Expansion is
planned, but state
intervention is still a
threat to long term
sustainability.
Photo © Paul
Rimmerfors.
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Paper, prices and politics
Sweden’s protest against the Vietnam War was given tangible form in
1969 through the decision to give economic aid to the Government of
North Vietnam. The main outcome was an integrated pulp and paper
mill in the Vinh Phu Province north-west of Hanoi. Known as Bai Bang
after its location, the mill became the most costly, one of the longest
lasting and the most controversial project in the history of Swedish
development cooperation. 
In 1996 Bai Bang produced at its full capacity. Today the mill is 
exclusively managed and staffed by the Vietnamese and there are
plans for future expansion. At the same time a substantial amount of
money has been spent to reach these achievements. Looking back at
the cumbersome history of the project the results are against many’s
expectations. To learn more about the conditions for sustainable 
development Sida commissioned two studies of the Bai Bang project.
Together they touch upon several important issues in development
cooperation over a period of almost 30 years: the change of aid 
paradigms over time, the role of foreign policy in development 
cooperation, cultural obstacles, recipient responsibility versus donor
led development etc.
The two studies were commissioned by Sida’s Department for
Evaluation and Internal Audit which is an independent department 
reporting directly to Sida’s Board of Directors. One study assesses the
financial and economic viability of the pulp and paper mill and the 
broader development impact of the project in Vietnam. It has been 
carried out by the Centre for International Economics, an Australian 
private economic research agency. The other study analyses the 
decision-making processes that created and shaped the project over a
period of two decades, and reflects on lessons from the project for
development cooperation in general. This study has been carried out
by the Chr. Michelsen Institute, a Norweigan independent research
institution.
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